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Abstract 
Prosociality is considered important in the study of offenders and offending 
behaviours. This is explained by the belief that the risk of offending is lowered if a 
person is possessed of certain prosocial skills. As a consequence HM Prison and 
Probation Service has developed several rehabilitative interventions aimed at 
improving these skills in offenders. However, despite the recognition that 
psychometric measurements can provide an understanding of individual cognitive 
abilities, the most recently developed programme does not currently require potential 
participants to be pre-screened for these skills.  
Across four separate studies the overriding aim of this thesis was to establish 
if certain individual prosocial abilities should be considered when designing new, or 
when making refinements to existing, interventions aimed at addressing recidivism. 
To do this, four hundred participants (comprising male and female, offenders and 
non-offenders) completed seven questionnaires, measuring abilities in Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, Executive Functioning (as 
determined by Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control), and 
levels of Social Capital.  
Study 1 focused on the influence of age on the development of prosociality 
and concluded that it may not be a limiting factor. Study 2 addressed the issue of 
gender and observed that differences could be detected in specific prosocial skills. 
Study 3 noted the influence of prosociality on Social Capital, but found no difference 
in perceived levels between offenders and non-offenders. Finally study 4 offered 
additional insight into the assessment of prosociality by noting the predictive 
abilities of Executive Functioning. 
 
 
Whilst each study adds to the theoretical knowledge surrounding the 
constructs of prosocial and offending behaviours, the findings may also be of interest 
to those involved in the designing or delivering of rehabilitative programmes aimed 
at improving prosocial abilities, thus benefiting society in the goal of lowering levels 
of recidivism in the UK. 
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The word ‘status’ throughout this thesis refers to whether the participant is an 
offender or non-offender and the word ‘gender’ throughout this thesis refers to 
whether the participant is male or female. 
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Chapter One 
The Introduction 
 
 
‘… nature teaches the spectators to take on the situation of  
  the sufferer, and teaches the sufferer to go some way in 
   taking on the situation of the spectators…the effect of this is to  
   lower the violence of his passion’ (Smith, 1790, p. 10). 
 
 
 
1.1: Research Background. 
 
Prosocial behaviour is said to define humanity (Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009). 
As a consequence, an understanding of prosocial behaviour, as well as the constructs 
that support it, is important when considering research and practice within the 
Criminal Justice System (Lam, 2012). In particular, research exploring prosociality 
is considered key in the study of offenders and offending behaviours (Towl & 
Crighton , 2010); something explained by the assertion that the risk of offending 
behaviour is lowered if a person is possessed of certain prosocial skills (Prior & 
Paris, 2005). Further, it has been suggested that the absence of, or reduced 
functioning in prosociality may contribute to the emergence of offending behaviours 
(Farrington, 2010; Palmer, 2013). 
 It has been recognised within the Criminal Justice System that punishment 
alone does not always reduce offending behaviours (Nagin & Snodgrass, 2013). To 
address this HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), as part of the Criminal 
Justice System, has developed a number of rehabilitative interventions aimed at 
2 
 
improving levels of prosociality in offenders (Palmer, 2013). However, evidence 
relating to the success of these programmes has been mixed (Harper & Chitty, 2005). 
For example, whilst early findings relating to the Enhanced Thinking Skills (ETS) 
programme demonstrated a statistically significant reduction in reconviction rates at 
the one year mark (Friendship, Blud, Erikson, & Travers, 2002), research at two 
years found little or no difference between those who took part in the programme 
and those who did not (Falshaw, Friendship, Travers, & Nugent, 2003; Cann, 
Falshaw, Nugent, & Friendship, 2003; Cann, 2006; McDougall, Clarbour, Perry, & 
Bowles, 2009).  In 2009 ETS was replaced by the Thinking Skills Programme (TSP), 
and whilst early reports suggest a positive impact on the attitudes of participating 
offenders, the gradual role out of the programme within the prison estate means that 
data relating to recidivism is unavailable (Gobbett & Sellen, 2014). However, the 
theoretical premise, that programmes aimed at improving prosocial abilities in 
offenders have a positive effect on reoffending levels, remains robust (Prior & Paris, 
2005). It is from this view that the aims and objectives of this thesis were developed.   
 
1.2: Research Rationale. 
 
Prosociality is commonly described as any voluntary, intentional behaviour 
that produces a beneficial outcome for the recipient where the cost to the donor is not 
considered (Grusec, Goodnow, & Kuczynski, 2000).  Of particular interest to this 
thesis, is the notion that an adequate level of prosocial understanding is necessary for 
effective and non-criminal social adaptation (Spenser, Betts, & das Gupta, 2015). 
However, prosociality is not a singular construct but rather requires the acquisition 
of a number of key skills (Sharp, 2008). This thesis will focus on three of those key 
skills: Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978); Empathic Understanding 
3 
 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005); and, Moral Reasoning (Gibbs, 
Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), which are said to work in combination to facilitate 
socially appropriate behaviour. Indeed, when utilised successfully, these skills are 
said to enable people to exercise self-control when tempted to do wrong, and feel 
guilt and remorse about any perceived wrongdoing (Singer & Klimecki, 2014).  
As noted in section 1.1 of this chapter, the theoretical knowledge relating to 
prosocial behaviour underpins a number of rehabilitative interventions within 
HMPPS. In particular, TSP considers a number of cognitive factors that are related 
to prosociality (Ministry of Justice, 2010); three of which appear to mirror the 
constructs of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning:  
(i) firstly, the ‘Stop and Think’ principle aims at helping offenders to 
‘see’ situations from a number of different perspectives in order to 
resolve issues and solve problems (Lösel & Beelmamm, 2005).  
(ii) secondly, the offender is encouraged to recognise and manage his or 
her own emotions, as well as those of others, and subsequently make 
more effective and controlled life decisions (Solomon, 2007).  
(iii) lastly, in order to make moral decisions from a socially acceptable 
perspective, the offender is encouraged to consider behaviours from 
the point of view of society, as well as his or her own personal values 
(Ward & Nee, 2009).  
Also noted earlier in this chapter, TSP was introduced in 2009 following, and 
in partial response to, the lack of success in relation to ETS (Sadlier, 2010). 
However, there are a number of potential issues in relation to TSP (Spenser et al., 
2015) that are relevant to the current thesis. Firstly, whilst it is recognised that 
psychometric measurements can provide an understanding of individual cognitive 
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abilities (Towl & Crighton, 2010) TSP does not require potential participants to be 
pre-screened in these areas. Instead the programme appears to assume that all 
partakers have a similar, albeit reduced, level on which the programme can build 
(Spenser et al., 2015). The second and third issues are related to gender and age. As 
with many other interventions adopted by the HMPPS, TSP is considered ‘gender 
neutral’ (Sadlier, 2010). However, Corston  (2007, p.3) recommended the creation of 
a “distinct…woman-centred …approach” to the rehabilitation of female offenders. It 
should therefore be considered that gender differences in Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning may exist. Similarly, in terms of age, whilst 
the acquisition of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning is 
thought to begin in early childhood (Grusec et al., 2000; Smith, Cowie, & Blades, 
2003), it is not fully understood whether each construct continues to change across 
adolescence and into adulthood (Smith et al., 2003). As a result it is not known how 
the age of a participant might affect his or her ability to make prosocial 
improvements.  
Taking a wider perspective, there are two further areas of specific interest to 
this thesis: Social Capital and Executive Functioning. As part of the TSP programme 
offenders are encouraged to build Social Capital (Ministry of Justice, 2010). This 
notion was underpinned by Adler and Kwon (2002) who noted that the quantity and 
quality of relationships ‘owned’ by a person can be influential in terms of his or her 
behaviour. However, Frith and Frith (2006) stated that to build social relationships, 
an individual must be equipped with a number of cognitive skills: Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. Therefore a potential association 
between Social Capital and Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning should not be overlooked.  
5 
 
With regard to Executive Functioning, this construct is described as the 
multidimensional control system that coordinates and manages a number of 
cognitive skills including Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning (Diamond, 2013). However, Executive Functioning is said to be 
underpinned by three separate abilities: (i) Working Memory (Gordon & Olsen, 
1998), (ii) Cognitive Flexibility (Welsh, Butters, Hughes, Mohs, & Heyman, 1991), 
and (iii) Inhibitory Control (Hala,, Hug, & Henderson, 2003). Therefore, the 
influence of Executive Functioning, as determined by Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, in relation to Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, is of further interest within this thesis.  
However, research relating to Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, as well as Social Capital and Executive Functioning, and their 
collective importance in terms of offender rehabilitation, is limited. As a 
consequence, the need to pre-screen for abilities in each of the constructs, as 
discussed in the previous paragraphs, remains undetermined. The current author 
suggests that the establishment of empirical evidence in relation to these gaps in the 
literature will contribute to the understanding of prosociality in general, and 
offending behaviours in particular. Further, the findings may assist future 
practitioners in the modification or development of interventions related to the 
improvement of prosocial behaviours in offenders; and, as such, may have 
implications in relation to levels of recidivism in the UK. This forms the basic 
research rationale for this thesis.  
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1.3: Research Aim. 
 
Given that an obvious consequence of acceptable prosocial functioning is the 
inhibition of aggression, and other behaviours that are harmful to another person 
(Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Eggum, 2010), the overriding aim of this thesis was to 
establish if specific factors should be considered when designing new, or when 
making refinements to existing, interventions aimed at reducing levels of recidivism. 
Those factors are Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, 
as well as Social Capital and Executive Functioning, as determined by working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control. 
 
1.4: Research Objectives.  
 
      The research objectives of this thesis were:  
1. To establish an understanding of how age is related to the ongoing 
development of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning. 
2. To establish if abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning are related to status and gender, across a representative 
age group.   
3. To establish:  
a. if Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning are associated with Social Capital, and  
b. if levels of Social Capital can vary according to status.  
4. To establish: 
a.  if Executive Functioning, as determined by abilities in Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control predicts 
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abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral 
Reasoning, and Social Capital, and  
b. if differences in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control can vary according to status.  
c. if Executive Functioning, as determined by abilities in Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control predicts 
abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning in an offending population. 
 
1.5: Chapter Overview. 
1.5.1: Chapter Two - A Literature Review.   
 The literature review in chapter two suggests that prosociality can be driven 
by a range of motivations. An appreciation of the theoretical frameworks 
underpinning prosocial and offending behaviours is described. In particular, the key 
psychological paradigms: (i) genetic factors, (ii) dispositional determinants, (iii) 
socio-environmental influences, and (iv) cognitive abilities, are discussed in the 
context of prosocial and offending behaviours. Evidence is submitted to support the 
premise that cognitive abilities represent the greatest cogency. It is suggested that 
from this perspective individuals are able to recognise and understand the goals and 
desires of another, as well as note that any subsequent actions may have an 
emotional and moral consequence for both parties (Prinz, 2007). It is noted that three 
key cognitive skills are needed to enable this process: (i) Theory of Mind, (ii) 
Empathic Understanding, and (iii) Moral Reasoning (Eggum et al., 2011; Sharp, 
2008; Spenser et al., 2015). A discussion relating to the acquisition and maintenance 
of Social Capital, and in particular its relationship to Theory of Mind, Empathic 
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Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, follows (Cole & Griffiths, 2007). Finally, the 
coordinated management of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral 
Reasoning, and Social Capital is discussed. Executive Functioning, as determined by 
Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, is considered in 
terms of their ability to co-ordinate and manage Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital (Diamond, 2013).  
1.5.2 Chapter Three - The Methodology. 
 
Chapter three presents the research design, methods of data collection, and 
data analysis considered to be the most suitable in addressing the research objectives 
noted in subsection 1.4 of the current chapter.  
1.6.3: Chapter Four - Study 1. 
As noted in section 1.1 of the current chapter, a number of the most recent 
rehabilitative programmes designed to address the problem of offending behaviours 
recognise the need to improve underdeveloped levels of prosociality in many of 
those who commit crimes (Antonowicz & Ross, 2005; Palmer, 2013). However, to 
the current author’s knowledge, previous research has not considered if Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning (as related to prosocial 
behaviours) are able to further develop during the life span of an individual. 
Therefore, chapter four, study 1, addresses this issue.   
1.5.4: Chapter Five - Study 2. 
A number of studies have focused singularly on Theory of Mind (McCrae & 
Costa, 1990), Empathic Understanding (Batson, 1987), and Moral Reasoning 
(Kohlberg, 1978), as well as the interaction between two of these constructs: (i) 
Theory of Mind and Empathic Understanding (Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & 
Wheelwright, 2004); (ii) Theory of Mind and Moral Reasoning (Astington, 2004); 
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and (iii) Empathic Understanding and Moral Reasoning (Eisenburg-Berg & Mussen, 
1978). However, although some researchers have considered a theoretical 
association amongst Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning (Eisenberg, 2010; Hoffman, 2000; Stams et al., 2006), to the current 
author’s knowledge, few have considered all three constructs, from an empirical 
perspective, within a single study (Lane, Wellman, Olson, La Bounty, Kerr, 2010; 
Spenser et al., 2015). Further, empirical research in relation to Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in female offenders has largely been 
neglected (Bottos, 2007), despite the recommendations of Corston (2007). Chapter 
five (study 2) therefore considers possible differences in abilities in Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning according to status and gender.  
1.5.5: Chapter Six - Study 3.  
The term ‘Social Capital’ has been adopted to describe the relationships that 
people have with each other. Chen et al. (2015), for example, describe Social Capital 
as the broad network of connections, accumulated during a person’s life-time, that 
are resource-rich, durable, and reciprocal. McKenzie, Whitley, and Weich (2002) 
noted that the relationship between Social Capital and certain cognitive skills, such 
as Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, is difficult to 
determine. However, whilst neuroscience provides evidence of an association 
between Social Capital and Theory of Mind (McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & 
Trouard, 2001), Empathic Understanding (Damasio, 2004), and Moral Reasoning 
(Sanfey, Rilling, Aronso, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), psychological studies 
considering the ability of each relate to Social Capital according to status are limited. 
Chapter six, study 3a addresses this issue, whilst study 3b considers differences in 
levels of Social Capital between the offender group and the non-offender group. 
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1.5.6: Chapter Seven - Study 4. 
It is recognised that Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning are needed for successful prosociality and that the cognitive management 
of these three constructs is complex (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2014). Executive 
Functioning (as determined by Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, Inhibitive 
Control) is said to be useful in coordinating this process (Borkowski & Burke, 
1996); thus enabling  a person to control and self-regulate in order to adapt to any 
situation in which they might find themselves (Marques, Pereira, Goes, & Barros, 
2015). Study 4a therefore considers status related differences in Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control. Further, despite evidence highlighting 
the importance of self-regulation in terms of social development, to the current 
author’s knowledge, previous research has not considered the ability of Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, to predict Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. In chapter seven 
study 4b addresses this issue,  
1.5.7: Chapter Eight - The Discussion.  
Chapter eight discusses the findings relating to the four studies, within the 
context of current theories and research. An improved knowledge and better 
understanding of the effects of age, status, and gender, with regard to abilities in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, are outlined. The 
relationship between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, 
and Social Capital, as well as an appreciation of the predictive nature of Executive 
Functioning is established. Finally, implications of the findings in terms of their 
potential impact on existing, or new, rehabilitative interventions aimed at reducing 
levels of recidivism by increasing prosocial awareness are noted.   
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1.6: Unique Contributions. 
 
Reducing the level of recidivism in the UK is an important goal for the 
Criminal Justice System (Delves & Norfolk-Whittaker, 2013). In considering the 
importance of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in 
relation to offending behaviours, this thesis offers the following unique contributions 
to the literature. 
1.6.1: Study 1.  
 
Firstly, as noted previously, past research is mixed with regard to the ability 
of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning to change across 
adolescence and into adulthood (Smith et al., 2003). Study 1, in considering 69 male 
non-offenders, across three age groups, addresses this issue and adds to the literature 
by concluding that age may not be a limiting factor in the promotion of prosocial 
behaviours.  
1.6.2: Study 2.  
 
Vessels and Huitt (2005) proposed that early deficiencies in prosociality may 
be addressed by ‘programmes’ which focus on developing certain cognitive skills. 
The overriding aim of this thesis is to establish if differences in Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning can be identified between a cohort of 
200 male and female offenders and 200 male and female non-offenders, across a 
representative age range. Study 2 adds to the literature by being the first to consider 
these variables in a single study according to status and gender; and concludes that 
differences in are detectable.  
1.6.3: Study 3. 
 
Venkatanathan, Karapanos, Kostakos, and Gonçalves (2013) noted that high 
levels of Social Capital are associated with compliance to societal norms and social 
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control. Study 3a and 3b, to the current author’s knowledge, are the first to note the 
influence of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning on 
Social Capital, as well as to establish within a single study that individual levels of 
the construct do not differ according to status.   
1.6.4: Study 4. 
 
Borkowski and Burke (1996) noted that Executive Functioning was a useful 
tool in the management and coordination of the skills required for prosociality. Study 
4a is, to the current author’s knowledge, the first to assess the ability of Executive 
Functioning, as measured by Working Memory (Gordon & Olsen, 1998), Inhibitory 
Control (Hala et al., 2003), and Cognitive Flexibility (Welsh et al., 1991), to predict 
levels of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social 
Capital. Study 4b notes differences in abilities between offenders and non-offenders 
in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control. Further, study 
4b, to the current author’s knowledge, is the first to consider the predictive, as 
opposed to the associative, relationship between these constructs and so offers 
further insight relating to the assessment of social functioning.  
 
1.7:  Conclusion. 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to establish if Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning should be considered when designing new, or 
making refinements to, interventions aimed at the improvement of prosocial 
awareness in offenders. This chapter began by describing the background to, and the 
rationale for, that aim. Further, it was noted that the risk of offending is lowered if a 
person acquires, to an appropriate level, Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning (Prior & Paris, 2005). The success of rehabilitative 
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programmes aimed at reducing offending behaviours through the promotion of 
prosociality was also commented upon (Harper & Chitty, 2005). However, it was the 
paucity of empirical studies in relation to the effects of age, status, and gender on 
these constructs that moulded the first two objectives of this thesis. The need for 
research considering the theoretical relationships of Social Capital and Executive 
Functioning, as determined by Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control, to Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, according to status and gender, shaped the final two objectives.    
Lastly, the unique contributions offered by all four studies within this thesis 
are noted. Whist each adds to the theoretical knowledge surrounding the constructs 
of prosocial and offending behaviours, the findings may also be of particular interest 
to those involved in designing or delivering rehabilitative programs, aimed at 
reducing levels of recidivism, by improving prosocial abilities. As noted by McNeill, 
Farrall, Lightowler, and Maruna (2012, p. 10) “a broadening of 'the desistance 
agenda' is long overdue”. The present thesis provides a unique view of Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, and their possible 
involvement in the acquisition and development of prosocial and/or offending 
behaviours. The subsequent amelioration of knowledge relating to social functioning 
and offending behaviours, may be of ultimate benefit to both the individual and 
society as a whole, in the goal of lowering levels of recidivism in the UK. A review 
of the current literature follows.  
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Chapter Two 
A Review of the Literature 
From Prosociality to Offending Behaviour 
 
According to Lam (2012), the concept of prosocial behaviour is highly 
important when considering research and practice within the Criminal Justice 
System. The importance of prosociality is explained by the assertion that the risk of 
offending behaviour is lowered if a person, during their formative years, is exposed 
to and acquires a number of key prosocial skills (Prior & Paris, 2005).  Conversely, 
it is suggested that the absence of, or reduced functioning in these skills, may 
contribute to the emergence of offending behaviours (Farrington, 2010; Palmer, 
2013).  As a consequence, the aim of many current rehabilitative programmes is to 
improve upon an assumed underdeveloped level of prosociality in those who commit 
crimes, in order to address the problem of offending behaviours (Antonowicz & 
Ross, 2005; Palmer, 2013). Despite this interest, opinions are mixed within the 
literature as to the definition of prosocial or offending behaviours (Pakes & 
Winstone, 2010), as well as how they are acquired (Dunfield & Kuhlmeierref, 2013). 
This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of each.  
 
2.1: Defining Prosocial and Offending Behaviours 
 
Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, and Schroeder (2005), described prosocial 
behaviour as any action which is intended to help another human being. Warneken 
and Tomasello (2009) added that such acts must also be the result of an unselfish 
concern for the wellbeing of that person. Building on this, Schäpke and 
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Rauschmayer (2014) suggested that an individual must not be coerced into prosocial 
acts, but instead have the freedom to choose whether or not to engage in such 
behaviours. Yet, it is evident from past research that some prosocial behaviour is, at 
least in part, self-serving. For example, Andreoni (1990) suggested that the 
expectation of positive emotions, which are often produced as a result of ‘helping’ 
someone else, may be enough to promote prosocial behaviours in some people; this 
he termed the ‘warm glow’ theory. Reciprocal or mutualistic prosociality can also 
explain the reasoning behind some prosocial actions. Reciprocal prosociality is an 
action that arises from feelings of gratitude or obligation, which often come as a 
consequence of being the recipient of a ‘good deed’ (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; 
Nicholson, Deboeck, Farris, Boker, &  Borkowski 2011), whilst mutualistic 
prosociality occurs when two or more individuals benefit from working together 
(Jensen, Vaish, & Schmidt 2014). Determined by individual differences with 
egoistical, practical, sympathetic, or moral origins, Padilla-Walker and Carlo (2014) 
concluded that the thought processes behind helping behaviours can be particularly 
difficult to infer.  
However, the current author posits that prosociality is probably a more 
encompassing construct that not only defines the basic parameters of behaviour, but 
also details the varying motivations therein. Grusec, Davidov, and Lundell’s  (2002, 
p. 2) proposition that prosocial behaviour is “a voluntary, intentional action, that 
produces a positive or beneficial outcome for the recipient, regardless of whether 
that action is costly, neutral, or beneficial to the donor” appears to satisfy all 
determinants and will therefore be adopted within this thesis.  
Offending behaviours are similarly complex in nature, and therefore also 
difficult to define. Despite being slightly aged, one theory that remains important is 
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that of Andrews and Bonta (1998). These researchers proposed that offending 
behaviours fall into four key categories:  
(i) those that are prohibited by the state and punishable under the law; 
(ii) those that violate the norms of religion and moral development, 
and are believed to be punishable by a supreme spiritual being;  
(iii) those that violate the norms of custom and tradition and are 
punishable by a community; and   
(iv) those that may be psychologically rewarding to the actor but inflict 
pain or loss on others.  
As this thesis is concerned with individuals who have committed a crime, it 
is behaviours that are prohibited by the state and punishable under UK law that are 
most relevant. Yet, even within this category the ‘deeds’ themselves may be varied; 
ranging from minor antisocial behaviours to quite serious criminal acts, which led 
Smart (2004) to conclude that a precise explanation of offending behaviour is 
difficult to establish. Therefore, as with prosociality, the current author argues that a 
broader definition of offending is required and for the purposes of this thesis, such 
behaviours are defined as actions which cause, or may cause harm, harassment, 
alarm, or distress to others, as recognised by the laws of England and Wales 
(Squires, 2008). 
 
2.2: Acquiring Prosocial or Offending Behaviours 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, opinions are mixed with regard 
to the acquisition of prosocial and offending behaviours. Simpson and Beckes 
(2010), for example, considered that such behaviours were the likely result of genetic 
factors. Hilbig, Glöckner, and Zettler (2014) disagreed, suggesting that dispositional 
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determinants were the most influential, whilst Gelfand and Hartman (1984) 
maintained that such behaviours were the result of socio-environmental influences. 
In contrast, Raviv, Bar-Tal, and Lewis-Levin (1980) focused on cognitive abilities in 
relation to the acquisition of prosociality or offending behaviours.  
In the following sub-sections of this chapter the genetic factors, dispositional 
determinants, and socio-environmental influences for prosocial and offending 
behaviours will be examined. Whilst this thesis will recognise that each contributes 
to an understanding of prosocial and offending behaviour, it will be suggested that in 
isolation and as separate explanations, they are limited. Therefore, the main focus of 
this thesis will be the cognitive abilities associated with the acquisition of prosocial 
or offending behaviours; an approach rationalised by past research. For example, 
Prinz (2007) suggested that for an individual to act in a prosocial way, he or she 
must be able to ‘recognise’ the thoughts, desires and beliefs of another, as well as 
‘understand’ that any actions taken may have an emotional and/or moral 
consequence; something thought to require cognitive abilities (Eggum et al., 2011).  
2.2.1: Genetic Factors. 
Wilson (1975) documented examples of ‘helping’ behaviours within the 
animal kingdom to support the theory that prosocial behaviour in humans is a pre-
programmed genetic function, rather than a learned ability. One example was Rice 
and Gainer’s (1962) research involving rats. These researchers placed one rat on the 
floor of a cage, whilst a second was suspended in the air. By pressing a bar, the rat 
on the floor of the cage was able lower the suspended rat to the ground. This was 
later repeated but the second rat was replaced with a block of foam. The researchers 
noted that the rats on the floor of the cage pressed the bar more often for the 
suspended rat, especially when the animal was exhibiting signs of distress, than for 
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the ‘silent’ block of foam. Sober and Wilson (1998) used these findings to explain 
similar behaviours in humans by suggesting that groups with a larger number of 
people, willing to act prosocially, had more chance of survival than a group 
comprised mainly of self-interested individuals. However, one limitation of these 
studies is that they were based on observed behaviours and did not empirically 
demonstrate a genetic tendency toward prosociality.  
Early twin studies attempted to address this issue. For example, Rushton 
(2004), in a study of 174 pairs of monozygotic twins and 148 pairs of dizygotic 
twins, assessed for a genetic contribution to prosocial behaviour. Using the Social 
Responsibility Questionnaire (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964) to measure self-reported 
altruism, empathy, and aggression, these researchers claimed that 42% of the 
variance was due to the twins' genes, 23% to a common environment, and the 
remainder to a non-shared environment. Similarly, Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington, and 
Milne (2002) considered a number of contemporary studies from the Netherlands, 
Britain, Norway, Sweden, Australia, and the USA. Using a quantitative modelling 
technique, this researcher suggested heritability rates of approximately .50. 
However, although twin studies are considered to be of high validity and reliability, 
the question remains as to whether other factors may influence individuals to act in a 
prosocial or offending manner (Webster-Stratton, Reid, & Beauchaine, 2011). 
Indeed, the heritability theory of prosocial and/or offending behaviour does not take 
into consideration dispositional determinants. Therefore, to fully evaluate the factors 
that are involved in the acquisition of prosocial or offending behaviour, such 
dispositional differences must be considered.  
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2.2.2: Dispositional Determinants. 
According to Gosling, Augustine, Vazire, Holtzman, and Gaddis (2011) 
personality is the manifestation of dispositional determinants peculiar to a person. 
This thesis will therefore discuss dispositional determinants in terms of personality. 
The Five Factor Model of Personality was proposed by Costa and McCrae in 1985. 
The model contends that personality can be specified in terms of five broad traits: 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and intellect. Eisenberg 
et al. (1989) observed that prosocial acts, such as spontaneous sharing and 
cooperation, were performed by individuals who were more extroverted or assertive; 
assertive behaviour being a sub-category of extroversion (Midlarsky & Hannah, 
1985).  
Taking a different stance, Hilbig et al. (2014) suggested that conscientiousness 
and agreeableness were most closely associated with prosocial behaviour in humans. 
Conscientiousness describes the propensity for self-control and the ability to abide 
by social rules (Roberts, Fillmore, & Milich, 2011), whilst agreeableness involves a 
communal orientation toward others and includes the ability to sympathise and 
empathise (Nettle & Liddle, 2008). Taken together, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness may contribute to prosocial relationships with others (Courbalay, 
Deroche, Descarreaux, Prigent, O’Shaughnessy, & Amorim, 2016). However, it may 
be that those who are more extroverted, conscientious, and/or agreeable simply find 
themselves in situations where they can put their prosociality to use more often than 
less sociable individuals. In terms of offending behaviours, Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1991) stated that people who scored highly for neuroticism were characterised as 
reacting strongly to unpleasant environmental stimuli which made them ‘moody’ and 
anxious, whilst those with high scores for psychoticism were described as callous, 
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aggressive, and lacking in empathy for others. High scores in both, Eynsenck and 
Eynsenck postulated, can sometimes affect an individual’s ability to control their 
actions and so result in offending behaviours.   
However, one limitation related to the dispositional theory is that it does not 
take into consideration socio-environmental differences. For example, Heider 
(1958), in his Theory of Personal Attribution, suggested that in addition to 
personality an individual’s interpretation of events can also influence his or her 
subsequent behaviour. Heider proposed the involvement of two key factors; internal 
attribution  which implies that the person’s behaviour is the consequence of 
individual factors such as genetics and personality and external attribution which 
considers the person’s behaviour in respect of the environment in which they live. 
Heider noted that internal attributions are often overestimated, and environmental 
factors neglected, when attempting to explain human behaviours.  
2.2.3: Socio-Environmental Influences. 
White and White (1977) suggested that an interaction with the social 
environment allows for the learning and internalisation of culture, language, habits, 
manners, and other social competencies. Over time most individuals come to 
appreciate, to some extent, the norms and values to which they are exposed, and 
learn to make sense of social interactions within a cultural context (Searle, 2001). 
Obedience to societal norms generally follows; thus giving rise to prosocial 
behaviours (Sanstock, 2014), which are considered essential for social order (Sharp, 
2008).  
This ‘learning’ process has been a focus for developmental psychologists for a 
number of years. Bowlby (1969), for example, suggested that the bonds formed 
between an individual and a significant other determine the level of commitment a 
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person has to the norms and values of the group to which he or she belongs. As a 
consequence, ‘social bonds’ are said to provide informal controls that influence 
future behaviours (Salvatore & Taniguchi, 2012). Although this suggests that 
prosociality is absorbed vicariously, it is recognised that the skill can also be 
conveyed through intentional teaching and instruction. For example, Eisenberg, 
Fabes, and Spinrad (2006) proposed that a child’s ability to exhibit prosocial 
behaviours, such as helping, sharing, comforting, and cooperating, is strengthened by 
occurrence, labelling, and parental reward. This was supported by Altay and Gure 
(2012), who noted that rewarded behaviour is likely to occur again, whilst 
punishment may prevent the repetition of undesirable actions. Sibling relationships 
are also important to this process as they often serve as social partners, role models, 
and foils (McHale, Kim, & Whiteman, 2006). 
In a wider social context, Catalano and Hawkins (1996) suggested that any 
bonds formed with the wider community are also critical in terms of developing 
prosocial and/or offending behaviours. The informal social controls that arise from 
these bonds are said to be characterised by a sense of obligation, expectation, 
trustworthiness, and social norms; this is known as Social Capital (Putnam, 2000). 
Indeed, Sampson and Laub (2005) noted that offending behaviours are more 
probable when Social Capital is missing, weakened, or broken, whilst Wentzel 
(2014) suggested that such actions may be the result of attachments to antisocial 
peers, and a commitment to the ‘values’ of that group. Therefore, it may be that 
whilst Social Capital is thought to be important in defining the forces that guide 
norms and conventions, it can be related to either prosocial or offending behaviours. 
This notion will be further discussed in section 2.9 of the current chapter, and also in 
chapter six.    
22 
 
However, as with the genetic factors and depositional determinants of 
prosocial and/or offending behaviours, socio-environmental theory, as a standalone 
explanation, is similarly incomplete. According to Eggum et al. (2011) what and 
how an individual ‘thinks’ is the greatest influence on how he or she behaves.  In 
other words, human behaviour is associated with the ability to manipulate 
cognitively the stored representations of events and situations. This may go some 
way in explaining why individuals with similar genetic, dispositional, and socio-
environmental backgrounds, can sometimes behave in very different prosocial and/or 
offending, ways. As such, cognitive abilities may be important with regard to 
individual differences in social responding (Raviv et al., 1980).  
2.2.4: Cognitive Factors. 
 
 It is generally agreed that there are three different cognitive skills utilised in 
the development of prosocial behaviours (Spenser et al., 2015):  
(i) Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), which is the ability to 
ascribe thoughts, intentions, beliefs and feelings to others;  
(ii) Empathic Understanding (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005), which is the 
ability to share in the emotional states of others;  
(iii) and Moral Reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992), which is the ability to 
differentiate between socially acceptable and unacceptable thoughts 
and behaviours.  
Past research has alluded to the fact that these skills are related to individual 
differences in prosocial behaviour (Spinrad & Van Schyndel, 2015). As a 
consequence, it has been further postulated that an inadequate development of 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning may explain, at 
least partially, reduced social functioning and contribute to offending behaviour 
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(Palmer, 2013).  To consider how prosocial and/or offending behaviours emerge and 
develop this thesis will now evaluate the theoretical background of Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, as well as any potential association 
between the three constructs.   
 
2.3: Acquiring Theory of Mind. 
 
The first cognitive skill to be discussed within this thesis is Theory of Mind. 
It is recognised that the mind encompasses mental states that include perceptions and 
intentions, as well as propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and hopes 
(McCrae & Costa, 1990).  Theory of Mind relates to how individuals ascribe these 
mental states to the self, and to others, in order to understand and predict behaviour. 
This process involves making the distinction between the ‘real’ world and the 
‘mentally-represented’ world.  There are four main competing approaches that 
attempt to explain how people form beliefs or judgments regarding another’s mental 
state or Theory of Mind. In line with theories relating to the acquisition of prosocial 
and offending behaviours, each theory makes use of a different psychological 
paradigm to explain the acquisition of Theory of Mind; the paradigms and theories 
are:  
(i) Genetic factors; the Modularity theory, 
(ii) Dispositional Differences; the Rationality-Teleology theory,  
(iii) Socio-environmental influences; the Theory-Theory theory, and  
(iv) Cognitive abilities; the Simulation theory.  
The following section will begin by describing each, before concluding that 
the ‘Simulation’ theory is most appropriate, within the parameters of this thesis, to 
describe how individuals acquire prosocial and offending behaviours.  
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2.3.1: The Modularity Theory. 
 
Firstly, from a genetic position, the Modularity theory proposes the existence 
of a domain-specific module within the human brain, which uses individual 
representations and computations to understand situations (Fodor, 1987). This 
module is said to be an innate cognitive structure that matures at a pre-programmed 
stage and is not influenced by learning (Leslie, 1994; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). 
Evidence for the Modularity theory is provided by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 
(1986). In a study of typically developing pre-school children, children with Down’s 
syndrome, and children with autism, participants were given scrambled pictures from 
comic strips with the first picture already in place. The participants were then 
required to put the remaining strips in order to make a coherent story. There were 
three types of story:  
(i) ‘mechanical’ where people or objects act causally with each other, 
(ii) ‘behavioural’ where a person act in a way not requiring mental 
attribution, and 
(iii) ‘mentalistic’ where people act in a way requiring mental attribution. 
The children with autism ordered the mechanical strips correctly and dealt 
adequately with the behavioural script but could not understand the mentalistic 
stories. Conversely, the children with Down’s syndrome, despite their general 
cognitive disability, were not deficient on any level; leading the researchers to 
conclude that autism impairs an area of the brain associated with Theory of Mind.   
 One major criticism of the Modularity theory is that it portrays Theory of 
Mind as merely part of a genetic endowment that starts in a similar way to puberty 
and once triggered becomes fixed and cannot be further developed (Scholl & Leslie, 
2001). However, Hay and Cook (2007), in a study of 7- to 12- year olds, provided 
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contradictory evidence, noting that age related improvements in Theory of Mind 
appeared to be possible. This was attributed to the fact that around this age 
(particularly in Western societies) children begin to associate more regularly with 
friends and peers (Hastings, Miller, & Troxel, 2014). As results of these peer 
interactions it is claimed that children are more able recognise and understand the 
thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of individuals outside of his or her family unit 
(McDonald & Messinger, 2011). Therefore, whilst the Modularity Theory may 
account for the onset of Theory of Mind, it does not offer an explanation regarding 
its further development.   
2.3.2: The Rationality-Teleology Theory. 
 
The Rationality-Teleology theory (Dennett, 1987) considers dispositional 
determinants in relation to Theory of Mind. Dennett suggested that, by taking into 
consideration individual characteristics, it was possible for a person to rationally 
‘predict’ another person’s behaviour. This theory was supported by Gergely, 
Nádasdy, Csibra, and B´ıró (1995) who investigated whether infants were able to 
interpret the actions of others, allowing them to draw inferences based on rational 
and expected behavioural characteristics. In two experiments, Gergely et al. 
measured the length of time infants spent looking at ‘situations’ which (i) met their 
expectations and (ii) violated their expectations; both in terms of outcome. These 
researchers suggested that the ‘looking’ times of one year old children indicated that 
they were able to make both types of inferences, whilst 9-month-old infants were 
not. Thus demonstrating that, by the end of the first year of life, children are able to 
use the principle of rational action not only for the interpretation and prediction of 
goal-directed behaviours, but also for making inferences in relation to different 
situations or contexts.  
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However, an intrinsic aspect of human behaviour is that, despite allowing for 
depositional differences, such actions are not always rational or predicable. It is 
therefore erroneous to suggest that certain behaviours will logically follow on from 
certain beliefs (Goddard, 2012).  For example, Goddard suggested that people may 
forget, or choose to ignore, many of their prior beliefs, and that to expect a ‘rational’ 
response from a person is to disregard any day-to-day changes in his or her mental 
state. These changes, he postulated, may be triggered by a number of factors, 
including socio-environmental influences. Therefore, it is important to consider the 
impact of socio-environmental factors on Theory of Mind.   
2.3.3: The Theory-Theory Theory. 
 
The Theory-Theory theory (Churchland, 1981; Fodor, 1987) takes into 
consideration the impact of socio-environmental factors on human behaviour. This 
theory asserts that individuals hold a basic or ‘naïve’ ability to infer the mental state 
of others. This can then be used to understand the intentions behind another person’s 
actions. The advantage of this theory is that it allows for the consideration of factors 
that may affect and/or alter a person’s mental state. The result is a framework that 
Churchland (1990, p. 51) described as “roughly adequate to the demands of everyday 
life”. 
Developmental psychologists, who championed the Theory-Theory theory, 
believed that individuals utilise a science-like processes to interpret the situations in 
which they might find themselves (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). In other words, it was 
postulated that people collect information, make observations, and accordingly 
change their beliefs, desires, hopes, and intentions, in a disciplined way, according to 
their current situation. This is evidenced by Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, and 
Schulz (2012) who considered the effect of prior beliefs verses unexpected outcomes 
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on children’s exploration.  Consistent with the Theory-Theory theory, these 
researchers found that children’s prior beliefs mediated their exploratory play. For 
example, the children in this study were more likely to further explore a situation 
when they noted information that conflicted with prior conceptual ideas. This, 
Bonawitz et al. proposed, provided evidence of a person evaluating all information 
available to him or her, before making a decision regarding a situation.  
However, Murphy and Medin (1985) suggested that the Theory-Theory 
theory was unstable. For example, whilst for most people agreement can be reached 
regarding the concepts of what is true or what is false, a definition of the word ‘truth’ 
may differ according to the individual, the time, and the place. Eggum et al. (2011) 
noted that to fully recognise such differences, and therefore to rationalise human 
behaviour, cognitive reasoning is needed.    
2.3.4: The Simulation Theory. 
 
The Simulation theory (Gordon, 1986) suggests that representational Theory 
of Mind requires a cognitive skill base. Simply, the theory proposes that individuals 
can predict another’s behaviour by answering the question, ‘What would I do in that 
particular situation?’ Both Heal (1986) and Goldman (1989) endorsed this idea, 
explaining that an observer must firstly create a ‘pretend’ mental state, which mirrors 
that of the person being observed, and secondly generate an anticipated ‘follow on’ 
mental state, to predict subsequent behaviours.  
Gallese and Goldman (1998), using neuropsychology, provided further 
evidence for the Simulation theory. They proposed that the ability to take on 
another’s mental state employed the brain’s mirror neurons. Keyser, Wicker, 
Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi, & Gallese (2004), demonstrated this process in an 
experiment which involved touching. Being touched is known to activate neurons in 
28 
 
the somatosensory cortex area of the brain. In Keysers et al.’s study, participants 
were shown a short video in which an individual was touched on the leg. Using 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, these researchers found that the brains of 
the ‘watchers’ were activated in a similar way to that of the person being touched.  
According to Decety (2010), this is the foundation on which Theory of Mind is built, 
and the process that successfully allows an individual to recognise and understand 
the perspective of another person.   
   Whilst the Simulation theory explains the cognitive mechanisms 
underpinning Theory of Mind, it does not fully explain a link between the construct 
and actual behaviours. To address this, Imuta, Henry, Slaughter, Selcuk, and 
Ruffman (2016), in a meta-analysis of 76 studies comprising of 6,432 children aged 
2- to 12- years, found an association between children with higher Theory of Mind 
scores and increased levels of observed prosociality. The magnitude of this effect 
was similar across a number of Theory of Mind assessments, all of which required 
the participant to identify the thought process of another person. These findings 
support the proposal that being able to explicitly consider what other people are 
thinking is related to Theory of Mind.  
However, with regard to offending behaviour, empirical evidence of a link 
with Theory of Mind is less conclusive. For example, Happé and Frith (1996) used a 
‘False Belief’ task and the Vineland Adaptive Behavioural Scales to investigate 
Theory of Mind in 6- to 12- year-olds with identified conduct disorders. These 
researchers reported that although the scores on the Vineland Adaptive Behavioural 
Scales indicated that the children in the study were socially impaired, the majority 
were evidenced to be adept at passing age-appropriate Theory of Mind tasks. 
Similarly, Richell, Mitchell, Newman, Leonard, Baron- Cohen, & Blair (2003) 
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predicted that adult psychopathic offenders would perform poorly on the ‘Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes’ test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) 
but reported no significant difference between them and the non-psychopathic 
control group. In contrast, Dolan and Fullam (2004), using a verbal faux pas task and 
a visual emotional recognition task, assessed Theory of Mind in 89 male adult 
offenders with DSM IV anti-social personality disorder and/or psychopathic 
diagnoses and a control group, matched for age and IQ. They found that some 
offenders were impaired in their ability to both recognise and understand how the 
speaker and the listener might feel following a faux pas. In relation to the offenders 
own crime, whilst some of the participants in Dolan and Fulham’s study were able to 
understand their victim’s perspective, the majority displayed a lack of concern 
regarding the immediate, or ongoing, impact of their actions.  
One explanation for this may lie in the fact that Theory of Mind is no longer 
believed to be a singular function (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Specifically, Shamay-
Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, and Levkovitz (2010) described Theory of Mind as 
comprising of both affective and cognitive components; cognitive Theory of Mind 
being the ability to make inferences about another’s beliefs and motivations, whilst 
affective Theory of Mind being the ability to understand any associated feelings. 
Neurological studies have provided empirical support for this duality (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2005; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007), demonstrating that 
patients with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, when faced with a Theory 
of Mind task, were able to recognise an ironic remark but were unable to understand 
the mental state behind that same remark. This is of significance because, to respond 
successfully to another’s mental state, it is thought that abilities in both cognitive and 
affective Theory of Mind are needed (Blair & Coles, 2000) 
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Yet, previous research appears to have, in many cases, used measures which 
focus almost exclusively on the cognitive aspects of Theory of Mind. Shamay-
Tsoory et al. (2005), for example, argued that the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) singularly assessed emotional recognition rather than 
simultaneously measuring both emotional recognition and understanding and, as 
such, only examined cognitive Theory of Mind. Therefore, to confidently detect any 
deficiencies in Theory of Mind, a measure which assesses the potential duality of 
Theory of Mind is needed. To address this issue, Spenser et al. (2015) used the 
Social Stories Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Jones, Stone, & Plaistead, 
1999). This measure is said to simultaneously consider a participant’s cognitive 
ability to recognise the knowledge states of various characters within a story, as well 
as his or her affective ability to understand the potential impact of any remark made 
by one character to another. Using a participant group comprising of 46 young-adult 
male offenders and a control group matched for age, Spenser et al. (2015) found 
significant differences in Theory of Mind, with the young-adult male offenders 
scoring lower than the control group. However, this research was limited in three 
ways: (i) the narrow age range, (ii) the lack of female participants, and (iii) IQ was 
not controlled for.   
To conclude, whilst Theory of Mind may have its roots in genetics, it is also 
likely to be affected by dispositional determinants and socio-environmental 
influences. However, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of this 
thesis, Theory of Mind appears to be reliant on cognitive abilities for its successful 
application. Building on this last theory study 2, reported in chapter five, assesses 
abilities in Theory of Mind, from both a cognitive and an effective perspective 
according to status.   
31 
 
2.4: Acquiring Empathic Understanding 
 
Empathic Understanding is the second cognitive skill to be discussed in this 
thesis. The term Empathic Understanding is a derivation of the German word 
einfuhlung; essentially the process where individuals project genuine feelings or 
emotions onto objects (Titchener, 1924, p. 417). However, this definition captures 
the construct of Empathic Understanding at its simplest (Duan & Hill, 1996); the 
conceptual interpretation being somewhat more complex. For example, Empathic 
Understanding, as a skill, is said to be the driving force behind successful social 
relations (Pinker, 2011). However, as with Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding 
is considered by some researchers to be innately dispositional (Kim & Kou, 2014), 
whilst others favour theories related to socio-environmental influences (Yamada & 
Decety, 2009), or cognitive determinants (Egan, 2010). The following subsection 
will discuss the proposed origins of Empathic Understanding. 
2.4.1: The Dispositional View of Empathic Understanding. 
 
The dispositional view of Empathic Understanding believes that an 
individual’s tendency to be empathic is a function of an ‘innate’ disposition (Duan & 
Hill, 1996) and that people will display similar levels of Empathic Understanding, 
regardless of a situation (Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008). 
For example, the dispositional view might expect viewing a motorist stranded on the 
side of the road in a thunderstorm to evoke the same predetermined reaction in a 
person as witnessing that same stranded motorist on a clear and warm day. Whilst in 
reality, most people are able to effectively understand that one experience is likely to 
evoke a greater degree of distress than the other; thus reflecting the notion that 
Empathic Understanding may concurrently depend upon innate dispositional 
determinants and socio-environmental influences (Goetz, 2003).  
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2.4.2: The Socio-Environmental View of Empathic Understanding. 
 
It has been suggested that an individual can better empathise with someone if 
they themselves have gone through a similar experience (Webster-Stratton et al., 
2011). For example, an individual’s ability to empathise with a bereaved person may 
differ according to their own experiences of death. Similarly, socio-environmental 
influences and cultural acceptability may also alter an individual’s expression of 
Empathic Understanding (Webster-Stratton et al., 2011). One example of this might 
be divorce. Whilst divorce is socially acceptable in most western societies, and 
therefore might arouse an empathic reaction, it is not so for all cultures where the 
same situation might evoke feelings of shame or disgust. Therefore, as Empathic 
Understanding derives from an interaction between two or more individuals, a better 
understanding of the construct may be found by considering its possible cognitive 
origins (Duan & Hill, 1996). 
2.4.3: The Cognitive View of Empathic Understanding. 
 
              Batson (1987) contended that Empathic Understanding is an emotional 
response that is characterised by feelings of tenderness, compassion, and sympathy. 
The ability to share such feelings requires an individual to take on the mental or 
emotional perspective of another (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Indeed, Hoffman (2000, p. 
216) argued that a “cognitive dimension helps give structure and stability to 
empathic affects, which should make [them] less vulnerable to bias”. Hoffman’s 
work also provides a theoretical model to link Empathic Understanding to other 
emotional states including sympathy, guilt, and anger. 
  However, whilst accepting that humans have a capacity for Empathic 
Understanding, the question remains whether all people are equally able to 
understand another’s situation, and to feel compassion for what that person might be 
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experiencing.  For example, in terms of offending behaviours, Van der Helm et al. 
(2012) considered a cohort of 59 juvenile delinquents in Holland and found them to 
demonstrate lower levels of Empathic Understanding, particularly for their victims, 
compared to non-delinquent adolescents. This was supported by Spenser et al. 
(2015) who found similar results in a study with young adult offenders (M age = 21 
years). In contrast, Beven (2006) suggested that the Empathic Understanding of 
offenders was not quite so simply explained, noting that some appear intolerant of 
the remembered distress of their victims, whilst others present with feelings of 
excitement or enjoyment. An explanation for this may be that although some 
offenders are able to recognise distress in their victims, they are unable to respond in 
what is considered a socially appropriate manner (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006).  
In addition, some studies suggest that differences in Empathic Understanding 
are unrelated to certain categories of offending. Mann, Hanson, and Thornton 
(2010), in a study of sex-offenders, concluded that some had an emotional 
congruence with children, believing that they were able to recognise and understand 
the needs of their child victim (Daly & Wilson, 1999). The earlier work of Sykes and 
Matza (1957) might offer an explanation for this belief. They proposed that many 
offenders hold values very similar to those of law-abiding citizens, yet to justify their 
offending behaviours they adopt techniques that temporarily ‘neutralise’ such 
attitudes. The techniques are defined as follows: 
• Denial of Responsibility where the offender is pushed or pulled into a
 situation beyond his or her control (i.e., "It wasn't my fault!"). 
• Denial of Injury where the offender thinks that his or her acts do not harm the  
             victim (i.e., "They have plenty of money!").  
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• Denial of the Victim where the offender thinks the victim deserves the injury  
 or that there is no victim (i.e., "They had it coming to them!"). 
• Condemnation of the Condemners where the offender see the condemners as
 hypocrites (i.e., "They probably did worse things in their day!").  
• Appeal to Higher Loyalties where the offender believes relationships are  
 more important than the law (i.e., "My friends depended on me, so what was   
            supposed to do?"). 
Another explanation for the mixed findings in relation to Empathic 
Understanding may be that it may be a multidimensional construct, comprised of 
both affective and cognitive components (Cox, Uddin, Di Martino, Castellanos, 
Milham, & Kelly, 2012). Cognitive Empathic Understanding denotes the ability to 
take the mental or emotional perspective of others, whilst affective Empathic 
Understanding is said to be the ability to share in their emotional experiences 
(Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Neurological research also supports the duality of Empathic 
Understanding. For example, Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, and Perry (2009) 
found that cognitive Empathic Understanding is disrupted by lesions to the medial 
prefrontal cortex, whilst damage to the bilateral amygdala disrupts affective 
Empathic Understanding.  As such, it is suggested that both cognitive and affective 
elements are required for a complete Empathic Understanding (Nummenmaa, 
Glerean, Viinikainen, Jääskeläinen, Hari, & Sams, 2008).  
To conclude, assuming that Empathic Understanding is comprised of both 
affective and cognitive components (Cox et al., 2012); it follows that both should be 
considered when assessing an individual’s ability to respond appropriately to 
another's mental state (Nummenmaa et al., 2008). Building on this notion, chapter 
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five (study 2), assesses abilities in Empathic Understanding, from both a cognitive 
and an effective perspective according to status.   
 
2.5: Acquiring Moral Reasoning. 
  
Moral Reasoning is the last prosocial skill to be considered within this thesis. 
Moral Reasoning can be defined as the cognitive process in which an individual 
attempts to determine the difference between what is right and what is wrong, by the 
use of logic (Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2015). According to 
Kohlberg (1978) people develop through three levels of Moral Reasoning: (i) the 
first level involves making decisions of morality based on the prospect of 
punishment; (ii) the second level assumes a perception of right and wrong, and 
believes the law to be the judge of morality; and, (iii) the third level occurs when a 
person makes decisions based on unspoken agreements, or when he or she can 
generalise ethical principles beyond his or her own personal interests. Kohlberg 
(1978) noted that an individual’s moral stage could be discerned from their 
behaviour.  
Palmer and Begum (2006) supported the premise that a person’s behaviour 
reflects his or her moral stage of development. In a study of 60, 14- to 17- year old 
male offenders and non-offenders, matched for age and IQ, they determined that the 
offenders reasoned at a less mature moral stage when compared to the control group.  
This was earlier explained by Gibbs (2003, p. 135), who suggested that a 
“developmental delay in moral judgement”, coupled with social skill deficits, were 
common amongst offenders. Palmer (2003) agreed, adding that the influence of 
parents, peers, and other socio-environmental factors may be responsible for the 
generation of cognitive distortions used to support illegal behaviours.  
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However, any discussion relating to Moral Reasoning and its development 
must acknowledge the cultural biases that are inextricably embedded in definitions 
of what is moral, and what is not (Rest, 1986). Woven throughout Kohlberg's theory 
is an inherent assumption that Moral Reasoning is defined by the principles of 
fairness and justice. Whilst fairness and justice are highly valued in individualistic 
and competitive cultures (common to many Western societies), other less 
competitive cultures may give more value to a different set of factors, such as 
compassion and group integrity. As a consequence, Bucciarelli, Khemlani, and 
Johnson-Laird (2008) suggested that Moral Reasoning might be better interpreted by 
four fundamental principles:  
(i) Indefinability of Moral Propositions. That is it is hard to tell from the 
proposition alone whether or not it concerns morals or conventions.  
(ii) Independent Systems. That is emotions or cognitive evaluations 
operating in parallel. 
(iii) Deontic Reasoning. That is all evaluations can depend on either 
unconscious or conscious inferences.  
(iv) Moral Inconsistency. That is the beliefs that are the basis of moral 
development are neither complete nor consistent.  
In other words, Moral Reasoning does not necessarily rely on any one simple 
defining principle. For example, what represents a moral issue in one instance, or a 
matter of fact in another, is likely to be a reflection of the attitudes of the interested 
parties.  
Raine and Yang (2006) proposed support for the premise of the importance of 
attitudes. In a neurological study, they presented participants with a number of moral 
decisions that were categorised as either ‘personal’ moral dilemmas (e.g., throwing a 
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person out of a sinking life-boat to save others), or ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas 
(e.g., keeping money found in a lost wallet). Raine and Yang found that the same 
areas of the brain were activated in both types of scenario; suggesting that these 
structures play a central role in the emotional processes influencing all moral 
decision-making.  
More recently, attempts to differentiate between the affective and cognitive 
elements of Moral Reasoning have been made (Blair, 2008). Blair described moral 
emotions, such as guilt, shame, and embarrassment, as the affective response to 
moral functioning and Moral Reasoning as the cognitive aspect of morality. Indeed, 
Ma (2013) suggested that Moral Reasoning, like Theory of Mind and Empathic 
Understanding, is dual construct; the affective aspect being associated with 
prosociality and the cognitive aspect being related to the justice reasoning elements 
of Moral Reasoning.   
Consequently, as with Theory of Mind and Empathic Understanding, it is 
appropriate to adopt the position that Moral Reasoning is comprised of both affective 
and cognitive components (Blair, 2008), and that both should be considered when 
assessing an individual’s ability to respond to another's mental state (Ma, 2013). 
Building on this, chapter five (study 2) assesses abilities in Moral Reasoning, from 
both a cognitive and an effective perspective according to status.   
 
2.6:  Associations between Theory of Mind, Empathic       
         Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. 
 
Hoffman (2000) suggested that both Theory of Mind and Empathic 
Understanding played a part in Moral Reasoning; arguing that Theory of Mind is the 
key activator in relation to Empathic Understanding and that Empathic 
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Understanding is the primary motivator of moral behaviour. Therefore, to fully 
understand the development of prosociality, it is important to identify any 
associations that may exist between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, as the key indicators of prosocial abilities (Stams et al., 2006; 
Eisenburg, 2010).  
 An association between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning was supported by Lane et al. (2010) who proposed that Theory of 
Mind and Empathic Understanding, in a group of children aged 3- to 5- years, would 
predict the quality of their Moral Reasoning. They found that the children with a 
developed Theory of Mind and Empathic Understanding were more motivated to 
evaluate differing perspectives when faced with moral dilemmas. Neurological 
research also offers support of an association between Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, and 
Piefke (2007), for example, using neuroimaging and behavioural measures in a 
sample of 26 participants (M age = 24 years) reported that the cognitive processing 
of facial expressions activated the same area of the brain as that involved in Moral 
Reasoning. Whilst more recently, Bzdok et al. (2012) in a meta-analysis of previous 
neurological studies, which considered Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning, concluded that Moral Reasoning is related to both recognising 
another’s point of view and understanding any feelings evoked by that perspective.  
With  regard to offending behaviours, a prime consideration in Piaget’s 
(1932) early ‘Developmental Theory of Moral Judgment’ was the extent to which a 
child was able to appreciate and empathise with another’s’ point of view. Whilst 
Stams et al. (2006) noted that the relationship between Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning has implications for understanding the 
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aetiology of criminal behaviour. However, despite the recognition of a potential 
association between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, empirical research involving all three constructs, within a single study, 
with an adult offending and an adult non-offending population, appears to be missing 
from the literature.  Chapter five (study 2) therefore examines the association 
between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, in a group 
of male and female offenders and male and female non-offenders.  
 
2.7: Other Factors Affecting Prosocial and/or Offending Behaviours  
 
It is generally agreed that prosociality is an amelioration of genetic factors, 
dispositional differences, socio-environmental influences, and cognitive 
development. However, other key effects have been identified within the literature as 
impacting on prosocial development; for example, age (Baillargeon et al., 2012), 
gender (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & van Court, 1995), and IQ (Han, Shi, Yong, & 
Wang, 2012). The following subsections will consider the literature relating to each 
of these.    
2.7.1: Age Related Prosocial and/or Offending Behaviours. 
 
There appears to be general agreement that prosocial behaviour is first 
detected in children between the ages of 12- and 18- months (Smith et al., 2003).  
Infants will initially react to others' negative emotions by mirroring their distress. 
Later a more concerned attention, in the form of positive physical contact or verbal 
reassurance, may be evidenced (Knafo et al., 2008). It is during the second year of 
life, as a child’s cognitive capacity to understand the goals and intentions of others 
increases, that he or she is then able to ‘help’ others in a wider variety of tasks and in 
response to a wider array of cues (Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). For 
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example, Liszkowski, Albrecht, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2008) noted that when a 
child knows the location of a ‘lost’ object, he or she will point to direct the attention 
of the person who is looking for it. Given that the infants themselves do not seem to 
gain anything by providing this information, their directional pointing is considered 
by some to be an act of helping (Liszkowski et al., 2008).  
According to Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, and Chapman (1992), 
the development of prosocial behaviour continues as children begin to gain a greater 
understanding of the world. With age and cognitive maturity, obedience to societal 
standards becomes steadily more important, and the ability to exhibit prosocial 
behaviour further strengthens (Bouchard, Mesgarani,  Johnson,  & Chang, 
2013). From a developmental point of view, most children begin to understand that 
prosociality is an obligatory part of a social relationship and take into account issues 
of right and wrong (Sanstock, 2014). Consequently, as a person moves through 
childhood and into adolescence, their thinking changes from being simplistic and 
needs-oriented, to a form that involves perspective taking and cognitive reasoning 
(Eisenberg, 2000). This was supported by Eysenck (2004) who in a study of 5- to 15- 
year olds noted that the frequency of prosocial behaviours varied according to age: 
(i) in young children - very occasionally;  
(ii) in 13- to 15- year olds - approximately 9% of the time;  
(iii) in18- to 20- year olds - approximately 21% of the time, and;  
(iv) in 23- to 25- year olds - approximately 49% of the time.  
This was supported by Eisenberg, Morris, and Spinrad (2005) who, in considering 
differences in prosocial behaviours between a group of adolescents (15- to 16- years) 
and adults (25- to 26- years) found that helping behaviours appeared to increase with 
age.  
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Further, Sze, Gyurak, Goodkind, and Levenson (2012) found that any growth 
in prosociality was enhanced when emotions were involved. For example, they 
observed that greater charitable donations resulted if a request was accompanied by 
an emotional video. Similarly, Beadle, Sheehan, Dahlben, and Gutchess (2015), in a 
study with young adults (M age = 19.8- years) and older adults (M age = 77.9 years), 
found that the older adults demonstrated greater prosocial behaviour than the 
younger adults, when feelings of empathy were triggered. However, the same 
researchers found no significant age-related differences when the ‘stimuli’ were 
neutral. This suggests that in a context where prosociality is the desired outcome, 
frequency increases with age.  
In relation to offending behaviours, Beadle et al. (2015) proposed a link 
between maturation and desistance. This association was first introduced almost a 
hundred years ago by Goring (1919) who suggested that age related desistance was a 
natural process. Similarly, Glueck and Glueck (1937, p.105), in their work relating to 
life course criminality, argued that “aging is the only factor which emerges as 
significant in the reformative process”. Indeed, the ‘age crime curve’ suggests 
that the majority of offending behaviour peaks at around 17- years of age, 
following which it starts to decline (Kazemian, 2007). 
Moffitt's (1993) theoretical work attempted to explain this apparent 
phenomenon. She noted two types of offender; the first being those who engage in 
offending for a brief period during adolescence, and the second being those who start 
to offend much earlier and continue well into adulthood. One possible explanation 
for this difference may be the ‘relationship’ that an individual has with society. For 
example, Sampson and Laub (2005) noted that most ‘non-offending’ people have 
some form of attachment to the society in which they live; for adolescents these ties 
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may involve their family, their school, and their peer groups, whilst employment, 
marriage, and parenthood are said to operate in a similar way for adults. Thus the 
absence of such relationships, either during adolescent or into adulthood, may 
influential in terms of offending behaviours. 
An alternative explanation was offered by Giordano, Cernkovich, & 
Rudolph (2002) who suggested the Cognitive Transformation theory, proposing 
that four age-related conditions must be in place for successful desistance to 
occur; they are: 
(i) a general openness to change,  
(ii) the ability to envision a more conventional self,  
(iii) a new negative view of offending behaviours, and  
(iv) an exposure to mechanisms that might facilitate change.  
Further, this theory draws on findings that suggest that individuals who are able to 
desist from crime have higher levels of self-efficacy, meaning that they see 
themselves in control of their own futures and have a clear sense of purpose and 
meaning in their lives (Maruna, 2001). One explanation for this may be that as an 
individual grows older, his or her ability to interact with the environment becomes 
more sophisticated, and he or she is more able to gauge the needs and requirements 
of others (Berk, 2013). To do this it is suggested that a developed set of cognitive 
reasoning skills are required (Dunfield & Kuhlmeierref, 2013). As noted in the 
introductory section of this chapter, those skills are purported to be Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning.   
However, whilst Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning have been shown to emerge in children at about the same time (Semel & 
Rosner, 2003) and continue to develop in a simultaneous manner throughout early 
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childhood (Decety & Jackson, 2004), there remains limited consensus in the 
literature regarding their development through adolescence and into adulthood. 
Therefore, it is suggested that to fully understand the relationship between age and 
crime, more testable theories and empirical evidence are needed (McNeill et al., 
2012). As a consequence, chapter four (study 1) gives consideration to the impact of 
age on the acquisition, and further development, of Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, and the results from study 1 are considered in 
studies 2, 3 and 4 (chapters five, six and seven). 
2.7.2: Gender Related Prosocial and/or Offending Behaviours. 
 
The construction and nurturing of prosociality, regardless of gender, is often 
said to be at the forefront of many caregivers’ minds (Morrow-Howell, McCray, Lee, 
& McBride, 2011). Indeed, the continuing development and maintenance of 
prosocial behaviours appears to be crucial for the effective functioning of society 
(Law, Siu, & Shek, 2012). Therefore, it may be reasonable to expect levels of 
prosociality to be similar and consistent in the majority of people (Espinosa & 
Kovářík, 2015).  
However, empirical evidence relating to gender differences in prosociality is 
mixed (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). For example, Eagly and Crowley (1986), in a 
meta-analytic review of gender differences in prosocial behaviour, concluded that 
overall males ‘helped’ more than females, and females got more ‘help’ than males. 
In contrast, Chadha and Misra (2006) reported no significant gender related 
differences in prosocial behaviours. More recently, this view was supported by 
Abdullahi and Kumar (2016) who, in a study of 30 males and 30 females (aged 20- 
to 30- years), found no significant gender differences relating to social relationships 
and behaviours. In contrast, Erdle, Sansom, Cole, and Heapy, (1992) stated that 
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women appear to score more highly on measures of helping behaviours than men, 
and that such gender related differences are evidenced in prosocial behaviours. 
Einolf (2001) concurred proposing that in general females are brought up to be more 
prosocially motivated than males.  
One possible explanation for this dichotomy in helping behaviours according 
to gender may be attributed to ‘prosocial gender stereotyping’. Indeed, gender 
stereotyping may influence both the behaviour of males and females, as well as the 
research itself (Hines, 2013). For example, Hines stated that the rules that guide 
prosocial behaviour may be influenced by personal knowledge relating to gender and 
gender-appropriate behaviour. Consequently, males and females may behave 
differently in terms of their prosocial behaviour, based on their own gendered 
knowledge. As a result, findings may be representative of either a ‘real’ difference in 
prosocial behaviour between males and females, or they may be a consequence of 
how studies are designed, conducted, and responded to. For example, Espinosa and 
Kovářík (2015), in a meta-analysis of experimental studies containing at least one 
measure of prosociality, found that the ‘social framing’ of questions to be a factor in 
the alleged differences in prosocial behaviours between male and female 
participants. Specifically, these researchers found that when a question was put into a 
‘social frame’, the female participants in their study demonstrated an increased level 
of prosociality in comparison to their male counterparts. However, it must be noted, 
any differences in perceived male and female prosociality is more likely to be a 
combination of both of these factors, with the stereotype influencing the behaviour, 
and the consequent behaviour informing the stereotype.  
 Indeed, Hines (2013) questioned the way in which males and females 
identify with, and take part in, prosocial behaviours. She demonstrated that the 
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female participants in her study performed stereotypically feminine or emotional 
prosocial behaviours, as well as traditionally masculine or physical ones. In contrast 
the male participants identified only with physical prosocial behaviours. Since 
emotions are naturally linked to social dilemmas, the capacity to inhibit them may 
result in lower sharing and less cooperation. Therefore, Hines’ findings may indicate 
that  men are more able to ‘absent themselves’ from the emotional aspects of 
dilemmas and so behave in a more ‘selfish’, or less prosocial way (Gross & John, 
2003; McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2008). Consequently, gender 
differences in prosocial behaviour may be about the types, rather than the quantity of 
prosocial behaviours (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006).  
To conclude, whilst it is possible that the emergence of an engaged and 
actively prosocial person has a biological foundation, the socio-environmental 
influences in relation to prosocial behaviours appear to be of similar importance 
(Salvatore & Taniguchi, 2012). This influence may also lead to differences in 
observed prosocial behaviours, according to gender. Therefore, in study 2 (chapter 
five) the impact of gender (as well as status) on Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, is considered.  
2.7.3: IQ and Prosocial/Offending Behaviours.  
 
The last factor which is said to impact on the development of prosociality, is 
IQ (Han, Shi, Yong, & Wang, 2012). IQ is a challenging construct to study, in part 
because it can be defined in a number of different ways (Deary, Johnson, & 
Houlihan, 2009). However, most definitions of IQ include the ability to reason, plan, 
solve problems, think abstractly, and understand complex ideas. Further, the ability 
to learn from personal experiences, as well as adapt to changing environments, are 
also important (Aknin, van Boven, & Johnson-Graham, 2014).  
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According to Green, Kreuter, Deeds, & Partridge (1980) intellectual ability 
appears to promote the development of social competence. Indeed, many of the 
abilities related to IQ, are similarly associated with prosociality (Vonk, Zeigler-Hill, 
Mayhew, & Mercer, 2013). Therefore, it may not be surprising that ‘cognitively-
delayed’ individuals sometimes show a significant reduction in the development of 
appropriate social skills (Guralnick & Groom, 1987). This notion led Langdon, 
Clare, and Murphy (2011) to acknowledge that prosociality may be moderated by 
IQ; a view widely researched in relation to offending behaviours. For example, 
Simonoff et al. (2004) reported low IQ to be a consistent risk factor for the 
emergence and continuity of offending behaviours during a person’s life. This was 
supported by Koenen, Caspi, Moffitt, Rijsdijk, and Taylor (2006) who, following a 
meta-analysis of previous studies, reported that the effect size of the association 
between lower levels of IQ and offending behaviour to be approximately .30.  
Further, both IQ and offending behaviours appear to be influenced by genetic 
and environmental factors (Aljabber, 2001). For example, according to Rhee and 
Waldman (2002), both IQ and offending behaviours are partly heritable. They 
reported that genetic influences account for one third of the variance in a child’s IQ, 
as well as one half of the variance in offending behaviours. Similarly, IQ and 
offending behaviours seem to share many environmentally generated  risk factors, 
such as low socioeconomic status (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002), a lack of educational 
opportunities (Towl & Crighton, 2010), and child maltreatment or domestic violence 
(Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, & Taylor, 2004). As a consequence, Kopp, Baker, and Brown 
(1992) suggested that individuals with low IQ scores may have difficulty in 
successfully following the rules of society or find it too difficult to verbally negotiate 
conflict; which may promote offending behaviours (Lynam & Henry, 2001).  
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For some time the association between IQ and offending behaviour has been 
considered to be robust (Lynam, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993). Koenen et al. 
(2006) concurred, stating that low IQ is a consistent risk factor for emergence and 
continuity of offending behaviour during a person’s life, even when other relevant 
risk factors are statistically controlled for. More specifically Entorf and Spengler 
(2000) stressed the importance of differentiating between factors such IQ, when 
assessing abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning. Therefore, IQ was assessed in chapter 3, and the results were considered 
in studies 2, 3, and 4 (chapter’s five, six and seven). 
 
2.9: Social Capital, Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding,  
       and Moral Reasoning. 
So far this thesis has focused on factors that are implicated in the acquisition 
of prosocial and offending behaviours. However, the acquisition and ongoing 
maintenance of prosociality, according to some research, is heavily dependent on the 
development of successful social relationships (Bosancianu, Powell, & Bratović, 
2013). Indeed, Bosancianu et al. stated that these relationships affect the 
contributions that people make to the welfare of others, as well as society in general. 
Yet, whether a person is asked to engage in prosocial behaviour, or even if they will 
comply with such a request, depends to a large extent on the ties and networks they 
have in place (Hooghe, 2002). These ties and networks are generally referred to as 
Social Capital (Lin, 2001). 
According to Lin (2001) there are three types of Social Capital. The first is 
scope-based Social Capital which emerges when a person has contact with a large 
number of people from a wide range of different backgrounds. The second is 
resource-based Social Capital which is so named because it refers to the ties that 
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individuals might have to more ‘resourceful’ others; which is this instance means the 
provision of information, contacts, and encouragement (Lin, 2001). The last type of 
Social Capital, which is arguably the most important from the perspective of this 
thesis, is relation-based Social Capital that refers to relationships or networks that 
are categorised as having strong ties, with a high level of trust and reciprocity. In 
these networks, people are more likely to provide help to each other, conform to 
group norms, and punish deviant behaviour. However, past research appears to focus 
on neuroscientific study, with limited evidence of a psychological association 
between Social Capital and Theory of Mind, Social Capital and Empathic 
Understanding, and Social Capital and Moral Reasoning (McKenzie et al., 2002). 
The next subsection will consider the available literature.  
2.9.1: Social Capital and Theory of Mind. 
 
In a neuroscientific study, McCabe et al. (2001) investigated the neural 
correlates of trust and reciprocity; two factors known to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of Social Capital. They exposed participants to a 
simple two-player reciprocal game of trust, in which he or she played against either a 
human or a computer, whilst at the same time undergoing a Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging scan. Following the results, participants were divided into one of 
two groups. Group one consisted of participants who demonstrated cooperative 
behaviours against a human opponent but not against the computer, and group two 
consisted of participants who showed no significant cooperative behaviours at all, 
regardless of the opponent. In the study, those who showed cooperating behaviours 
against a human opponent, also demonstrated high levels of activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex; an area of the brain known to be implicated in Theory of Mind. 
However, as noted in the introduction to the current section, previous studies appear 
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not to have considered a psychological link between Social Capital and Theory of 
Mind. To address this study 3(chapter six) considers this relationship.   
2.9.2: Social Capital and Empathic Understanding. 
 
Social Capital is conceptualised by cooperative behaviours, especially those 
involving trust and reciprocity (Balliet & van Lange, 2013). Key to trust is the 
perception of fairness or unfairness (Andreoni, 1990). Some studies have made a link 
between perceived unfairness in social interaction and the activation of regions in the 
brain associated with Empathic Understanding. For example, Petersen, Roepstorff, 
and Serritzlew (2009) in a study involving online gaming, noted that emotions were 
evoked according to whether an opponent was perceived as having acted fairly or 
unfairly. In relation to the perceived unfairness, the emotions displayed by the 
participants were most predominantly anger and disgust. 
 Singer et al. (2006) similarly demonstrated an association between Social 
Capital and Empathic Understanding within an offending population. They firstly 
exposed participants to a range of dilemma based interactions where an opponent 
was seen to act either ‘fairly’ or ‘unfairly’. The results demonstrated that the ‘unfair’ 
opponents were considered significantly less ‘likeable’, than those who acted fairly. 
Secondly, Singer et al. conducted brain scans on their participants, whilst he or she 
observed videos where both the ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ opponents were subjected to 
‘painful’ electric shocks. Analysis of the participants’ brain activity revealed 
significantly less activity in the area of the brain related to Empathic Understanding 
when the ‘unfair’ opponents were ‘shocked’ compared to the ‘fair’ opponents. In 
addition, significant activity in the area of the brain associated with ‘reward’ was 
noted when the ‘unfair’ opponents received electric shocks; something that was 
found to be positively associated with a desire for revenge. However, as with Theory 
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of Mind, previous studies appear not to have considered a psychological link 
between Social Capital and Empathic Understanding. To address this, study 3 
(chapter six) considers this relationship.  
2.9.3: Social Capital and Moral Reasoning. 
 
Social Capital is said to involve many influencing factors; including social 
proximity, number of encounters, mutual commitments, trust, reciprocity, and moral 
motivations (Sanghera, Ablezova, & Botoeva, 2011; Torche & Valenzuela, 2011). 
As such, Moral Reasoning is likely to allow for the consideration of various 
emotional states, and be highly context sensitive (Barbalet, 2009). However, Lin 
(2001) noted that  by emphasising that Social Capital is motivated by the norms of 
trust and reciprocity (Lin, 2001), moral motivations may have been ignored (Fevre, 
2000). As such, bonds based on sympathy and sentiment, as well as trust and 
reciprocity, may be better explained by Moral Reasoning (Filonowicz, 2008).  
Despite this dichotomy, evidence for a relationship between Moral Reasoning 
and Social Capital can be found in neuroscientific studies. For example, in a study 
where offenders were exposed to a number of morality based dilemmas, involving 
both computer generated and real life scenarios, Sanfey et al. (2003) found that the 
computer generated scenarios did not activate moral emotions such as shame, guilt, 
or embarrassment, in the same way that the real life situations did; thus indicating a 
relationship between Social Capital and Moral Reasoning. However, as with Theory 
of Mind and Empathic Understanding, previous studies appear not to have 
considered a psychological link between Social Capital and Moral Reasoning. To 
address this, study 3 as reported in chapter six, considers the relationship between 
Social Capital and Moral Reasoning. 
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2.10: Executive Functioning, Theory of Mind, Empathic   
         Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. 
Cognitive constructs, such as Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, are said to have the capacity to regulate thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours (Blair, 2002). They are also reported to provide a foundation for 
maintaining positive social relationships or Social Capital (Flook, Goldberg, Pinger, 
& Davidson, 2015). As such, self-regulation in these areas is increasingly recognised 
as an important contributor to successful social participation (Moffitt et al., 2011). 
However, the coordination and management of Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, as well as Social Capital, is said to be 
complex. According to McCloskey, Perkins, and Van Divner (2009) Executive 
Functioning is said to be the overarching system, which co-ordinates the building 
blocks involved in; 
(i)  maintaining and shifting cognitive set, 
(ii) visualising and manipulating information,  
(iii) strategising,  
(iv) selecting a response from among competing choices, and  
(v) maintaining task goals.   
Further, the maturation of the brain is linked to the development of Executive 
Functioning. This is demonstrated by the advancement of abilities, which are said to 
be present in a rudimentary form at the beginning of life, but undergo rapid 
development congruent with brain growth during childhood, such as Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital (Diamond, 
2013). This led Nigg and Huang-Pollock (2003) to note the effects of an 
underdeveloped Executive Functioning in terms of a person’s long-term social 
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functioning. For example, in a study with school children, they found that positive 
reciprocity was needed for successful social interaction, and in particular the ability 
to comprehend, maintain, and comply with social rules appeared to be essential. 
Further, norm-breaking behaviours sometimes led to social rejection (Coie, Dodge, 
& Kupersmidt, 1990).  
Barkley (2010) suggested that effective Executive Functioning was 
associated with prosociality, and conversely a dysfunction in this area is said to be 
predictive of offending behaviours (Mullin & Simpson, 2007). As a consequence, 
programmes aimed at addressing an offender’s ability to self-regulate have been a 
particular focus of the Criminal Justice System (Sharma, Prakash, Sengar, 
Chaudhury, & Singh, 2015). Yet, despite evidence highlighting the importance of 
self-regulation, there is a paucity of research considering the predictive ability of 
Executive Functioning in relation to Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning. In addition, a gap in the literature exists relating to the effect that 
Executive Functioning may have on Social Capital. An explanation for this may be 
that Executive Functioning is noted as not having a ‘gold-standard’ test used in its 
measurement (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Salthouse, 2005); possibly 
because of its multidimensional nature (Brugger, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & 
Wilson, 1998). Indeed, Executive Functioning is said to be made up of an array of 
cognitive abilities, which include: (i) Working Memory; (ii) Cognitive Flexibility, 
and (iii) Inhibitory Control (McCloskey et al., 2009). Therefore, these constructs 
were used as the determining factors of Executive Functioning to address this gap in 
the literature (see study 4, chapter seven).   
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2.12:  Conclusion. 
 
Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) argued that cognitive skills are associated with 
prosocial behaviour. This may be because cognitive structures underlie the capacity 
to discern others’ thoughts, emotions, and needs, as well as the ability to respond 
adequately to those observations. As a result, prosocial people tend to be well 
regulated and low in impulsiveness (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). They are also able to 
exercise self-control when tempted to do wrong, and feel guilt and remorse about 
any perceived wrongdoing (Hoffman, 1970), and are often characterised by their 
compassion for others (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). 
So far, this thesis has suggested that prosociality can be driven by a range of 
motivations. An appreciation of the theoretical framework underpinning prosocial 
and offending behaviours has been offered. In particular, the key psychological 
paradigms; (i) genetic factors, (ii) dispositional differences, (iii) socio-environmental 
influences, and (iv) cognitive abilities, have been discussed in relation to the 
acquisition and realisation of prosocial and offending behaviours. It has been 
described that whilst each paradigm has traditionally been presented as a singular 
and separate influence, that can prompt, change, or mitigate behaviour, psychology 
now takes a more multi-dimensional stance. It has been proposed that cognition 
represents the greatest cogency, as from this perspective the individual must 
recognise and understand the goals and desires of another, as well as note that any 
action they take will have an emotional consequence for both parties (Prinz, 2007). It 
is also noted that do this a person must acquire three separate, yet related, cognitive 
skills; namely Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning 
(Eggum et al., 2011; Elliott, Racine, & Busse, 1995; Sharp, 2008; Spenser et al. 
2015).   
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The need for further psychological studies in relation to Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning was noted in the current chapter. In 
particular, it was stated that whilst Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning have been shown to emerge in children at about the same time 
(Semel & Rosner, 2003), and continue to develop in a simultaneous manner during 
early childhood (Decety & Jackson, 2004), there is no consensus regarding their 
development through adolescence and into adulthood. This gap in the literature is 
addressed and further discussed in study 1 (chapter four) of this thesis.  
More recently, Farrington (2010) noted that status related variances in Theory 
of Mind, Empathic Understanding, or Moral Reasoning are equivocal, whilst Hines 
(2013) questioned the way in which males and females identify, and take part in, 
prosocial behaviours. To clarify this issue Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning, in relation to gender and status are examined and further 
discussed in 2 (chapter five) of this thesis. 
 In addition, McKenzie et al. (2002) noted that a link between Social Capital 
and key cognitive skills, such as Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, is complex. Whilst there appears to be neuroscientific support for 
this association: (i) Social Capital and Theory of Mind (McCabe et al., 2001), Social 
Capital and Empathic Understanding (Damasio, 2004), and Social Capital and Moral 
Reasoning (Sanfey et al., 2003), studies considering each from a psychological 
perspective, with a male and female, offending and non-offending population, are 
limited. This gap is addressed and further discussed in study 3 (chapter six) of this 
thesis.  
Finally, despite evidence highlighting the importance of self-regulation in 
terms of social development (Marques, et al., 2015), to the current author’s 
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knowledge, previous research has not considered the ability of Executive 
Functioning to predict Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, 
as well as Social Capital. Similarly, additional research regarding differences in 
abilities according to status in Executive Functioning, as determined by Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, are missing from the 
literature.  These gaps will be addressed and further discussed in study 4 (chapter 
seven) of this thesis. The following chapter will define the methodologies behind 
each of the four studies within this thesis.   
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Chapter Three 
The Methodology 
 
 McNeill et al. (2012) suggested that a broadening of what is sometimes 
referred to as 'the desistance agenda' is long overdue. Consequently, the overriding 
purpose of this thesis was to examine how Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, as the key constructs behind prosociality, 
might have importance in terms of offender rehabilitation. Specifically, it is 
proposed that the ability to break down prosociality, as well as understand and 
measure its individual components (Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning) will be useful for researchers and practitioners alike. Similarly, 
the relationship between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning and Social Capital, as well as the overriding influence of Executive 
Functions on each individual construct, could be particularly useful in relation to 
understanding prosocial and offending behaviours.  
Therefore, this thesis asked the following questions: 
1. Do abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning differ according to age? - study 1 (chapter four). 
2. Do abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral      
Reasoning differ according to a person’s gender or  
status? - study 2 (chapter five). 
3. Is there an association between Social Capital and Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, and if so are they able to 
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predict an individual’s Social Capital across status? - studies 3a and 3b 
(chapter six). 
4. Is Executive Functioning able to predict ability in Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and levels of Social Capital? 
- studies 4a and 4b (chapter seven). 
This chapter presents the research design, data collection, and data analysis 
procedures considered to be the most suitable in addressing the research questions 
noted above. However, before practical procedures are presented, the theoretical 
fundaments of the selected design will be discussed.  
3.1:  Design.  
 
 As stated by Sayre (2001, p.4) “gathering intelligence…is the purpose of 
conducting research of all types”.  Within psychology one of two methods or 
research are generally adopted; qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative research is 
used to quantify the problem by way of generating numerical data or data that can be 
transformed into useable statistics. It is used to quantify attitudes, opinions, 
behaviours, and other defined variables. Quantitative research uses measurable data 
to formulate facts and uncover patterns of behaviour, and data collection methods are 
highly structured, using various forms of surveys, face-to-face or telephone 
interviews, longitudinal studies, website interceptors, online polls, and systematic 
observations. In contrast to qualitative research, quantitative methods can be more 
generalisable due to a larger sample population.  
The reasons for choosing a quantitative design in this thesis threefold: Firstly, 
the aim of this thesis was to establish statistically significant conclusions about a 
population by studying a representative sample of that population. Since it is 
impractical to conduct a census, which includes everyone in the population, because 
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of constant turnover and resource constraints, a representative sample is chosen from 
the population. Secondly, the studies within this thesis are measurements of 
outcome. This type of research tests the accuracy of a theory by determining if the 
independent variables cause an effect on the dependent variable. Often, surveys, 
correlation studies, and measurements of outcomes are evaluated to establish 
causality within a credible confidence range. Lastly, quantitative research offers both 
reliability and validity. In terms of validity in it is enables separate researchers to 
come to similar conclusions using the same experimental design or participants in a 
study to consistently produce the same measurement. From the perspective of 
validity, all of the instruments used in the thesis are verified as measuring the 
construct they are purported to test. This adds assurance that any change in the 
dependent variable will be effected by the independent variable; as such, the results 
will be generalisable to the chosen population.  
3.1.1: Study 1: Age related differences in Theory of Mind, Empathic  
          Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. 
 
A one-way, between groups, multivariate analysis of covariance 
MANCOVA, controlling for IQ, was conducted to investigate age related differences 
in prosocial skills in (a) 69 males and (b) 69 females across three age groups: 
adolescents (n= 23; 14- to 17- years), young adults (n=23; 18- to 24- years), and 
adults (n=23; 25- to 55- years) across the five different measures. The independent 
variables were the three age groups: (i) male adolescents, (ii) male young-adults, and 
(iii) male adults, and the five dependent variables were: verbal Theory of Mind, 
visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, and performance-
based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning.  
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3.1.2: Study 2:  Gender and status related differences in Theory of Mind,  
          Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. 
 
A two-way, between groups, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling 
for IQ and age,  was conducted to explore the impact of gender and status on the five 
dependent variables: (i) verbal Theory of Mind; (ii) visual Theory of Mind; (iii) self-
reported Empathic Understanding; (iv) performance-based Empathic Understanding, 
and; (v) Moral Reasoning. The two independent variables were (i) gender, which had 
two levels; (a) male (n=200, 18- to 55- years) and (b) female (n=200, 18- to 55- 
years), and (ii) status, which had two levels: (a) offender (n=200, 18- to 55- years) 
and (b) non-offender (n=200, 18- to 55- years).  
3.1.3: Study 3. Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning,  
 and Social Capital. 
 
Study 3 a:  Associations between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital were measured. The relationship between 
Social Capital and (i) verbal Theory of Mind; (ii) visual  Theory of Mind; (iii) self-
reported Empathic Understanding; (iv) performance-based Empathic Understanding, 
and; (v) Moral Reasoning were investigated using Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation Coefficient in offenders (n = 200; 18- to 55- years) and non-offenders (n 
= 200; 18- to 55- years). The study controlled for IQ, age, and gender.   
Study 3b: Status related differences in Social Capital. An independent t-test 
was conducted to compare the Social Capital scores of offenders (n = 200; 18- to 55- 
years) and non-offenders (n = 200; 18- to 55- years).  
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3.1.4: Study 4: Executive Functioning, Theory of Mind, Empathic  
Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. 
 
Study 4a: Differences in abilities in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, 
and Inhibitory Control between offenders and non-offenders. A one-way, between 
groups, multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), controlling for age and 
IQ, was conducted to investigate status related differences in Executive Functioning 
as informed by abilities in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control, between 200 offenders (males and female, aged 18- to 55- years) and 200 
non-offenders (male and female, aged 18- to 55- years). The independent variables 
were the two status groups: (i) offenders, and (ii) non-offenders, and the three 
dependent variables were: Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control. 
Study 4b: Executive Functioning, as informed by Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, as predictors of Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. Path analysis was 
used to analyse the ability of Executive Functioning to predict Theory of Mind 
Verbal, Theory of Mind - Visual, Empathic Understanding- Self-Report, Empathic 
Understanding- Performance-Based, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital in a mixed 
cohort of male and female offenders (n = 200). 
 
3.2:  Measures. 
3.2.1: IQ.  
The WASI – Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999) 
was chosen to assess IQ as it provides a reliable, brief measure of IQ in research 
settings. This measure produces an estimate of general intellectual ability. The 
WASI consists of four subtests: Vocabulary, Block Design, Similarities, and Matrix 
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Reasoning. Scores on the Vocabulary and Similarities subtests were combined to 
yield a Verbal IQ (VIQ) score; similarly, scores on the Block Design and Matrix 
Reasoning subtests were combined to yield a Performance IQ (PIQ) score. Scores 
from the four subtests were combined to derive a Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) score. Raw 
scores on each of the subtests were converted into age-adjusted standardized scores, 
and from there the index scores (VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ) were derived.  The 
Vocabulary subtest assessed a participant’s word knowledge by asking him or her to 
produce the definitions of given words. The researcher presented the words visually 
and orally, and the participant was required to define the word. The answer was 
given a score of 0, 1, or 2 points using a scoring guide. The Similarities subtest 
measured a participant’s ability to form comparisons between verbal concepts. For 
the first four items of the test, the participant was presented with two rows of 
pictures. He or she was then required to choose one picture from the bottom row that 
was most similar to the pictures in the top row. For the rest of the items, the 
researcher read two words and the participant had to describe how those items were 
similar. As with Vocabulary, the participants’ responses were scored 0, 1, or 2, based 
on the manual’s scoring guide. The Block Design subtest measured non-verbal 
reasoning and visuospatial organisational abilities. This task required the participant 
to copy a geometric design presented on a stimulus card using two-dimensional 
blocks. It assessed lower-level cognitive abilities (e.g., basic visual perception) as 
well as higher-level perceptual planning elements; this integrated functioning of a 
variety of brain systems was measured with this subtest. The Matrix Reasoning 
subtest measured the ability to manipulate, abstract, and perceive the relationships 
between shapes; therefore, it measured non-verbal perceptual and visuospatial 
organisational abilities, as well as visual analogical reasoning (Braze et. al, 2007). In 
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this task, two sets of geometric patterns are presented to the participant. The first 
pattern has one piece missing; the participant is required to select the missing piece 
from the second set of patterns. A correct response to the problem is awarded 1 
point; an incorrect response scores 0. The final score is the sum of all correct 
responses, and ranges between 0 and 35.   
3.2.2: Verbal Theory of Mind.  
The Social Stories Questionnaire (SSQ, Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & 
Wheelwright, 2004) was chosen to measure verbal Theory of Mind. This measure 
consists of ten vignettes. Each vignette is divided into three sub-sections, making a 
total of 30 sub-sections.  Each sub-section contains either: a blatantly offensive 
utterance, a subtly offence utterance, or no offensive utterance, which is made by one 
character to another. In all, 10 sub-sections contain a blatantly offensive utterance, 
10 sub-sections contain a subtly offensive utterance and 10 sub-sections contain no 
offensive utterance. In the following example vignette sub-section 1 contains a 
blatantly offensive utterance (dialogue line b), sub-section 2 contains no offensive 
utterance, and sub-section 3 contains a subtly offensive utterance (dialogue line b).  
Sub-section 1: 
            Linda was nervous. She was about to introduce her new boyfriend, James, to  
            her friends, Faye and Alex. She was nervous because they had really like her  
             last boyfriend, Keith. She was also nervous because she had just spoken to 
             her old best friend Kate. Kate and Linda had been best friends at school but  
             when they left Kate had got a job in another town and they had lost touch. 
             That was five years ago. But Kate was back and wanted to meet up tonight.  
             At 7pm the doorbell rang and Linda opened the door to see Kate standing 
             there. 
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1a) ‘Hello stranger’, said Linda,’ Come on in’. 
1b)  ‘Crikey, there’s a few more lines on that face than I remembered’,  
         said Kate. 
1c)  ‘Well it’s been a few years. What brings you back? 
Sub-section 2: 
2a) ‘I just came back to see my mum’, replied Kate. 
2b) ‘Oh,’ said Linda, ‘Do you want a drink?’ 
             The others arrived shortly afterwards and to Linda’s relief everyone was 
              getting on really well.   
             Sub-section 3: 
 Linda had cooked a meal of roast beef. Just after she had dished it out she 
             realised she’d forgotten to ask James if he was vegetarian.  
3a) ‘Great meal, Linda’, said James to Linda’s relief. 
Later when Linda was making coffee with Faye and Alex she realised she  
            was out of milk.  Faye carried the black coffee into the living room. 
3b) ‘Sorry Keith, you don’t mind it black do you?’ said Faye. 
3c) ‘No’, replied Linda’s boyfriend. 
Participants were asked to indicate if they thought a section contained an 
utterance which might upset or offend another character by ticking a ‘yes’ response.  
If the participants indicated that they thought an utterance might upset or offend 
another character, they were then asked to identify the dialogue line on which the 
utterance appeared by placing a dot at the beginning of the appropriate line.  If they 
thought the section was void of any offensive utterance, they were asked to tick the 
‘no’ response.  Participants were awarded one mark for each target utterance 
correctly identified.  The highest score for each type of utterance was therefore 10, 
with a maximum of 30 marks for the measure in total. Lawson et al.’s (2004) 
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guidelines for administering the test were followed throughout.  According to 
Lawson et al. the probability of identifying a target by chance alone is p = .5 x .25 = 
.125; therefore, corrections were not considered necessary. This test has been 
reliably used in the measuring of Theory of Mind in autistic adults by Lawson et al., 
who contend that a low score indicates a less developed Theory of Mind, whilst a 
higher score implied a more developed Theory of Mind. The type of utterance was 
randomly placed throughout the sub-sections.  The sections without an offensive 
utterance acted as a control. In the current study the internal consistency (Cronbach's 
alpha coefficient) was α = .72.  
3.2.3: Visual Theory of Mind.  
The ‘Reading of the Mind in the Eyes test’ revised version (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001) was chosen to measure visual Theory of Mind. This measure consists of 36 
photographs plus 1 practice photograph. The 36 photographs (which were included 
for standard use in the measure) were split into 3 levels: 12 positive emotions, 12 
negative emotions, and 12 neutral emotions. The levels were distributed randomly 
throughout the test and are given to the participants in the same order. The ages of 
the ‘eyes’ are mixed and split evenly between men and women; however they all of 
Caucasian ethnicity. The participant was asked to pick which of the four words best 
described what the person in the photograph was thinking or feeling. Three of the 
words were ‘foil mental state terms’ while the fourth was deemed to be ‘correct’. 
The position of the correct word was randomised. The participant was asked to 
circle, their choice on the answer sheet provided, where the four possible answers 
were replicated (see figure 3.1).   
In this example the correct answer is ‘playful’. Participants were awarded one 
mark for each correct emotion identified and zero marks for each incorrect emotion 
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identified. The maximum number of marks was 36. A definition of each word taken 
from the original test was also included to ensure all participants had an equal 
understanding on the meaning of each word.  In the current study the internal 
consistency was α = .61. 
 
       PLAYFUL                                                                    COMFORTING 
 
                             
                      
 
 
 
               BORED                                                                          IRRITATED      
        
Figure 3.1: Example of a photograph taken from Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste and  
                    Plumb, 2001 (reproduced with the permission of www.autismresearchcentre.com) 
                                                                                                                    
3.2.4: Self-Reported Empathic Understanding. 
The Empathy Quotient (EQ –Short, Wakabayashi et al., 2006) was selected 
to measure self-reported Empathic Understanding. This measure was used to assess 
participants’ Empathic Understanding.  Participants were instructed to read each of 
the 22- statements carefully and judge the extent to which they agreed using a four-
point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly agree) to 4 (Strongly disagree).  Half the items 
were positively worded (e.g., “I really enjoy caring for other people”) and half 
negatively worded (e.g., “I find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite”).  
The order of presentation was randomised to avoid a response bias.  Participants 
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scored two points if they recorded a strongly empathising response and one point if 
they recorded a slightly empathising response.  Slightly and strongly non-
empathising responses scored no marks.  The highest score obtainable is therefore 
44.  The higher the score the more empathic the participant is deemed to be. There 
have been some concerns regarding this type of measure. For example, Makino 
(2010) suggested that self-report empathy measures might not be an indication of 
how a participant actually feels but rather how they believe other people might 
expect them to feel. In addition, it is important to note that the data may also vary 
according to an individual's ability to verbalise his or her own thoughts (Zhou, 
Valiente, & Eisenberg, 2003). However, the Empathy Quotient is reported to have 
acceptable internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .76 
(Wakabayashi et al., 2006). In the current study the internal consistency was α = .81.  
3.2.5: Performance-Based Empathic Understanding.  
The Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 
2002) was chosen to measure performance-based Empathic Understanding. This 
measure assesses the four-branch model of emotional intelligence (perceiving 
emotions, using emotions, understanding emotions, and regulating emotions). The 
test consists of 141 questions that are divided among 8 tasks (2 for each branch). The 
test yielded four branches and a total emotional intelligence score.  
The first branch ‘Perceiving Emotions’  was measured by asking participants 
to identify the emotions expressed in photographs of people’s faces (Faces) as well 
as the feelings suggested by artistic designs and landscapes (Pictures). For example, 
in the Faces task, participants were presented with a picture of a person expressing a 
basic emotion. Below the picture is a list of five emotions; the subject was asked to 
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rate on a five-point scale how much of a particular emotion was expressed in the 
picture.  
The second branch ‘Use of Emotion to Facilitate Thought’  was measured by 
two tests that assess the participant’s ability to describe emotional sensations and 
their parallels to other sensory modalities using a non-feeling vocabulary 
(Sensations), and identify the feelings that might facilitate or interfere with the 
successful performance of various cognitive and behavioural tasks (Facilitation). For 
example, the task measuring Sensations presented participants with a sentence 
asking them to imagine feeling an emotion such as shame. Participants were then 
given a list of adjectives pertaining to other sensory modalities (e.g., cold, blue, and 
sweet) and were asked to rate on a five-point scale from Not Alike to Very Much 
Alike how much the feeling of shame was similar to the adjectives.  
The third branch ‘Understanding Emotion’ was measured by two tests that 
pertain to a participant’s ability to analyse blended or complex emotions (Blends) 
and to understand how emotional reactions change over time or how they follow 
upon one another (Changes). For example, a question on the Blends task presented a 
statement such as: 
          ‘Acceptance, joy, and warmth often combine to form…’  
Participants were then presented with a list of response alternatives and were asked 
to choose the most appropriate.  
The fourth branch ‘Managing Emotions’ had two subtests that assessed how 
participants managed the emotions of others (Social Management), and how a 
participant regulated his or her own emotions (Emotion Management). For example, 
the Social Management task asked participants to read a short story about another 
person, and then determine how effective several different courses of action would 
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have been in coping with emotions in the story. Participants rated a number of 
possible actions ranging from Very ineffective, to Very effective. The MSCEIT is an 
objective test because there were better and worse answers on it, as determined by 
consensus or expert scoring. Consensus scores reflected the proportion of people in 
the normative sample (over 5,000 people from various parts of the world) who 
endorsed each MSCEIT test item. Expert norms were obtained by Mayer et al. 
(2002) from a sample of 21 members of the International Society Research on 
Emotions (ISRE) who provided their expert judgment on each of the test’s items. 
Participants received credit for correct answers to the extent that they match those of 
the experts. Full-scale MSCEIT scores based on the consensus norms and expert 
norms correlated highly, r = .91 (Mayer et al., 2002).  
The MSCEIT is reliable at the full-scale level and at the area and branch 
levels (Mayer et al., 2002). Mayer et al. reported full-test split-half reliabilities of .93 
and .91 for consensus and expert scoring, respectively. The test-retest reliability of 
the full-test MSCEIT over a three-week interval was r (59) = .86 in a college student 
sample (Brackett & Mayer, 2002). In the current study the internal consistency was α 
= .76.   
3.2.6: Moral Reasoning.  
The Socio-Moral Reflection Measure (SRM-SF, Gibbs et al., 1992) was 
selected to assess Moral Reasoning. This measure is used to assess participants’ 
moral judgment. The social values assessed included contract, affiliation, life, 
property, law, and legal justice.  Participants responded to each of the 11 statements 
using a three-point scale (Very important, Important, and Not important) to indicate 
the level importance they attributed to each. They were then asked to give a short 
reason as to why they had attributed that level of importance to a particular item. 
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 For example: 
 
How important is it for parents to keep their promises to their children? 
VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
Why?........................................................................................................ 
 
As recommended by the authors, the lead researcher was self-trained using 
the guidelines and training materials provided by Gibbs et al. (1992) which have 
good inter-rater reliability, r(23) = .99, p<.001. The importance attributed to each 
statement acted merely as a prompt for the participant and was not assessed by the 
researcher.  Each reason (given in response to the question ‘why’ in each of the 11- 
statements) was assessed by the lead researcher, matched against standardised 
answers and scored accordingly (1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2 and so on, up to a maximum 
of 4.0).  The scores were summed and divided by the number of valid responses.  A 
minimum of seven valid responses were needed to ensure accuracy.  The resultant 
SRM-SF score indicated the participants’ global stage or level of moral 
development.  For data analysis the score is multiplied by 100 to create a continuous 
range of 100 (indicating lower levels of Moral Reasoning and corresponding to 
Kohlberg's moral stage 1) to 400 (indicating higher levels of Moral Reasoning and 
corresponding to Kohlberg's moral stage 4).   
The measure has been found, in past research, to discriminate between 
offenders and non-offenders (Palmer & Begum, 2006). The measure is reported by 
Palmer and Begum to have acceptable levels of test and re-test reliability, r (234) = 
.88, p <.001, and comparable validity with the Moral Judgement Interview (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987), r (43) = .88, p < .0001.  The SRM-SF also shows good convergent 
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validity with age, r (372) = .66, verbal IQ, r (319) = .49, and economic status, r (349) = .20 
(Gibbs et al., 1992) and has good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha 
coefficient reported of .92. In the current study the internal consistency was α = .93.  
3.2.7: Social Capital.  
The Cambridge Friendship Questionnaire (FQ; Baron-Cohen, Richler, 
Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003) was selected to measure levels of Social 
Capital in both the offenders and non-offenders in studies 3 and 4. As noted in 
chapter 2 (sub-section 2.9) the acquisition and ongoing maintenance of prosociality 
is dependent on the development and maintenance of successful social relationships - 
referred to as Social Capital (Bosancianu, Powell, & Bratović, 2013). Sabatini 
(2009) suggested that the construct of Social Capital is comprised of three distinct 
sub-types: bonding Social Capital, bridging Social Capital, and linking Social 
Capital (see chapter 7, section 7.3, for a more detailed explanation).  The 
‘relationships’ or ‘ties’ within these sub-types of Social Capital are said to be 
characterised by a sense of knowledge, obligation, expectation, and trustworthiness 
which serve to endorse societal norms (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994); thus offering a 
system of informal social control (Sampson & Laub, 2005). Indeed, Sampson and 
Laub argue that offending behaviours may result when a person’s relationships or 
ties are absent, weakened, or broken. However, most studies examining this proposal 
have relied on observational methods, with few self (or performance-based) report 
instruments being developed.  To address this gap Baron -Cohen et al. (2033) 
developed the FQ, noting that individual wills score highly  if they: (i) enjoy close, 
trusting, reciprocal, and supportive relationships; (ii) like and are interested in 
people; (iii) enjoy interaction with others for its own sake ,and; (iv) find such 
relationship to be  important (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2003).  This measure is 
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a 35-item self-report questionnaire. The questions are based on assumed none gender 
differences. A sample item is as follows, where the participant was asked to tick only 
one box: 
 
a.  I have one or two particular best friends.  
b.  I have several friends who I would call best friends.  
c. I don’t have anybody who I would call a best friend.  
 
The possible scoring range is 0 to 135. The FQ is reported by Baron-Cohen et al. as 
having high internal consistency reliability (α = 0.75), with α = 0.72 for the current 
study.   
3.2.8: Executive Functioning.  
As noted in chapter two, Executive Functioning is not noted as having a 
‘gold-standard’ test used in its measurement (Chan et al., 2008; Salthouse, 2005). 
One possible explanation for this may lie in the multidimensional nature of 
Executive Functioning (Brugger et al,, 1998). Consequently, it is standard in most 
studies to use different tests to measure the different core components of Executive 
Functioning (Chan et al., 2008), and there remains no agreement within the literature 
as to which test should be adopted, and in which combination (Salthouse, 2005). In 
addition, abilities in Executive Functioning is said to be comprised of three key 
factors: (i) Working Memory, (ii) cognitive Flexibility, and (iii) Inhibitory Control 
(McCloskey et al., 2009). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis it is important to 
identify which of these components are most closely associated with Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning.  
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 Firstly, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2003) proposed a link between Theory 
of Mind and Working Memory, whilst Tager-Flusberg, Paul, and Lord (2005) 
suggested that flexible problem solving, or Cognitive Flexibility and Theory of 
Mind. The WAIS III and its shortened version, the WASI, are both recognised to test 
aspects of Executive Functioning; the VIQ subscale measures verbal compression 
and Working Memory, and the PIQ subscale measures planning reasoning, problem 
solving, processing speed, and Cognitive Flexibility. Therefore for the purposes of 
this thesis the WASI – Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999), 
was used to measure Working memory and Cognitive Flexibility.  
Secondly, Dix (1991) proposed that emotional and behavioural self-
regulation were learned skills which develop as a result of strong parent-child 
relationships, similar in construct to prosociality. Eisenburg (2007) built on this idea 
by suggesting that, as most prosocial skills were ‘costly to the actor’, the ability to 
self-regulate or inhibit, from an emotional or behavioural perspective, was 
imperative. More recently, it was proposed that self-regulation developed in line 
with Empathic Understanding (Deater-Deckard, 2014; Eisenberg, 2013), whilst the 
earlier work of Hoffman (1987) noted that both emotional regulation and inhibition 
were necessary when making moral judgements; hence linking both to Moral 
Reasoning.  
However, Von Hippel and Gonsalkorale (2014) suggested that the traditional 
cognitive tests used to assess inhibition (for example the Stroop colour –word test) 
measure only cognitive ability. Specifically a person’s selective attention capacity 
and skills, as well as their brain are processing speed ability. Von Hipple and 
Gonsalkorale proposed that such tests do not accurately assess a person ability to 
inhibit or regulate emotions and behaviour and went on to suggest that the MSCEIT 
73 
 
(Mayer et al., 2002)  is better suited to as a measure, as its subscale ‘emotional 
management’ measures a person’s ability to inhibit and self-regulate behaviour. 
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the relevant subscales of the MSCEIT (Mayer et 
al., 2002) were used.  
 
3.3:  Participants. 
One hundred male offenders (aged 18- to 55- year-olds; M = 27.38, SD = 
7.095) were recruited from a male adult, category B, prison in England and 100 
female offenders (aged 18- to 55- year-olds; M = 30.24, SD = 10.57) were recruited 
from a female adult, closed category prison in England.  Category B male prisons 
and closed category female prisons house inmates who do not require maximum 
security, but for whom escape needs to be made difficult. All participants were 
serving a sentence of six months or less. A sentence of six months or less indicates 
that the offenders would not have committed an indictable offence such as murder, 
manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, major drugs offences, grand theft, robbery, or 
conspiracy. All other offences such as (but not limited to) assault, burglary or theft, 
driving offences, minor drugs offences, and minor fraud may be included; however, 
the actual offence was not available.  A control group of 100 males and one hundred 
females were recruited from the general and student population, in England, to match 
the age of the offenders (M age male control = 27.89, SD = 8.55 and M age female control = 
31.46, SD age female control = 10.78). When asked participants reported that they did not 
have a criminal record.   
In addition, a further cohort of 23 adolescent males aged 14- to 17- years (M 
age = 15, SD = 1.13) were recruited for study 1 (chapter four) from the general 
74 
 
population of England. With regard to the male adolescent group, the number of 
participants used represents the whole of the data gathered (n = 23).  
The samples were self-selected as the participants volunteered to take part; 
having responded to identical posters placed either on the wing notice-boards in the 
prison for the offender group or prominent places (such as school, university, or 
community library notice boards, community centre notice boards, and the university 
intranet notice board). As per the recruitment criteria, all participants were English 
speaking. No upper age limit was specified. With the exception of the student 
participants who were given research credits for taking part, no other form of 
compensation was given to any of the groups.  
3.3.1: IQ. 
 
As noted in subsection 2.7.3, allowing for different levels of IQ when 
assessing abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning is of importance (Entorf & Spengler, 2000).  Therefore, an independent-
samples t-test was conducted to compare the IQ of individuals (both male and 
female) according to status with condition one being the offender group (n = 200, 
18- to 55- years) and condition two being the non-offender group (n = 200, 18- to 
55- years). This initial screening of IQ revealed a significant difference in the levels 
of IQ between the offender group and the non-offender group, with the offender 
group scoring lower on the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of IQ (Wechsler, 1999), 
Offenders (M = 86.83, SD = 9.214); Non-Offenders (M =90.04, SD 11.52; t (398) = -
3.076, p < .05. Therefore all four studies within this thesis controlled for IQ. 
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3.4:  Procedure. 
Written consent was obtained from all participants in line with the England 
and Wales’s National Offenders Management Services (NOMS) and the supervising 
University’s ethical approval procedure. Specifically, with regard to those under the 
age of 18- years, the head teacher of the participating school informed the students’ 
parents of the nature of the study, and asked them to respond if they did not want 
their son to take part in the study and all parents agreed that their son could 
participate in the research. Consent for the research was then given by the head 
teacher at the school. The young people were also asked to give their consent before 
completing the questionnaires. All of the young people approached to participate in 
the study did so.  
Before commencing the main measures an IQ test was administered. 
Participants then completed six measures to access ability in Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. Tests were 
conducted in the following way; (i) Participants in the offender groups were tested 
individually in an empty room in the prison and (ii) Participants in the control group 
were either tested individually in an empty room in the university booked 
specifically for the task or, they completed an identical set of questions placed on 
Survey Monkey - which meets the BPS Guidelines for Ethical Practice in 
Psychological Research Online (2007). The 14- to 17- year old participants 
completed the questionnaires individually during class time.  
All participants were told that participation was voluntary; that there were no 
right or wrong answers, and they could withdraw from the study at any time. Where 
the tests were conducted in person; the researcher sat in the room with the participant 
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to provide help with reading the stories or statements if required.  When no help was 
needed the researcher remained silent, out of the participant’s direct line of vision, 
and at a suitable distance to protect the participant’s privacy. In the offender group 
the door to the room remained open at all times and a prison officer was stationed 
outside the room to ensure the safety of the researcher; the officer was not in the 
participant’s direct line of vision and a suitable distance was maintained to protect 
the participant’s privacy.  Each participant was given standard verbal instructions 
and told that they would not be timed but should try to complete the task as quickly 
as possible. The orders of the measures were counterbalanced across participants to 
prevent order effects. When finished the completed tasks were collected by the 
researcher. The participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
3.5: Ethical Approval. 
Formal ethical approval was sought at an institutional level, through existing 
formal structures within the College of Business, Law and Social Sciences, 
Nottingham Trent University. The college’s ethical clearance is in line with the 
British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009).  Ethical 
approval was granted on 19th June, 2012.  In addition, ethical approval was sought 
form the National Offenders Management Services (NOMS) for research with both 
male and female offenders. NOMS gave ethical approval for research with male 
participants (172-12) on 4th September, 2012, and for research with female 
participants (2013-149) on 29th July 2013. For copies of all briefing and debriefing 
documents, as well a consent forms see the appendices. The following four chapters 
comprise studies one through to four.  
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Chapter Four 
Study 1  
Age Related Development of Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning 
 
In chapter two the definition of prosocial behaviour was given as “a 
voluntary, intentional action that produces a positive or beneficial outcome for the 
recipient regardless of whether that action is costly, neutral, or beneficial to the 
donor” (Grusec et al., p. 2). In the same chapter, the factors said to influence the 
acquisition of prosociality: (i) genetic factors; (ii) dispositional determinants; (iii) 
socio-environmental influences, and; (iv) cognitive abilities were discussed. With 
particular focus on the cognitive aspects of prosocial behaviour, it was stated that for 
an individual to act in a prosocial way, he or she must be able to recognise the 
thoughts, desires, and beliefs of another, as well as to understand that any actions he 
or she takes, may have an emotional and/or moral consequence, for both themselves 
and the other person (Prinz, 2007). According to Eggum et al. (2011), to do this 
requires the acquisition of three cognitive skills: Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. 
  Consequently, if prosociality dictates that a person must recognise the 
thoughts, desires, and beliefs of another, as well as understand that all behaviours 
can have an emotional and/or moral consequence, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the opposite might also be true. That is, that offending behaviour may be the 
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consequence of an inability to recognise the beliefs, feelings, or intentions of others. 
Palmer (2013) suggested that this could result from an underdeveloped Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and/or Moral Reasoning. From the perspective of 
the Criminal Justice System, and in particular interventions aimed at reducing 
offending behaviours by improving prosociality, the ability to improve upon Theory 
of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and/or Moral Reasoning, during a person’s life 
span, is important.  
To the current author’s knowledge the present study is the first to consider if 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning have the potential 
to further develop during the life span of an individual, in a single study. Therefore, 
the aim of study 1 was to establish whether Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning have the potential to develop beyond 
childhood, and at what point, if any, they become fixed.  
 
4.1: Age Related Development of Theory of Mind.  
One of the most important milestones in the development of Theory of Mind 
is the ability to attribute false belief; that is, to recognise that others can have beliefs 
about the world that are different from one’s own (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). To do 
this, individuals must understand how knowledge is formed and that their own 
beliefs, as well as those of others, are based on their own personal knowledge or 
mental state. Further, a person must recognise that a belief can accurately represent 
reality and be true or misrepresent reality and be false, and that behaviours can be, in 
part, predicted by personal knowledge (Eggum et al., 2011). Eggum et al. also 
proposed that to acquire false belief, individuals must be able to hold two mental 
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representations in mind at the same time; in other words, a true state of reality and a 
false mental representation of reality.  
Research has suggested that very young children, tend to confound another 
person’s knowledge with their own (Begeer, Bernstein, van Wijhe, Scheeren, & 
Koot, 2010). Specifically, in false belief tasks, when asked to suggest where another 
will look for a hidden object, he or she will predict that a person will look where the 
object really is and not where they (‘falsely’) believe it to be. Failure to attribute 
false beliefs disappears around the age of three or four years (Callaghan et al., 2004). 
A meta-analysis conducted by Wellman and Liu (2004) demonstrated that this 
pattern of performance is robust across different procedures and cultures; thus 
supporting the theory that biological maturation is the main factor responsible for the 
onset of false-belief understanding in typically developing children. 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) conducted one of the earliest studies to 
successfully demonstrate false-belief in children. They stated that three-year-olds 
tend to fail in false-belief tasks, whereas four-year-olds usually succeed on the same 
task. In their research, typically developing children watched a scenario featuring 
puppets in which the protagonist (Sally) leaves a ball in a basket and then departs the 
scene. In her absence, the target (Anne) is seen to move the object from the basket 
and place it in a box. The children in the study were asked to predict where Sally will 
look for the ball when she returns to the room, or alternatively where she will ‘think’ 
the ball is. Prior to the age of four, children typically answer incorrectly; that is that 
Sally will think the ball is in the box (where it really is). After the age of four years, 
however, children answer as an adult would, by specifying the place where Sally 
actually left the ball; thereby ascribing to Sally a Theory of Mind. Carlson and 
Moses (2001) explained that to do this an individual must be able to override any 
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dominant or habitual thoughts, beliefs, or desires. For example, they must ignore the 
natural compulsion to reference reality as they perceive it to be. The extra year, 
during which this ability is able to mature, may be the crucial difference that enables 
four-year-olds to successfully attribute false belief.  
Whilst limited in number, and with mixed findings, some studies have 
addressed the issue of Theory of Mind and its progression during an individual’s life 
span. One such study suggested that Theory of Mind continues to develop in a 
gradual fashion beyond the preschool years and into early adulthood (Birch & 
Bloom, 2007). In their study of 155 students, Birch & Bloom found that adults not 
only take into consideration their own knowledge and that of others, but also the 
plausibility of a given scenario. Similarly, Valle, Massaroa, Castelli, and Marchetti 
(2015) found an improved performance, on an appropriate false-belief task between 
an adolescent group (M age = 14.8 years) and a young adult group (M age = 22.8 
years), with the young adult group scoring higher than the adolescent group. The 
researchers attributed this difference in scores to the young adults having better 
cognitive abilities than the adolescents, which they exploited in order to respond 
specifically to the requirements of the task.  
However, other research has concluded differently; Begeer et al. (2010), for 
example, considered Theory of Mind to be fully developed in childhood. In a study 
of 124, 6- to 20- year olds, the researchers found no improvement in the performance 
of the older participants when compared to the younger participants; thus concluding 
that Theory of Mind is fixed in early childhood. Alternatively, Bernstein, Thornton, 
and Sommerville (2011) suggested that false belief reasoning may follow a more 
bell-shaped development, increasing throughout childhood, stabilising in adulthood 
but then declining again in later life.  In their study of 95 adults (aged 17- to 59- 
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years), Bernstein et al. found that the older participants exhibited more false belief 
bias than the younger participants, irrespective of cognitive ability. In other words, 
the older participants tended to confound another person’s knowledge with their 
own, in a similar way of younger children.  
In addition, it has been suggested that the ability to respond to another’s 
mental state requires the recognition and understanding of both visual and verbal 
cues (Blair & Coles, 2000). For example, simple forms of Theory of Mind are 
dependent on visual imagery, whilst higher orders also require verbal input 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999). This is particularly evident when moving from natural 
concepts to social concepts; which appear to be dependent on the ability to utilise 
both visual and verbal Theory of Mind (Blair & Coles, 2000). This was supported by 
de Villiers (2007) who noted that language development appeared to be predictive of 
Theory of Mind in typically developing children. 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that, whilst there is some agreement regarding 
the initial emergence of Theory of Mind, whether it continues to develop after 
childhood, through adolescence and into adulthood remains unclear. Study 1 will 
address this issue, taking into consideration both verbal and visual Theory of Mind. 
The following hypotheses are made: 
 Hypothesis 4.1 is that there will be significant differences in verbal 
Theory of Mind across the three age groups: adolescents, young adults, 
and adults, in (a) males and (b) females. 
  Hypothesis 4.2 is that there will be significant differences in visual 
Theory of Mind across the three age groups: adolescents, young adults, 
and adults, in (a) males and (b) females. 
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4.2: Age Related Development of Empathic Understanding  
The second key skill to be discussed in this chapter, in relation to the 
development of prosocial behaviour, is Empathic Understanding. Empathic 
Understanding denotes the ability to take the mental or emotional perspectives of 
another, whilst sharing in their emotional experiences (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). 
Although claims are made that Empathic Understanding is evidenced in very young 
children, measuring such abilities can be problematic due to their limited verbal 
ability. As a consequence, Martin and Clark (1982) designed a study using a variety 
of control stimuli; including silence, white noise, synthetic crying sounds, non-
human crying sounds, and the child’s own cry, in order to conduct their research. 
They found that children as young as 18- to 72- hours following birth, often display 
distress reactions when  exposed to the sound of another infant crying; this they 
termed reflexive or reactive crying, or emotional contagion.  
Later, in a longitudinal study of 14- to 36- month-old infants, Zahn-Waxler et 
al., (1992) considered typically developing children’s responses to the simulated 
distress of a parent and a stranger, at home and in a laboratory. By measuring 
different manifestations of empathic responding, including: (i) concern, as noted by 
the child’s facial expression; (ii) hypothesis testing by asking the child a question 
such as ‘what happened?’, and (iii) prosocial behaviour as noted by the child’s 
physical reactions, these researchers found that many apparent prosocial behaviours 
increased in quantity over the second year of life. Furthermore, Zahn-Waxler et al. 
noted that the quality of the child’s behaviour also developed during that same 
period; for example the youngest infants’ responses were primarily comprised of 
physical actions, whereas older children were capable of a wide variety of helping 
behaviours, such as verbal comfort, sharing, and distraction tactics.  This was 
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supported by Hoffman (2000) who stated that by the age of two years, children 
normally begin to display the fundamental behaviours of Empathic Understanding 
by having an emotional response that corresponds with another person's emotional 
state.  
In support of the premise that Empathic Understanding continues to develop 
beyond initial emergence, some studies have noted improvements in the skill 
between early and middle childhood (Hay & Cook, 2007). During this time, it is 
known that children, particularly in western societies, begin to associate more 
regularly with friends and peers and less frequently with their parents (Hastings et 
al., 2014). As a result, by the age of 12- years, some young people begin to better 
understand the emotions of individuals outside of their family unit (McDonald & 
Messinger, 2011). This more complex understanding of empathy sometimes 
manifests itself in a phenomenon called empathic lying. Also known as telling a 
white lie; the predominant aim of which is to protect another person’s feelings 
(Evans & Lee, 2011).  
However, the findings of studies focusing on the age related development of 
Empathic Understanding, beyond middle childhood, are less consistent. For 
example, some research advocates an increase in Empathic Understanding from 
middle to late childhood. Indeed, Eisenberg et al. (1999) measured multiple prosocial 
constructs, and in particular Empathic Understanding, at various time points in 
participants aged from 4- to 20- years of age. This was done through measured 
observation in a naturalistic, as well as laboratory setting, and through self, parent, 
and/or friend report. The researchers concluded that early spontaneous sharing in 
childhood appeared to predict a more increased Empathic Understanding in later 
adolescence. Similarly, Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, and Shepard 
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(2005) found that the manifestations of Empathic Understanding, such as sharing or 
donating, were more pronounced in adolescents, when compared to 7- to 12- year 
olds. 
In contrast, Carlo, Crockett, Randall, and Roesch (2007) reported a decrease 
in empathic tendencies during adolescence. Approximately 500 participants, aged 
11- to 18- years, took part in their study. Analysing both self- and parental-reports of 
Empathic Understanding, Carlo et al. found less evidence of helping behaviours, 
particularly in boys, after the age of 13- years. Kanacri, Pastorelli, Zuffiano, 
Eisenberg, & Ceravolo (2014) found similar results in a longitudinal study of 
adolescents and young adults (aged 13- to 21- years), also noting a decrease in 
Empathic Understanding around the age of 13- years.  
Decreases in Empathic Understanding during early adolescence may be, at 
least partially, explained by the social changes that take place for individuals during 
that time. For example, adolescents start to renegotiate existing relationships with 
their parents and develop new peer relationships, which might impact either 
positively or negatively, on their empathic abilities (Carlo et al., 2007). It is also 
apparent that adolescents differ in their management of these changes (Zarrett & 
Eccles, 2006), with some finding the transition to adulthood quite difficult 
(McDonald & Messinger, 2011). Indeed, McDonald and Messinger suggested that 
the ability to cope with these changes may, at least in part, be influenced by an 
individual’s emotional maturity; which in turn could impact upon his or her ability to 
empathise.   
Similar inconsistencies are found when considering the age related 
development of Empathic Understanding during adulthood (Grühn, Rebucal, Diehl, 
Lumley, & Labouvie-Vief, 2008). For example, when considering the data from self-
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report measures, older adults often appear better at regulating their emotions than 
younger adults (Birditt & Fingerman, 2005). In their study with 666 adults (aged 25- 
to 74- years), Birditt and Fingerman revealed that older adults were less likely to 
engage in arguments, or report tensions, with others, when compared to younger 
adults. In contrast, Labouvie-Vief and Marquez (2004) suggested that older adults 
possess a less differentiated view of ‘self’ and ‘others’ and therefore their ability to 
process affective information is diminished. This potential deficit in Empathic 
Understanding in older adults may be explained by changes in cognitive and 
emotional intelligence, both of which are thought to increase in early life and 
diminish in later adulthood according (Henig, 2013). However, in a study of wisdom, 
where empathy was also measured, Gluck, Bluck, Baron, and McAdams (2005) 
reported no age-related differences in Empathic Understanding within their 
participant group aged 30 to 72 years. 
Therefore, having reviewed the literature relating to Empathic 
Understanding, this thesis suggests that whilst there is an agreement regarding its 
initial emergence, there remains conflicting opinion as to whether the skills 
continues to develop during the life span of an individual. Study 1 will add clarity to 
the literature, by measuring if Empathic Understanding continues to develop into 
adulthood; the following hypotheses are made: 
 Hypothesis 4.3 is that there will be significant differences in self-reported 
Empathic Understanding across the three age groups: adolescents, young 
adults, and adults, in (a) Males and (b) females, and  
 Hypothesis 4.4 is that there will be significant differences in 
performance-based Empathic Understanding across the three age groups: 
adolescents, young adults, and adults, in (a) males and (b) females.  
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4.3: Age Related Moral Reasoning 
 
The last key skill to be considered within this thesis, in relation to prosocial 
behaviour, is Moral Reasoning. Kohlberg (1976, p. 33), based on a study of 50, male 
participants, aged between 10- and 26- years, concluded that Moral Reasoning 
moved from a ‘pre-conventional stage’, which included “most children under 9 [and] 
some adolescents”, through a ‘conventional stage’, being “the level of most 
adolescents”, to finally reach a ‘post conventional stage’ during early adulthood. 
However, Kohlberg’s work has not been without criticism. Gilligan (1982), for 
example, pointed out that the participants in Kohlberg’s study were all white, middle 
class, young males, and suggested that his conclusions therefore may not be 
transferrable to other members of the human population. Further, Eisenberg (2000) 
suggested that Kohlberg’s approach was too narrow; noting that it did not take into 
consideration individual variations that may motivate moral or immoral behaviour. 
Along similar lines, Baek (2002) proposed that the dilemmas, on which Kohlberg’s 
participants were measured, included scenarios uncommon in non-western cultures.  
Despite these criticisms, some research has maintained that Kohlberg’s moral 
stages are associated with age. For example, Snarey (1995) stated that moral 
judgment does improve over time, and attributed this to the fact that, with maturity, 
an individual becomes more able to take on both society’s and other people’s 
perspectives. Decety, Michalska, and Kinzler (2012) drew similar conclusions. In 
their study, 127 participants (aged 4- to 36- years) were shown 96 short video 
recordings, whilst undergoing a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan. The 
recordings portrayed intentional harm, such as a person being pushed and 
unintentional harm, such as a person being hit accidentally. The recordings also 
showed both intentional and unintentional damage to objects. The findings indicated 
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that younger children have a tendency to consider all perpetrators as malicious; 
irrespective of intention or target (people or objects). However, the older participants 
perceived the perpetrator as less menacing in relation to accidental actions, 
especially when the target was an object; thus suggesting that Moral Reasoning does 
continue to alter with age.   
  However, whilst adolescence can be representative of a heightened rate of 
prosocial activity in some, antisocial behaviours are seen to increase in others 
(Veenstra, 2006). This can be explained by moral disengagement and low self-
regulation, often experienced during adolescence that can exacerbate antisocial 
behaviours and supress potential prosociality (Hardy, Bean, & Olsen, 2015).  A 
variety of challenges, opportunities, and influences, that distinguish adolescents’ 
lives from those of children, including the transition to larger schools and romantic 
relationships, have been offered by way of explanation (Hart & Carlo, 2005). 
Specifically, in many Western cultures, one quality that often separates adolescents 
from children is that the former spends more time with peers and less time with their 
parents. As a consequence, adolescents can be more influenced by their peers than 
younger children. Pardini, Loeber, and Stouthamer-Loeber (2005) suggested that the 
negative influence of antisocial peers is a major contributor in relation to adolescent 
offending behaviours. In contrast, Lawford, Pratt, Hunsberger, and Pancer (2005) 
noted that young adults, who have positive relationships with their parents, are more 
committed to caring for others as they get older.  
So whilst the seeds of Moral Reasoning may be planted early in childhood, in 
some instances this skill does not fully form until young adulthood (Hardy & Carlo 
2011).  Further, having reviewed the literature relating to Moral Reasoning, this 
thesis suggests that, whilst there is an agreement regarding its initial emergence, 
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there is conflicting opinion as to whether Moral Reasoning continues to develop 
during the life span of an individual, or if at a certain point it becomes fixed. The 
study that follows will add to the current literature, by considering whether Moral 
Reasoning continues to develop or, as Kohlberg suggested, it is fixed in early 
adulthood; the following hypothesis is made:  
 Hypothesis 4.5 is that there will be significant differences in Moral 
Reasoning across the three age groups: adolescents, young adults, and 
adults in (a) males and (b) females.  
To conclude, the need to further explore age-related changes in Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, during adolescence, through 
young-adulthood, and into adulthood, and to clarify the mixed findings of the current 
literature, is suggested. The following study will therefore investigate individual 
ability in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in male 
and female adolescents (14- to 17-year-olds), male and female young-adults (18- to 
24- year olds) and male and female adults (>25 years).  
 
4.4: Methodology 
4.4.1: Design 
 
As noted in chapter three a one-way, between groups, multivariate analysis of 
co-variance (MANCOVA) controlling for IQ was conducted to investigate age 
related differences in prosocial skills. A group of 69 males, across three age groups 
were recruited for in this study. The independent variables were the three age groups; 
(i) male adolescents, (ii) male young-adults, and (iii) male adults, and the five 
dependent variables were: (i) verbal Theory of Mind,  (ii) visual Theory of Mind, 
(iii) self-reported Empathic Understanding, (iv) performance-based Empathic 
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Understanding, and (v) Moral Reasoning. Further, to examine any indicated 
differences between the three age groups, in each of the five dependant measures a 
series of multiple analyses of variances (ANOVAS) were performed.  
4.4.2: Participants 
 
 Twenty-three adolescent males aged 14- to 17- years (M = 15, SD = 1.13) 
and twenty-three adolescent female (M = 15.34, SD = 1.31),  twenty-three young-
adult males aged 18- to 24- years (M = 19.52, SD = 1.24) and twenty-three young-
adult females aged 18- to 24 (M = 20.18, SD = 1.98), and twenty-three adult males 
aged 25- to 55- years (M =41, SD=9.35) and twenty-three adult females aged 25- to 
55- years (M = 38.17, SD 3.13) were recruited from the general population of 
England.  With regard to the male adolescent and female adolescent groups, the 
number of participants used represents the whole of the data gathered (male n = 23, 
female n = 23). With regard to the male and female young-adult and male and 
female adult groups, the number of participants used is a subsample of the main male 
and main female non-offending samples. In this instance, the first 23 male young-
adults and the first 23 female young-adults, and the first 23 male adults and the first 
23 female adults were selected from a total of 50 male young-adults, and 50 male 
adults.  
The samples were self-selected as the participants volunteered to take part; 
having responded to identical posters placed in prominent places (such as school, 
university, or community library notice boards, community centre notice boards, and 
the university intranet notice board). As per the recruitment criteria, all participants 
were English speaking. No upper age limit was specified. With the exception of the 
student participants who were given research credits for taking part, no other form of 
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compensation was given to any of the groups. 
4.4.3: Materials, Procedure, and Ethical Considerations 
The following measures were used for study 1: (i) verbal Theory of Mind - 
The Social Stories Questionnaire (SSQ, Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 
2004), (ii) visual Theory of Mind - The ’Reading of the Mind in the Eyes test’ 
revised version (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), (iii) self-reported Empathic 
Understanding - The Empathy Quotient (Wakabayashi et al., 2006), (iv) 
performance-based Empathic Understanding - The MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002), 
and (v)  Moral Reasoning - The Socio-Moral Reflection Measure (Gibbs et al., 
1992).  For full details relating to the materials, the procedure and all ethical 
considerations, please refer to chapter three. 
 
4.5: Results 
 
 As can be seen in Table 4.1 and 4.2, there is a difference in the mean scores 
for each of the five measures across the three age groups in (a) males and (b) 
females. The standard deviations in each of the five measures, across the three age 
groups, indicated that most of the scores were located fairly close to the relevant 
mean score. 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary assumption testing was also conducted 
for each of the five measures for the whole sample (see Table 4.3). Skewness and 
kurtosis values were obtained with regard to the distribution of the data. With regard 
to the skewness, the following was identified: for verbal Theory of Mind and Moral 
Reasoning, the negative result indicates that all the scores were clustered towards the 
higher end, in relation to the maximum scores available in this measure. For visual 
Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, and performance-based 
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Empathic Understanding, the positive results indicate that all the scores were 
clustered towards the lower end, in relation to the maximum scores available in this 
measure. However, all score were located within the permitted range of -1 to +1 
(Clark-Carter, 2010) indicating a relatively normal distribution of the data. 
With regard to kurtosis of the data, the following was identified: for verbal 
Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, and Moral Reasoning the negative results 
across all three age groups indicate that the distribution of scores is relatively flat. 
For self-reported Empathic Understanding and performance-based Empathic 
Understanding, the positive results indicate that the scores are clustered towards the 
centre. However, with the exception of the performance-based Empathic 
Understanding score, all scores were within the permitted range of -3 to +3 (Clark-
Carter, 2010) indicating that the data were relatively normally distributed. To further 
check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, preliminary assumption testing 
was conducted. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was used to assess the 
distribution of the scores. For each of the five measures the results were p > .05 
indicating violation of the assumption of normality. However, the box plots indicated 
the existence of a number of outliers which may have been the cause of the violation 
of the assumption of normality. The normal Q-Q plots showed the scores to be 
clustered around reasonably straight lines, for each for each of the five measures. 
This again suggests a near normal distribution of scores.  
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Table 4.1:  Descriptive statistics for the male participants in verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-
based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning scores by age group  
 
                                                                               Adolescents                          Young-Adults                                     Adults 
 
                                                                        n           M          SD                 n           M             SD                 n              M              SD    
 
                  Verbal Theory of Mind            23       12.47       2.69                 23         13.52        2.95                23         15.56        1.70     
 
 
                  Visual Theory of Mind            23        12.52        2.89                23        19.39        5.34                 23         28.0          6.19     
 
                              (Self- Report) 
                   Empathic Understanding       23        26.52         5.03               23         31.87       6.17                 23         32.35       5.07   
    
                                        (Performance-Based) 
                  Empathic Understanding        23        10.48          2.96              23        12.48        6.36                 23        14.43       5.75     
 
 
                         Moral Reasoning              23        274.96       20.21              23       304.13      26.97               23       304.91      31.95    
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Table 4.2:  Descriptive statistics for the female participants in verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-
based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning scores by age group  
 
                                                                               Adolescents                          Young-Adults                                     Adults 
 
                                                                        n           M          SD                 n           M             SD                 n              M              SD    
 
                  Verbal Theory of Mind            23       12.65         2.80             23         14.17        3.24                23         18.17          3.13     
 
 
                  Visual Theory of Mind            23        13.22         2.49              23        24.24        3.34                 23         32.0           5.45     
 
                              (Self- Report) 
                   Empathic Understanding       23        27.13         3.24             23         32.87       3.18                 23         35.72         4.07   
    
                                     (Performance-Based) 
                  Empathic Understanding        23        11.32         2.38              23        13.42        4.36                 23        15.12         3.14     
 
 
                         Moral Reasoning              23       278.74        28.63              23       318.13      31.35               23       324.69      25.67    
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Table 4.3:  Descriptive statistics for verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning scores across whole data set  
 
                                                          
                                                                                   n            M            5% Trimmed M            SD              Skewness          Kurtosis            
 
                    Verbal Theory of Mind                      138        13.85              13.95                     2.78                   -.58                 -.48          
 
 
                    Visual Theory of Mind                       138       19.92               19.68                    8.04                   .38                 -.97     
       
                               (Self-Reported) 
                     Empathic Understanding                  138        29.61                29.56                    4.90                   .22                   .38        
   
                            (Performance-Based) 
                     Empathic Understanding                  138        12.53                 12.26                   4.41                   0.74                 -5.9    
      
 
                     Moral Reasoning                               138        289.15               297.28                30.82                  -.19                -.813          
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It was concluded that the data reflected the underlying nature of the 
constructs being measured, the different ages of the participants, and the abilities in 
those constructs to change over time, for both (a) males and (b) females. Therefore, 
following the above assessment of the descriptive statistics and assumption test 
outcomes, it was concluded that the data were sufficiently’ normal’ to reject the 
option of transformation. However, as Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances 
indicated that the assumption of equality of variance had been violated for each of 
the five measures, p >.05, and after following Tabachnick and Fidell’s 
recommendations (2013), a more stringent p value was adopted for subsequent tests, 
p<.025.  
To investigate age differences in prosocial skills across the three age groups 
for the five different measures, and to control for type I error a one-way, between 
groups MANCOVA was performed, controlling for IQ. The independent variable 
was age group; (adolescents, male young-adults, and male adults) and the five 
dependent variables were: verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-
reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning. A statistically significant difference was found to exist between 
the three age groups for (a) males, F (5, 61) = 3.86, p < .001; Wilks’ Lambda = 58; 
partial η2 = .241, and (b) female, F (5, 61) = 4.12, p < .001; Wilks’ Lambda = 62; 
partial η2 = .258. To examine the indicated differences between the three age groups, 
in each of the five measures verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-
reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, further tests were conducted. A series of multiple ANCOVAS 
(controlling for IQ) was selected for this. As this would increase the risk of type I 
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error, in line with Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2013) recommendations, a more 
stringent p value was adopted, p < .025.  
Firstly, to explore the impact of age on verbal Theory of Mind ability and test 
hypothesis 4.1, a one-way, between groups ANCOVA was conducted. Hypothesis 
4.1 was supported as there was a statistically significant difference in verbal Theory 
of Mind across the three age groups in (a) males: F (2, 66) = 9.02, p < .001, and (b) 
females: F (2, 66) = 21.747, p <.001.  An effect size for (a) males and (b) females of .2 
was calculated using eta squared. However, post- hoc comparisons, using Tukey’s 
HSD test (p =.01) for the (a) males revealed only partial support for hypothesis 4.1 as 
the mean score for the adolescent group (M = 12.48, SD= 2.69) did not differ 
significantly from that of the young-adult group (M = 13.52, SD= 2.95). However, 
there was a significant difference between the adolescent group and the adult group 
(M =15.56, SD =1.7) and the young-adult and the adult group, with the adolescent 
group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult group and the adult group for 
verbal Theory of Mind. With regard to (b) females post- hoc comparisons, using 
Tukey’s HSD test (p =.01) revealed only partial support for hypothesis 4.1 as the 
mean score for the adolescent group (M = 12.65, SD = 2.8) did not differ 
significantly from that of the young-adult group (M = 14.17, SD = 3.24). However, 
there was a significant difference between the adolescent group and the adult group 
(M =18.17, SD = 3.13) and the young-adult and the adult group, with the adolescent 
group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult group and the adult group for 
verbal Theory of Mind (see Figure 4.1).   
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  Figure 4.1:  Mean Score for Verbal Theory of Mind by Age Group for Males and Females 
 
 
 To explore the impact of age on visual Theory of Mind and test hypothesis 
4.2, a one-way, between groups ANCOVA was conducted. Hypothesis 2 was 
supported as there was a statistical significant difference in visual Theory of Mind 
regarding age for the (a) males: F (2, 66) = 54.46, p <.001, and (b) females:  F (2, 66) = 
48.825, p <.001. An effect size for (a) males and (b) females of .2 was calculated 
using eta squared. Post- hoc comparisons for the (a) males, using Tukey’s HSD test 
(p = .01), were conducted. These tests indicated that the mean score for the 
adolescent group (M = 12.52, SD = 2.88) differed significantly from that of the 
young-adult group (M = 19.39, SD = 5.34) and the adult groups (M = 27.91, SD = 
6.19), with the adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult 
group and the adult group for visual Theory of Mind. In addition, there was a 
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significant difference between the young-adult group and the adult group, with the 
young-adult group scoring significantly lower than the adult group for visual Theory 
of Mind. With regard to the (b) females, post- hoc comparisons, using Tukey’s HSD 
test (p = .01) were conducted. These tests indicated that the mean score for the 
adolescent group (M = 13.22, SD = 2.49) differed significantly from that of the 
young-adult group (M = 24.24, SD = 3.34) and the adult groups (M = 32.0, SD = 
5.45), with the adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult 
group and the adult group for visual Theory of Mind. In addition, there was a 
significant difference between the young-adult group and the adult group, with the 
young-adult group scoring significantly lower than the adult group for visual Theory 
of Mind (see Figure 4.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 4.2:  Mean Score for Visual Theory of Mind by Age Group for Males and Females 
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   To explore the impact of age on self-reported Empathic Understanding and 
to test hypothesis 4.3, a one-way, between groups ANCOVA was conducted. 
Hypothesis 4.3 was supported as there was a statistical significant effect of age on 
self-reported Empathic Understanding scores in (a) males: F (2, 66) = 8.11, p < .001, 
and (b) females, F (2, 66) = 2.184, p < .025 . An effect size of .2 was calculated using 
eta squared. However, post- hoc comparisons, using Tukey’s HSD test (p =.01) 
revealed only partial support for hypothesis 4.3 in (a) males. They indicated that the 
mean score for the adolescent group (M = 26.52, SD= 5.03) differed significantly 
from that of the young-adult group (M = 31.87, SD= 6.2) and the adult group (M = 
32.34, SD = 5.07), with the adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the 
young-adult group and the adult group for self-reported Empathic Understanding. 
However, no significant difference was detected between the young-adult group and 
the adult group (see Figure 4.3). With regard to (b) females, post- hoc comparisons, 
using Tukey’s HSD test (p =.01) revealed only partial support for hypothesis 4.3. 
They indicated that the mean score for the adolescent group (M = 27.13, SD = 3.24) 
differed significantly from that of the young-adult group (M = 31.87, SD= 6.2) and 
the adult group (M = 32.87, SD = 3.18), with the adolescent group scoring 
significantly lower than the young-adult group and the adult group for self-reported 
Empathic Understanding. However, no significant difference was detected between 
the young-adult group and the adult group (see Figure 4.3). 
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                Figure 4.3:  Mean Score for Self-Reported Empathic Understanding  
                                          by Age Group for Males and Females 
 
To explore the impact of age on performance-based Empathic Understanding 
and test hypothesis 4.4, a one-way, between groups ANCOVA, was again 
conducted. Hypothesis 4.4 was supported as a statistically significant effects of age 
on performance-based Empathic Understanding was detected in (a) males: F (2, 66) = 
3.73, p = .029 and (b) females F (2, 66) = 3.082, p = .045. An effect size of .2 was 
calculated using eta squared for both (a) males and (b) females. However, post- hoc 
comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test (p =.01) revealed only partial support for 
hypothesis 4.4 in (a) males as they indicated that the mean score for the adolescent 
group (M = 10.34, SD = 2.69) differed significantly from that of the young-adult 
group (M = 13.48, SD= 6.36), and the adult group (M = 14.43, SD = 5.75), with the 
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adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult group and the 
adult group for performance-based Empathic Understanding. However, the young-
adult group did not differ significantly from that of the adult group. With regard to 
(b) females, post- hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test (p =.01) revealed only 
partial support for hypothesis 4.4 as they indicated that the mean score for the 
adolescent group (M = 11.32, SD = 2.38) differed significantly from that of the 
young-adult group (M = 13.42, SD = 4.36), and the adult group (M = 15.12, SD = 
3.14), with the adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult 
group and the adult group for performance-based Empathic Understanding. 
However, the young-adult group did not differ significantly from that of the adult 
group (see Figure 4.4). 
 
 
Figure 4.4:  Mean Score for Performance-Based Empathic Understanding  
by Age Group for Males and Females 
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Finally, to explore the impact of age on Moral Reasoning and test hypothesis 
4.5, a further one-way, between groups ANCOVA, was conducted. Hypothesis 4.5 
was supported as a statistically significant effects of age on Moral Reasoning was 
detected in (a) males: F (2, 66) = 9.32, p < .001, and (b) females F (2, 66) = 3.19, p < 
.05. An effect size of .2 was calculated using eta squared. However, post- hoc 
comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test (p = .01) revealed only partial support for 
hypothesis 4.3 in (a) males as they indicated that the mean for the adolescent group 
(M = 274.96, SD = 20.21) differed significantly from that of the young-adult group 
(M = 304.13, SD = 26.97) and the adult group (M = 304.91, SD = 31.95), with the 
adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult group and the 
adult group for performance-based Empathic Understanding. However, the young-
adult group did not differ significantly from that of the adult group. With regard to 
(b) females, post- hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test (p = .01) revealed only 
partial support for hypothesis 4.3 as they indicated that the mean for the adolescent 
group (M = 278.74, SD = 28.63) differed significantly from that of the young-adult 
group (M = 318.13, SD = 31.35) and the adult group (M = 324.69, SD = 25.67), with 
the adolescent group scoring significantly lower than the young-adult group and the 
adult group for performance-based Empathic Understanding. However, the young-
adult group did not differ significantly from that of the adult group (see Figure 4.5).   
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      Figure 4.5:  Mean Score of Moral Reasoning by Age Group for Males and Females 
 
 
 
4.6: Discussion 
 
The current study had one aim: to investigate the effect of age on abilities in 
both verbal and visual Theory of Mind, self-reported and performance-based 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. From the findings there appeared to 
be age related differences in each of the five measures: verbal Theory of Mind, 
visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in (a) males and (b) females. The 
findings will now be discussed in relation to each measure. 
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4.6.1: Theory of Mind 
 
Post-hoc tests, with regard to verbal Theory of Mind (hypothesis 4.1), 
revealed that whilst there was a significant difference between the male and female 
adolescent group and the male and female adult group, with the adult group scoring 
higher on the measure than the adolescent group, and the male and female young-
adult and the male and female adult group, with the adult group scoring higher on the 
measure than the young-adult group, there was no significant difference in the scores 
of the male and female adolescent group and the male and female young-adult group. 
In contrast, a significant difference in visual Theory of Mind (hypothesis 4.2) was 
identified between the male and female adolescent group and both the male and 
female young-adult group and the male and female adult groups, with the young- 
adult group scoring higher on the measure than the adolescent group, and the adult 
group scoring higher on the measure than the adolescent group, and the young-adult 
group and the adult group, with the adult group scoring higher on the measure than 
the young-adult group.  
There are a number of reasons why the observed effects of age regarding 
Theory of Mind might have occurred. One possible explanation may be that of 
‘rehearsal’ (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004).  Epley et al. suggested that even 
the most ‘effortful cognitive processes’ can become more efficient with practice and 
experience. Consequently, as a result of years of accommodating the many differing 
perspectives of others, it may be that adults are able to process scenarios in a more 
proficient way, when compared to children. Indeed, Apperly, Samson, and 
Humphreys (2009), noted that even after acquiring Theory of Mind, as demonstrated 
by passing developmentally sensitive false-belief tasks, children’s abilities remained 
slower and less flexible than those of adults. This suggests that cognitive 
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improvements in speed and flexibility, which are known to advance with age (Ball, 
Edwards, & Ross, 2007), may explain later developments in Theory of Mind.   
Ability in language may also offer an explanation for the current findings 
(Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). For example, Dunn and Brophy (2005) 
suggested that ‘conversational pragmatism’ may be an important developmental 
factor in an individual’s ability regarding Theory of Mind. Pragmatics is the branch 
of linguistics dealing with the rules relating to language; this includes taking turns in 
conversation, listening to what has been said and responding appropriately. 
According to Blain-Brière, Bouchard, and Bigras (2014) speech pragmatism is 
acquired by children between the ages of 4- and 5- years. This may explain why 
individuals with delayed language, as a result of deafness or autism, may also be late 
to pass tasks measuring abilities in Theory of Mind (Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 
2003). 
Lastly, a link between Theory of Mind and Executive Functioning (Duval, 
Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011) may also give additional clarity for 
the current findings. Executive Functioning is a ‘domain-general’ skill that is said to 
include data processing in terms of speed and flexibility, as well as memory 
(Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). According to Lahat, Todd, Mahy, and Zelazo (2010) 
Executive Functioning is essentially the conscious regulation of thoughts, emotions, 
and behaviours. Certain aspects of Executive Functioning, specifically Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, are thought to be necessary 
for the development of Theory of Mind (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 
2006). Further, some studies have suggested that Executive Functioning is involved 
in the role of moderating perception and memory (Gilbert, 1998). For example, 
MaCrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, and Milne (1999) found that memory bias, 
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particularly when the information was counter to expectations, was dependent on 
cognitive processes associated with Executive Functioning.  As the association 
between theory of Mind and Executive Functioning appears to be important it will be 
further considered in study 4 (chapter seven) of this thesis. 
To conclude, study 1 suggests that whilst verbal Theory of Mind may only 
develop in a gradual fashion from adolescence to early adulthood, it has the ability to 
improve significantly during adulthood. However, visual Theory of Mind has the 
ability to improve significantly during the life span. These findings, regarding the 
age related development of Theory of Mind, may be of importance to those involved 
in the designing and delivering of rehabilitative programmes aimed at reducing 
reoffending by improving prosocial abilities. Indeed, establishing each participant’s 
individual ability in Theory of Mind before considering them suitable for, or 
allocating them to, rehabilitative programmes aimed at improving prosocial skills, 
may be of long-term benefit in the goal to lower recidivism in the UK.   
4.6.2: Empathic Understanding  
 
With regard to Empathic Understanding (hypothesis 4.3), post-hoc analysis 
showed that whilst the scores for the male and female adolescent group differed 
significantly from that of the male and female young-adult group and the male and 
female adult group, with the young-adult group scoring higher on the measure than 
the adolescent group, there was no significant difference in the scores between the 
male and female young-adult group and the adult group. With regard to hypothesis 
4.4, significant differences were found in male and female Empathic Understanding 
between the male and female adolescent group and the male and female adult group, 
with the adult group scoring higher on the measure than the adolescent group, but the 
mean score for the male and female adolescent group did not differ significantly 
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from that of the male and female young-adult group, and the male and female young-
adult group did not differ significantly from that of the male and female adult group.  
One explanation for the identified differences in Empathic Understanding, 
particularly between the adolescent group and the adult group, may be attributed to 
individual and social changes that take place during adolescence. For example, 
adolescents experience signiﬁcant gains in mobility and independent decision 
making (Grotevant, 1998). This in turn provides opportunities for renegotiating 
existing relationships with parents, and for developing new peer relationships; both 
of which can impact, often positively, on prosocial behaviours which last into 
adulthood (Carlo, Fabes, Laible, & Kupanoff, 1999). Yadav and Iqbal (2009) built 
on this proposition by suggesting that adolescents who are well schooled in life skills 
and experiences exhibit greater abilities in Empathic Understanding, in adulthood. 
Yadav and Iqbal stated that such life skills enabled adults to utilise knowledge, 
attitudes and values, and consequently behave in a more empathic way. The 
development of Empathic Understanding through adolescence and into adulthood is 
also supported by neuroscience. Schulte-Rüther et al., (2011) suggested that distinct 
brain regions are associated with Empathic Understanding and responding, and the 
continuous refinements of this network is responsible for the developmental changes 
in Empathic Understanding during a person life (Blakemore, 2008). 
With regard to the relative stabilising of Empathic Understanding in older 
adults, there are two theories that may offer an explanation.  The Socio-Emotional 
Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) posits an age related 
‘shift’ in a person’s cognitive ability. Consistent with this idea, Gross et al. (1997), 
in their study of 199 Catholic nuns (aged 24- to 101-) in the USA, stated that the 
older adults reported an increased ability to regulate their emotions when compared 
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to younger adults. The second relevant theory is that of Dynamic Integration 
(Labouvie-Vief, 2003). This theory is concerned with the development of cognitive 
complexity and allows for a person’s ability to represent his or her own, as well as 
that of others’ emotions. Both theories suggest that cognitive representations become 
increasingly complex and well-balanced between adolescence and early adulthood, 
following which stability is achieved. However, it is important to note that neither 
the  Socio-Emotional Selectivity Theory  nor the Dynamic Integration Theory appear 
to consider contextual factors that may moderate age related change in Empathic 
Understanding; in particular Working Memory (Fung & Carstensen, 2003); 
something that will be addressed in study 4 (chapter seven) of this thesis.  
In summary, study 1 of this thesis found that individuals display a marked 
improvement in both self-reported Empathic Understanding and performance-based 
Empathic Understanding between adolescence and young-adulthood. These findings 
are of importance, as they suggest that abilities in Empathic Understanding are 
relatively plastic, and thus can generally be improved upon in young adults, aged 18- 
to 24- years. Therefore, such an improvement gives confidence to those involved in 
the designing and delivering of rehabilitative programmes aimed at reducing 
reoffending by improving prosocial abilities. However, it is the relative stabilising of 
Empathic Understanding in older adults, found in both the self-report and 
performance-based measures, which may be of particular interest to practitioners as 
this may suggest that rehabilitative programmes aimed at reducing recidivism by 
improving prosocial abilities could be less successful in people of this age group. 
4.6.3: Moral Reasoning.  
 
Hypothesis 4.5 stated that there would be significant differences in Moral 
Reasoning across the three age groups. Following post-hoc tests, a significant 
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difference emerged between the male and female adolescent group and the male and 
female young-adult group, with the young-adult group scoring higher on the measure 
when compared to the adolescent group. However, no significant difference in scores 
between the male and female young-adult group and the male and female adult 
group was observed.  
The evidence provided by study 1 appears to suggest that most individuals 
develop Moral Reasoning as defined by Kohlberg’s (1976) stages of moral 
development; that is that Moral Reasoning steadily develops during, childhood, 
through adolescence, and into early adulthood, thereafter maintaining stability and 
consistency. However, it must be pointed out that Kohlberg, in his original research, 
only considered individuals up to the age of 26- years. This may suggest that he 
believed that abilities in Moral Reasoning are maximised in early adulthood. Mason 
and Gibbs (1993), appear to support with this notion, proposing that individuals are 
exposed to the largest number of life experiences, with increased opportunities for 
more complex thinking and perspective taking, between adolescence and early 
adulthood. Therefore, it is possible that an improved knowledge of socially 
acceptable behaviour, evidenced by the approval of others, may peak at this time; 
which in turn may foster a growth in Moral Reasoning (Branch, 2000).  However, it 
must also be considered that as a consequence the design of Kohlberg’s initial 
research, and that of researchers who followed in his path, does not allow for the 
measurement of Moral Reasoning beyond early adulthood. 
Alternatively, another explanation for the findings of the current study may 
be related to the way people assess the situation in which they find themselves. 
Kohlbergian theories suggest that individuals do this using the most sophisticated 
levels of Moral Reasoning in their possession (Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, 
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Carpendale, & Bush, 1991). However, Krebs et al. concluded that such a premise is 
unrealistic and that people are more likely to employ an ‘appropriate’ level of Moral 
Reasoning, regardless of their ability, but dependant on the situation. Simply, people 
may be more morally flexible than Kohlberg's model of Moral Reasoning implies, 
and as a result moral judgments may be relatively plastic. Krebs and Denton (2006) 
concurred, stating that  the stages of Moral Reasoning play a relatively minor role in 
determining the moral judgments or behavioural decisions made by people in their 
everyday lives. Whilst Krebs and Denton accepted that people do tend to acquire 
increasingly sophisticated levels of Moral Reasoning as they age, sophistication is 
not always necessary to solve many of the moral problems encountered by a person 
on a daily basis. In other words, problems can be solved perfectly adequately with 
simple forms of Moral Reasoning; meaning Kohlberg’s level 4 may not be adopted 
when level 2 allows for a satisfactory judgement to be made. This suggests that the 
flexibility to select an appropriate level to solve a day-to-day moral dilemma may be 
as important as the highest level of Moral Reasoning that a person has attained. 
In addition, individual differences derived from personality traits, socio-
environmental influences, and cognitive abilities may also affect Moral Reasoning 
(de Vries & Walker, 1986). Specifically, with regard to cognition, some theories of 
Moral Reasoning rest upon the premise that developmental progression occurs in 
parallel to Executive Functioning (Gibbs, 1979). Executive Functioning, as stated 
earlier in this chapter, is a domain general skill used in the regulation of thoughts, 
emotions, and behaviours, and as such, may also have an impact on the development 
of Moral Reasoning (Lahat et al., 2010); a topic this author believes to be of 
particular significance, and so will be further considered in study 4 (chapter seven).  
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4.7: Conclusion. 
 
To conclude, whilst Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning have received psychological attention for a number of years, research 
regarding their development during a person’s lifespan has, to some extent, been 
neglected. To the current author’s knowledge, study 1 was the first to demonstrate 
the effects of aging on Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, in a single study, using a cohort of male and female, 14- to 55- year olds. 
Most importantly, the findings of study 1 suggest that age may not be a prohibitive 
factor in relation to the later development of values necessary for socially acceptable 
behaviour. In particular, the findings suggest that Moral Reasoning appears to be 
relatively plastic from adolescence to early adulthood. Whilst the plateauing of 
Moral Reasoning in early adulthood cannot be ignored, the current author suggests 
that this may either be reflective of the ‘ceiling’ characteristic inherent in the 
measure being used, or it may imply that by early adulthood individuals have 
developed all the ‘tools’ they need to make moral decisions, but choose to engage 
only those considered necessary to solve a given dilemma. 
Although the current study had one key limitation that is it did not consider 
an offending cohort (something future studies may wish to address), it nonetheless 
proposes that improvements in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, between some age groups, may be possible. This, as stated in the 
introductory section of this chapter, is considered necessary for the success of 
rehabilitative programmes, aimed at the reduction of reoffending levels, through the 
improvement of prosocial skills (Ministry of Justice, 2010). Therefore, the findings 
of study 1 may be of interest to researchers and practitioner alike.  
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Chapter Five 
Study 2 
 ‘Gender’ and ‘Status’ Related Differences in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning 
 
Every society has commonly accepted rules of conduct that individuals are 
expected to follow; subsequent compliance with these rules generally results in 
socially acceptable behaviour (Gächter, Nosenzo, & Sefton, 2012). As noted in 
chapter two, socially acceptable behaviour requires, amongst other things, the  
utilisation of three individual prosocial skills; Theory of Mind (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978), Empathic Understanding (Davis, 1983), and Moral Reasoning 
(Gibbs et al., 1992). More recently, research has suggested that Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning are comprised of both cognitive and 
affective elements (Blair, 2008; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 
2005), both of which are required for the successful implementation of each skill 
(Lauri et al., 2008; Ma, 2013; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Used in combination, the 
cognitive and affective aspects of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning enable most individuals to control their behaviour in socially 
appropriate ways (Sharp, 2008; Spenser et al., 2015; Stams et al., 2006). 
An obvious consequence of appropriate prosocial behaviour is the inhibition 
of harmful actions (Decety, 2008).  Consequently, an undeveloped Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and/or Moral Reasoning may contribute to antisocial or 
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offending behaviours (Sharp, Croudace, & Goodyer, 2007; Sharp, 2008). However, 
whilst there are a number of studies that have focused on the interaction of two of the 
individual constructs; (i) Theory of Mind and Empathic Understanding (Lawson, 
Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2004); (ii) Theory of Mind and Moral Reasoning 
(Astington, 2004); and (iii) Empathic Understanding and Moral Reasoning 
(Eisenburg-Berg & Mussen, 2007), few have considered all three in a single study 
(Lane et al., 2010; Spenser et al., 2015).  Indeed, to this author’s knowledge, Spenser 
et al. (2015) was the first to consider the variations in Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, in a single study, in an adult offending 
population. In a study, of 46 young-adult offenders (aged 18- to 24- years) and a 
matched control group, Spenser et al. demonstrated a significant difference in the 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning between the 
groups. However, the study was not without limitations; firstly it included only male 
participants, and secondly, the age range of the participants was limited. Whilst it is 
known that young male offenders make up one-third of those sentenced to prison 
each year (T2A, 2012), the actual prison estate has no upper age limit and includes 
female offenders; these issues will therefore be addressed in study 2. 
In addition, research with female offenders has, to some extent, been 
neglected (Bottos, 2007). This may be because historically women have been 
accused of far fewer crimes than men. Specifically, between the years of 1674 and 
1913, women accounted for only 21% of all defendants tried. One explanation for 
this could be the ‘roles’ traditionally assigned to men and women (Richardson, & 
Hammock, 2007).  In recognising that women are often cast in a nurturing role, these 
researchers suggested that historic female offences were primarily driven by the need 
to provide for dependants, rather than the various gratuitous motivations often 
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attributed to male offending. The Emancipation Theory (Adler, 1975) argued that as 
the roles of women become more similar to those of men, so would their 
participation in criminal activity. However, in the Criminal Justice Statistics, 
Quarterly Update, (2012), it was reported that 929,720 men were convicted of 
crimes, compared to 297,034 women. This represents a female proportion of 
approximately 24%; a figure similar to that found in historic data.  
One explanation for the difference in crime rates between male and female 
offenders, may be because women are said to be better able to: (i) attribute the 
mental states of others, and (ii) affect more socially appropriate responses, than their 
male counterparts (Blair, 2005; Russell, Tchanturia, Rahman, & Schmidt, 2007). In 
other words, women may be more prosocially skilled than men, and therefore may 
be more compliant with regard to the rules of society. As a result, it is possible that 
the theories surrounding male offending cannot simply be transferred to female 
offending (Bennett, Farrington, & Huesmann, 2005).  
As previously mentioned in chapter two, many current rehabilitative 
programmes, designed to address the problem of offending behaviours, recognise the 
need to improve upon perceived underdeveloped prosocial ability as a way of 
reducing offending behaviours in those who commit crimes (Antonowicz & Ross, 
2005; Palmer, 2013). Indeed, many of the programmes available are considered 
gender neutral, and so are offered to both male and female offenders (Epstein, 2015); 
despite Corston (2007, p. 13) recommending the creation of a “distinct, radically 
different, visibly-led, strategic, proportionate, holistic, woman-centred, integrated 
approach” to the rehabilitation of female offenders. This thesis proposes that to 
address this goal, at least in part, the ability to identify and measure any differences 
in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, between male 
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and female, offenders and non-offenders, would allow practitioners to further tailor 
rehabilitative programme to their target audience.  
Therefore, to address the limitations identified in Spenser et al. (2015), and 
better understand differing abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning according to gender, as well as status, study 2 will include both 
male and female offenders and non-offenders, and apply no upper age limit. Hence, 
the aims of this study are:  (i) to investigate any differences in abilities in Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning according to gender (males 
verses females), across a representative age group (18- to 55- years) and (ii) to 
investigate any differences in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning according to status (offenders verses non-offenders), across a 
representative age group (18- to 55- years).  
 
5.1: Theory of Mind 
 
5.1.1: Theory of Mind according to differences in gender. 
 
Past research has observed a significant difference in Theory of Mind 
between male and female participants; however, it must be noted that this is largely 
using a young, non-offending samples. For example, Walker (2005) observed an 
advantage in preschool girls over preschool boys on tasks used to measure Theory of 
Mind. More recently, Calero, Salles, Semelman, and Sigman (2013) in a study of 9- 
to 15- year olds, examined the hypothesis that gender differences in Theory of Mind 
may continue beyond infancy and found that girls performed significantly better than 
boys in all tasks. Similarly, Hiller, Young  and Weber (2014), using the five-step 
model of Theory of Mind development (Wellman & Liu, 2004), found that the 
young adult women demonstrated superior ability in the Theory of Mind tasks, and 
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that these abilities were strongly associated with levels of prosociality. In particular, 
this was evident in the ‘Knowledge Access Theory of Mind’ task; a task known to be 
strongly associated with higher prosocial behaviours and lower rates of aggression. 
Hiller et al. concluded that gender was a unique predictor of variance in Theory of 
Mind, favouring females.  
However, past research has generally relied on methods that assess Theory of 
Mind from a verbal perspective; that is many studies use written measures which 
require participants to read a question and respond appropriately. This may explain 
why females are thought to have a better Theory of Mind when compared to males, 
as research has shown that females perform better than males in most verbal tests, 
with the reverse being true of visual tests (Sagrilo & Ferreira, 2012). Given that Blair 
and Coles (2000) reported that Theory of Mind requires the recognition and 
understanding of both verbal and visual cues, any study assessing the construct using 
only verbal or visual stimuli, may obtain findings that are biased towards female 
participants with regard to the verbal stimuli or the male participants with regard to 
the visual stimuli. Hence, to address this limitation, the current author proposes that 
a measure that assesses both verbal and visual cues is necessary. To this end, the 
Social Stories Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) which assesses Theory of 
Mind from a verbal perspective, and the ‘Reading of the Mind in the Eyes’ test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) which assesses Theory of Mind from a visual 
perspective, were adopted in study 2 of this thesis. 
5.1.2: Theory of Mind according to differences in status  
With regard to status, some prior studies have found no significant difference 
between offenders and non-offenders, when considering Theory of Mind. For 
example, Dolan and Fulam (2004), using a battery of tasks to assess the ability of 89 
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male adult offenders (with either DSM IV antisocial personality disorder and/or 
psychopathic diagnoses), found that the majority of the participants had acquired an 
acceptable level of Theory of Mind. One explanation for this may be that most past 
research appears to have used measures that only focus on the cognitive aspects of 
Theory of Mind; that is the ability to recognise the mental state of another person. 
For example, Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005) argued that the ‘Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes’ test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) singularly assesses emotional recognition 
rather than simultaneously assessing both emotional recognition and understanding 
and, as such, only considers cognitive Theory of Mind.  
However, Blair and Coles (2000) suggested, that to respond to another's 
mental state, both cognitive and affective Theory of Mind are needed; that is the 
ability to recognise and understand the mental state of another. This may, in part, 
explain why many offenders typically ‘pass’ Theory of Mind tasks but are still poor 
at responding to another's mental state;  as to do this requires both the recognition 
and understanding of  that person’s cues.  Hence, to address this limitation and, to 
better detect potential reduced ability according to status; a measure which assesses 
the duality of Theory of Mind was implemented. As noted in section 5.1.1, the 
measure selected was the Social Stories Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999); a 
'faux pas' test which simultaneously considers a participant’s cognitive ability to 
recognise potential differences in the knowledge states of multiple characters in a 
story and his or her affective ability to understand the potential emotional impact of 
an offensive remark made by one character to another. 
Therefore, in order to establish all possible effects or outcomes, in relation to 
verbal and visual, as well as cognitive and affective, Theory of Mind, between male 
and female offenders, male and female non-offenders, male offenders and non-
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offenders, and female offenders and non-offenders, and be of maximum  use to 
practitioners,  the following hypotheses were made: 
 Hypothesis 5.1a. There will be significant gender related differences in 
verbal Theory of Mind.  
  Hypothesis 5.1b. There will be significant status related differences in 
verbal Theory of Mind.   
 Hypothesis 5.1c.  There will be an interaction between gender and status 
with regard to verbal Theory of Mind. 
 Hypothesis 5.1d.There will be significant gender differences in visual 
Theory of Mind. 
 Hypothesis 5.1e.There will be significant status related difference in 
visual Theory of Mind. 
 Hypothesis 5.1f.  There will be an interaction between gender and status 
with regard to visual Theory of Mind. 
 Hypothesis 5.1g. There will be an association between verbal Theory of 
Mind and visual Theory of Mind. 
 
5.2:  Empathic Understanding. 
5.2.1: Empathic Understanding according to differences in gender. 
 
Research has noted a significant difference when considering individual 
ability in Empathic Understanding between male and female participants. For 
example, Messing, Randoin, Tissot, Rail, and Fortin (2004) demonstrated that the 
development of Empathic Understanding varied according to both the gender of the 
child, and of the parent. Noting the gender of the participant and the parent, Messing 
et al. asked the children to complete an affective empathy measure, whilst their 
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parent completed a scale to assess their own parenting style. A positive association 
between high levels of Empathic Understanding in female children and an 
‘empathic’ childrearing style in their parent(s) was found; thus suggesting that 
parenting style, as well as parent to child relationships, might play a significant role 
in the development of Empathic Understanding in children.  
This perceived gender difference in Empathic Understanding also appears to 
continue into adulthood. With a sample of 60 participants (male = 24; female = 36), 
aged between 19- and 47- years (M age = 24.5 years), Rueckert, Branch, and Doan 
(2011) reported that the female participants scored significantly higher than the 
males. Using the Emotional Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), participants were asked to predict, 
across 10 different scenarios, how much: (i) happiness, (ii) sadness, and/or (iii) anger 
they would feel if a particular scenario happened to: (i) them, (ii) a friend, or (iii) an 
enemy. Overall, the female participants rated themselves as likely to feel more 
emotions than men, whether the event happened to themselves, to a friend, or to an 
enemy.   
However, one explanation for these self-reported differences in levels of 
Empathic Understanding between men and women may be the result of societally 
perceived ‘gender roles’ (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). Rueckert et al., (2011), noted 
that a prevalent stereotype in most western societies is that women are more people-
oriented, helpful, and empathic than men. For this reason, Makino (2010) criticised 
self-report measures, suggesting that they might not be indicative of how a person 
actually feels but rather reflect their knowledge of how other people might expect 
them to feel.  
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5.2.2: Empathic Understanding according to differences in status. 
 
Past findings, have also found differences in ability, between offenders and 
non-offenders, when considering Empathic Understanding. For example, Beven 
(2006), in a study of 106 adult male offenders (mean age of 33- years), found a 
significant positive association between reduced Empathic Understanding and 
offending behaviour. More specifically, Bevan determined that some offenders 
exhibit intolerance, whilst others demonstrate a level of excitement or enjoyment in 
response to the distress of their victims. This suggests that whilst the offenders in the 
study were able to comprehend the emotional state of their victim, they were unable 
to respond in a socially appropriate way.  
An absence of guilt and shame in connection with offending behaviours is 
often associated with a lack of empathy (Blair, 2005). This lack may be explained by 
feelings of ‘entitlement’. That is a belief that one is as, if not more, deserving of a 
‘reward’ than others (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Further, such a feeling of entitlement 
has been associated with narcissism (Baskin-Sommers, Krusemark, & Ronningstam, 
2014). Wai and Tiliopoulos (2012) described narcissism as an extreme form of 
selfishness. In practice, narcissism, coupled with a sense of entitlement, may give an 
individual permission to disregard the law, as well as cause them to underestimate 
his or her chances of being caught when in pursuit of a personal goal (Hepper, Hart, 
Meek, Cisek, & Sedikides, 2014).  
To address these limitations and to enable practitioners to better understand 
individual abilities in Empathic Understanding, as well as giving consideration to all 
possible effects or outcomes in terms of male and female offenders, male and female 
non-offenders, male offenders and non-offenders, and female offenders and non-
offenders, a performance-based measure, as well as a self-report measure, was 
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considered necessary. To this end, study 2 used the Empathy Quotient (Wakabayashi 
et al., 2006), a self-report measure of Empathic Understanding, and the Emotional 
Intelligence Test (Mayer et al., 2002), a performance –based measure of Empathic 
Understanding. The following hypotheses are made: 
 Hypothesis 5.2a. There will be significant gender related differences in 
self-reported Empathic Understanding.  
  Hypothesis 5.2b. There will be significant status related differences self-
reported in Empathic Understanding.   
 Hypothesis 5.2c.  There will be an interaction between gender and status 
with regard to self-reported Empathic Understanding. 
 Hypothesis 5.2d.There will be significant gender differences in 
performance-based Empathic Understanding. 
 Hypothesis 5.2e.There will be significant status related difference in 
performance-based Empathic Understanding. 
 Hypothesis 5.2f.  There will be an interaction between gender and status 
with regard to performance-based Empathic Understanding. 
 Hypothesis 5.2g. There will be an association between self-reported 
Empathic Understanding and performance-based Empathic 
Understanding.  
 
5.3: Moral Reasoning. 
 
5.3.1: Moral Reasoning according to differences in gender.  
 
Implicit within Kohlberg’s (1969) Stages of Moral Judgement is the belief 
that morality is universal and equally applicable to men and women (Nisan & 
Kohlberg, 1982). However, according to his stages of moral development, Kohlberg 
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claimed that the average female attained a moral judgment rating of level three,  
whilst males reached, on average, level four; thus concluding that females are 
inferior to men in relation to Moral Reasoning.  
 Gilligan (1982) questioned the validity of Kohlberg’s theory with regard to 
females. She argued that Kohlberg’s reliance on a male normative sample resulted in 
both a theory and a measurement system that were insensitive to the traditional 
female concerns of responsibility and care. Based on her Care of Ethics theory, 
Gilligan developed a complementary 3-stage model:  
(i) Stage 1. At this stage a woman’s morality is thought to be self-oriented 
and decisions based on what she considers to be best for herself;  
(ii) Stage 2. At this stage care for others takes precedent. Here women 
develop a sense of respect for, and responsibility to, others; and 
(iii) Stage 3. At this stage women learn to equate personal needs with those 
of others, and the focus shifts to a dynamic relationship. In the latter part 
of this stage care extends to inter-personal relationship.  
This led Gilligan (1982) to conclude that males tend to organise their social 
relationships in a hierarchical order, subscribing to a morality of rights or justice; 
whilst females value interpersonal connectedness, care, sensitivity, and responsibility 
to people. She further suggested that Kohlberg's scoring criteria assign interpersonal 
care orientations a lower rating than justice orientations and advocated the need to 
integrate each orientation; stating that only then could full human potential in Moral 
Reasoning be measured. This premise was supported by Walker (1984) who 
attributed identified differences in Moral Reasoning between males and females to 
factors relating to the measurement instrument itself, as well as MacKinnon and 
Fiala (2015) who noted that such measures were biased towards men.  
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As a consequence, past research may offer information relating to male 
Moral Reasoning that is not easily transferred to females. To address this limitation, 
the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure (SRM-SF, Gibbs et al., 1992) was adopted in 
study 2, as it has been purported to equally measure Moral Reasoning in both males 
and females participants.   
5.3.2: Moral Reasoning according to differences in status. 
 
Some studies have concluded a strong negative relationship between Moral 
Reasoning and illegal behaviour. Kohlberg (1969, p. 33), for example, proposing an 
association between an individual’s moral stage and their behaviour, argued “that 
children under nine, some adolescents, and adult criminals typically reasoned at 
stages one and two; whereas individuals who have achieved a higher level of Moral 
Reasoning engaged in responsible, consistent, and predictable behaviour”. Palmer 
and Begum (2006) provided empirical support for this. These researchers, in a study 
of young male offenders (n = 60, M age = 19.53 years, SD = 0.79), found that the 
adolescent offenders in their study reasoned at Kohlberg’s moral stage two; in other 
words they reasoned in a way that maximised their own needs and desires, whilst 
minimising any negative consequences. In contrast, the matched non-offender 
control group reasoned at moral stage three which is said to take onto account the 
perspective of a third-person and is based on mutually trusting relationships.  
Similarly, Chen and Howitt (2007) found that Moral Reasoning was 
significantly lower in the offender group in their study, when compared to the 
control group. The male offenders in their study completed the SRM-SF measuring 
of Moral Reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992), having been classified according to a crime 
category, which included drug offences, violence, and theft. Chen and Howitt 
concluded that whilst the SRM-SF was of limited usefulness in differentiating 
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between offence types, it was good at differentiating between offenders and non-
offenders in terms of their ability to reason from a moral perspective.  
However, research in this area has largely focused on young male offenders. 
As noted earlier in the introductory section of this thesis, whilst young male 
offenders make up one-third of those sentenced to prison each year (T2A, 2012), the 
actual prison estate includes a noteworthy proportion of female offenders and has no 
upper age limit. Therefore, in order to accommodate all possible effects or outcomes, 
in relation to Moral Reasoning across a representative age group (18- to 55- years), 
between male and female offenders, male and female non-offenders, male offenders 
and non-offenders, and female offenders and non-offenders, and be of maximum use 
to practitioners, the following hypotheses were made:  
 Hypothesis 5.3a. There will be a significant gender related difference 
in Moral Reasoning.  
 Hypothesis 5.3b. There will be significant status related difference in 
Moral Reasoning.  
 Hypothesis 5.3c. There will be an interaction between gender and 
status with regard to Moral Reasoning. 
 
5.4: Methodology 
 
 For the design, participants, measures, procedures, and ethical considerations 
relating to study 2, please refer to chapter three. 
 
5.5. Results 
 
 The sample comprised the 400 participants aged 18- to 59- years (M = 27.82 
years; SD = 8.55 years) as detailed in chapter three. Descriptive statistics were 
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obtained by gender and status, for each of the five measures used (verbal Theory of 
Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-
based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning). As can be seen in Table 5.1 
there is a difference in the mean scores and the SD indicated that all the scores were 
located fairly close to the relevant mean score. 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary assumption testing was also conducted 
for each of the five measures. Table 5.2 shows the mean scores in each of the five 
measures. The standard deviation indicates that all the scores are located fairly close 
to the relevant mean score. Skewness and kurtosis values were then obtained to 
provide information relating to the distribution of the scores. With regard to the 
skewness of the data, for all five measures, the negative result indicates that all the 
scores were clustered towards the higher end, in relation to the maximum scores 
available in this measure. However, all score are located within the permitted range 
of -1 to +1 (Clark-Carter, 2010), which indicates a relatively normal distribution of 
the data. With regard to kurtosis of the data, the following was identified: for verbal 
Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, the negative result suggests that the distribution of scores is 
relatively flat. For performance-based Empathic Understanding the positive results 
indicate that the scores are clustered towards the centre. However, with the exception 
of performance-based Empathic Understanding, all scores are within the permitted 
range of -3 to +3 (Clark-Carter, 2010), indicating that the distribution of the data is 
fairly normal. 
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Table 5.1:  Descriptive Statistics for verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning scores by Gender and Status 
 
 
                                                      Male Offenders                     Male Non-Offenders                      Female Offenders                       Female Non-Offenders 
 
                                                     n         M          SD                   n           M             SD                     n          M          SD                        n          M          SD 
 
 
          Verbal 
  Theory of Mind                  100       6.03         4.16             100         13.20        4.05              100         14.34       4.96                  100       14.42      4.40 
 
 
              Visual 
  Theory of Mind                  100       18.76        6.01            100       27.74         5.60               100         19.56       9.66                  100       29.54      4.63 
 
 
           Self-Reported 
Empathic Understanding    100       27.22        7.65             100       27.94         8.43              100         27.33       5.00                   100        29.09      7.73 
 
    
      Performance-Based 
Empathic Understanding    100     109.69     24.89             100      120.55        19.78             100        117.66       17.45                100      141.15     16.63 
 
 
 
   Moral Reasoning               100     273.63      39.75            100      320.56        29.83              100       275.87      27.12                 100      329.75      29.49 
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Table 5.2:  Descriptive Statistics for verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning scores across the Whole Data Set 
 
                                                          
                                                                           n            M            5% Trimmed M            SD                 Skewness             Kurtosis            
  
                               Verbal 
                    Theory of Mind                         400         12.06               12.70                      5.53                    -.43                     -.79          
  
                                              Visual 
                    Theory of Mind                         400          23.90              24.07                     8.26                    -.431                   -.66     
       
 
                                Self-Reported 
                    Empathic Understanding         400         27.33                27.43                    7.65                   -.039                   -.103        
   
 
                            Performance-Based 
                    Empathic Understanding         400        122.26              122.39                  23.03                  -.178                    .255   
      
 
                        Moral Reasoning                   400        299.95               301.06                 39.75                   -.223                  -.316          
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The variances in the data are more likely to reflect the underlying nature of the 
constructs being measured, the different ages of the participants, and that abilities in those 
constructs may change over time. Therefore, following an assessment of the descriptive 
statistics and assumption test results it was concluded that the data were sufficiently’ 
normal’ to reject the option of transformation. However, as Levene’s Test of Equality of 
Error Variances indicated that the assumption of equality of variance had been violated for 
each of the five measures, p >.05, and after following Tabachnick and Fidell’s 
recommendations (2013), a more stringent p value was adopted, p < .025.  
A series of two-way, between groups ANCOVA (controlling for age and IQ), was 
conducted to explore the impact of gender and status on the five dependant variables: (i) 
verbal Theory of Mind, (ii) visual Theory of Mind, (iii) self-reported Empathic 
Understanding, (iv) performance-based Empathic Understanding, and (v) Moral 
Reasoning. The independent variables were: (i) gender (male and female) offenders and (ii) 
status (offenders and non-offenders). IQ was controlled for as noted in chapter three.  
5.5.1: Verbal Theory of Mind  
 
Hypothesis 5.1a was supported as there was a statistically significant main effect 
for gender, F (5, 394) = 106.075, p = .000, with the female group scoring higher than the 
male group on the measure for verbal Theory of Mind. However the effect size was small 
(partial eta squared = .212). Similarly, hypothesis 5.1b was supported as there was a 
statistically significant main effect for status, F (5, 394) = 69.921, p = .000, with the non-
offender group scoring higher than the offender group on the measure for verbal Theory of 
Mind, however the effect size was small (partial eta squared = .151). Hypothesis 5.3c was 
also supported as there was a statistically significant interaction effect between gender and 
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status, F (5, 394) = 61.236, p = .000, suggesting that the effect of gender on verbal Theory of 
Mind depends on the value of status (see Figure 5.1).  
 
 
                                       Figure 5.1:  Mean Scores for Verbal Theory of Mind 
 
Post hoc analyses were conducted given the statistically significant results of the 
ANOVA F test. Specifically, Tukey HSD tests were conducted on all possible pairwise 
contrasts. The following pairs of groups were found to be significantly different (p < .05): 
male offenders (M = 13.2, SD= 4.16) and male non-offenders (M = 13.2, SD= 4.05), male 
offenders and female offenders (M = 14.34, SD = 4.96), and male offenders and female 
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non-offenders (M = 14.42, SD = 4.37). In other words, male offenders scored significantly 
less on the measure for verbal Theory of Mind than the male non-offenders, the female 
offenders and the female non-offenders. The male non-offenders did not differ significantly 
from the female offenders or the female non-offenders and the female offenders did not 
differ significantly from the female non-offenders.  
5.5.2: Visual Theory of Mind 
 
Hypothesis 5.1d was not supported as there was no statistically significant main 
effect for gender, F (5, 394) = 4.578, p = .033; the effect size was small (partial eta squared = 
.011). In contrast, hypothesis 5.1e was supported as there was a statistically significant 
main effect for status, F (5, 394) = 69.921, p < .001, with the non-offender group scoring 
higher than the offender group on the measure for visual Theory of Mind. The effect size 
was medium (partial eta squared = .322). Hypothesis 5.1f was not supported as the 
interaction between gender and status was not statistically significant F (5, 394) = .547, p = 
.46 (see Figure 5.2).                                                                    
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Figure 5.2:  Mean Scores for Visual Theory of Mind 
 
5.5.3: Verbal and Visual Theory of Mind. 
 
The relationship between verbal Theory of Mind and visual Theory of Mind was 
investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.  Hypothesis 5.1g was 
supported as there was a moderate positive association between the two variables, r (398) 
=.522, p = .000, with high scores in verbal Theory of Mind associated with high scores in 
visual Theory of Mind.  
5.5.4: Self-Report Empathic Understanding.  
 
Hypothesis 5.2a was not supported as there was no statistically significant main 
effect for gender, F (5, 394) = 4.895, p = .28; the effect size was small (partial eta squared = 
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.012). However, hypothesis 5.2b was supported as there was a statistically significant main 
effect for status, F (5, 394) = 8.679, p = .003, with the non-offender group scoring higher than 
the offender group on the measure for self-reported Empathic Understanding. However, the 
effect size was small (partial eta squared = .22).  Hypothesis 5.2c was not supported as the 
interaction effect between gender and status was not statistically significant, F (5, 394) = 
.415, p = .52 (see Figure 5.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Mean Scores for Self-Reported Empathic Understanding 
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5.5.5: Performance-Based Empathic Understanding.  
 
Hypothesis 5.2d was supported as there was a statistically significant main effect 
for gender, F (5, 394) = 47.783, p < .001, with the female group scoring higher than the 
offender group on the measure for performance-based Empathic Understanding. However, 
the effect size was small (partial eta squared = .108). Hypothesis 5.2e was also supported 
as there was a statistically significant main effect for status, F (5, 394) = 80.183, p < .001, 
with the non-offender group scoring higher than the offender group on the measure for 
performance-based Empathic Understanding. However, the effect size was small (partial 
eta squared = .169). In addition, hypothesis 5.2f was supported as the interaction effect 
between gender and status was statistically significant, F (5, 394) = 11.367, p = .001, 
suggesting that the effect of gender on performance-based Empathic Understanding 
depends on the value of status (see Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5.4:  Mean Scores for Performances-Based Empathic Understanding 
 
Post hoc analyses were conducted given the statistically significant results 
identified in the ANOVA F test. Specifically, Tukey HSD tests were conducted on all 
possible pairwise contrasts. The following pairs of groups were found to be significantly 
different (p < .05): male offenders (M = 109.69, SD= 24.89) and male non-offenders (M = 
120.55, SD = 19.78), male offenders and female offenders (M = 117.66, SD = 17.44), and 
male offenders and female non-offenders (M = 141.15, SD = 16.68).  In other words, male 
offenders scored significantly less on the measure for performance-based Empathic 
Understanding than the male non-offenders, the female offenders and the female non-
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offenders. Similarly the female non-offenders differed significantly from the male non-
offenders, with the male non-offenders scoring significantly less than the female non-
offender and the female offenders M = 117.66, SD = 17.45) differed significantly from the 
female non-offenders, with the female offenders scoring significantly less than the female 
non-offenders.  The male non-offenders did not differ significantly from the female 
offenders, with the male non-offenders scoring significantly higher on the measure for 
performance-based Empathic Understanding than the male non-offenders. Similarly did not 
differ significantly from the female offenders and the female offenders did not differ 
significantly from the female non-offenders.  
5.5.6: Self-Report and Performance-Based Empathic Understanding.  
  
The relationship between Empathic Understanding – Self-Report and Empathic 
Understanding- Performance –Based Verbal was investigated using Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient. Hypothesis 5.2g was not supported as the results showed 
no association between the two variables, r (398) =.009, p=.915.      
5.5.7: Moral Reasoning. 
 
Hypothesis 5.3a was not supported as the main effect for gender did not reach 
statistical significance, F (5, 394) = 3.299, p = .07. However, hypothesis 5.3b was supported 
as there was a statistically significant main effect for status, F (5, 394) = 262.853, p < .001, 
with the non-offender group scoring higher than the offender group on the measure for 
Moral Reasoning. The effect size was medium (partial eta squared = .400). Hypothesis 5.3c 
was not supported as the interaction effect between gender and status was not statistically 
significant, F (5, 394) = 1.352, p = .246 (see figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.5:  Means Cores for Moral Reasoning 
 
 
 
5.6: Discussion. 
 
The current study had two aims: first to investigate differences in abilities in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in relation to gender 
across a representative age group, and second to investigate differences in abilities in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning between offenders and 
non-offenders. The findings will now be discussed. 
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5.6.1: Verbal Theory of Mind. 
 
There was a main effect of gender (hypothesis 5.1a), and also of status (hypothesis 
5.1b), for verbal Theory of Mind. With regard to gender, the male group scored lower on 
the measure for verbal Theory of Mind than the female group, and with regard to status, the 
offender group scored lower on the measure for verbal Theory of Mind than the non-
offender group. With regard to hypothesis 5.1c, the significant interaction indicated that the 
effect of gender on verbal Theory of Mind was dependant on the value of status.   
By using a ‘Faux Pas’ task that simultaneously measured both cognitive and 
affective Theory of Mind, study 2 added to the literature by providing empirical support for 
a difference according to gender, across a representative adult cohort, in a single study. 
Specifically, study 2 found differences in abilities in verbal Theory of Mind according to 
gender between men and women; with the men scoring lower than the women. The 
disparity between male and female scores in verbal Theory of Mind, with the males scoring 
lower than the females, might be explained by looking at variations in the amount of 
supportive and emotional talk that parents and older siblings enter into with younger 
children; as research suggests such communications appear to favour girls over boys 
(Brown & Dunn, 1996). According to Leaper, Anderson, and Sanders (1998) this 
difference in turn may be all that is needed to give girls a boost with regard to their 
developing Theory of Mind. Similarly, Hughes (1998) proposed that parents may train 
female offspring to think more carefully about social interactions, than their male 
counterparts, by making the thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of others the focus of 
discussions.  
In assessing verbal Theory of Mind according to status, the present study differed 
from most past research in that it was able to detect a difference according to status; with 
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the offenders scoring lower on the measure than the non-offenders. One explanation for 
this difference may rest in the traditional methods used to assess Theory of Mind. For 
example, Richell et al.’s (2003) research used a measure that considered only emotional 
recognition, rather than emotional recognition and understanding; thus assessing only 
cognitive Theory of Mind (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005).  As Blair and Coles (2000) stated, 
both cognitive and affective Theory of Mind are needed for the recognition and 
understanding of another person’s cues. Therefore, as noted in subsection 5.1.2 of this 
chapter, the use of a measure that assesses Theory of Mind from only a cognitive 
perspective may explain why offenders typically ‘pass’ Theory of Mind tasks but are still 
poor at responding to another's mental state. Further, the main aim of Richell et al. (2003) 
was to compare abilities in Theory of Mind between two offender groups; a psychopathic 
group and a non-psychopathic group, and not to identify differences in ability in Theory of 
Mind between offenders and non-offenders. This thesis would suggest that in Richell’s 
study, both offender groups (psychopath and non-psychopath) may have had similar, 
possibly reduced, abilities in Theory of Mind; thus demonstrating no significant difference 
between their scores.  
To conclude, in addressing the limitations of previous studies by assessing a larger 
cohort of male and female adult offenders and male and male adult non-offenders, using a 
‘Faux Pas’ task that simultaneously measured both cognitive and affective Theory of Mind, 
study 2 was able to identify differences is ability in verbal Theory of Mind according to 
status. This adds to the literature by providing empirical support for a difference between 
offenders and non-offenders, across a representative adult age group, in verbal Theory of 
Mind, in a single study. 
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5.6.2: Visual Theory of Mind. 
 
The current study did not identify a significant difference in visual Theory of Mind 
according to gender (hypothesis 5.1d).  This means that no differences in scores, between 
the male group and the female group, were identified.  Study 2 did however find 
differences in abilities in visual Theory of Mind according to status (hypothesis 5.1e), with 
the offender group scoring lower than the non-offender group on the measure for visual 
Theory of Mind. With regard to hypothesis 5.1f the interaction was not significant 
indicating that the effect of gender on visual Theory of Mind was not dependant on the 
value of status. The results will now be discussed.  
With regard to gender, one explanation for this may lie within the task itself. Bolger, 
Hornickel, Cone, Burman and Booth (2007) noted that boys appear to outperform girls in 
tasks where they are presented with a visual stimulus; whilst girls outperform boys in tasks 
where there is a verbal stimulus. Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging these 
researchers measured the brain activity in 31 boys and 31 girls (aged 9- to 15- years) as 
they performed spelling and writing tasks. The tasks were delivered in two sensory 
modalities: verbal and visual. Bolger et al. found that the boys showed significantly greater 
activation in the language areas of the brain, when presented with a visual stimulus, when 
compared to the girls; however, the reverse was also true in that the girls outperformed the 
boys when the stimulus was delivered by means of the written word.  As the ‘Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes’ test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), used in study 2 of this thesis, involved 
looking at photographs of eyes, whilst at the same time matching the observed expressions 
to one of the four written descriptors, it is possible that the two types of stimuli (verbal and 
visual) moderated for each other. Future research may therefore like to identifying a task 
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that taps into belief attribution in a purely visual manner bypassing language, and therefore 
reducing other executive demands (Roux & Uhlhaas, 2014). 
With regard to the identified differences according to status, one explanation for this 
may be that a delay in cognitive development, possibly caused by a background where 
abuse, conflict, neglect, and negative attitudes predominate (Towl & Crighton,  2010),  
may have an impact on the shaping of an individual’s Theory of Mind (Happé & Frith, 
1995). Keenan and Ward (2000) noted that individual experiences within the family, and/or 
larger social environments, are witnessed from both a verbal and a visual standpoint. 
Whereas, Schurz et al. (2015), stated that visual perspective taking is a fundamental feature 
of the human social brain, and aids a more accurate representation. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that any delayed, or reduced, development in relation to Theory of Mind might 
feasibly affect both verbal and visual perspective taking.  To the current author’s 
knowledge study 2 is the first to consider and demonstrate differences according to status 
in visual Theory of Mind; thus adding to the literature.  
5.6.3: Verbal and Visual Theory of Mind.  
 
The hypothesis, that there would be an association between verbal Theory of Mind 
and visual Theory of Mind (hypothesis 5.1g), was also supported. To the current authors 
knowledge this is the first study to evaluate both visual and verbal Theory of Mind, from a 
cognitive and affective perspective, according to gender and status, in a single study. By 
demonstrating a difference in ability between the offending and non-offending participants, 
the current study offers an insight into the overall perspective taking abilities of offenders.  
Further, the present study shows the importance of assessing Theory of Mind from a visual, 
as well as a verbal, point of view, before concluding a person’s individual ability.  
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5.6.4: Self-Report Empathic Understanding. 
 
A main effect according to gender (hypothesis 5.2a) was not found. This means that 
there was not a significant difference in the scores for self-reported Empathic 
Understanding between the male and female participants; however, a main effect relating 
to status (hypothesis 5.2b) was identified, with the offender group scoring lower than the 
non-offender groups on measures for self-reported Empathic Understanding. There was no 
interaction between gender and status (hypothesis 5.2c) indicating that the effect of gender 
on self-reported Empathic Understanding was not dependant on the value of status 
The current study found no gender difference in scores with regard to self-reported 
Empathic Understanding.  One explanation for this may be the validity of self-reported 
Empathic Understanding measures themselves. Makino (2010) suggested that studies using 
self-report measures, where gender differences in Empathic Understanding were found, 
may not be representative of how a participant actually feels, but rather reflect his or her 
beliefs relating to how society expects them to feel. An example of this was found by Klein 
and Hodges (2002); these researchers noted that the women in their study scored more 
highly than the men in measures for Empathic Understanding when the reasons for the 
research were withheld. However, when the participants were told the true nature of the 
study, no gender differences were identified. It might then be that male and female 
differences in Empathic Understanding, as identified by self-report measures, are not a true 
reflection of ability, but rather of societal biases. In other words, when assessing empathy, 
women may feel they must respond more empathically and men may feel they must 
respond less empathically, in order to conform to gender roles (Michalska, Zeffiro, & 
Decety, 2016), thus masking gender differences. Therefore, in finding no differences in 
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gender related performance-based Empathic Understanding; the present study proposes a 
true reflection of male and female empathic abilities.  
With regard to status, the current findings support the earlier work of Spenser et al. 
(2015) who reported that a lack of empathy is characteristic of an offending personality. 
Whilst a number of theories have been offered to explain this association; this thesis 
focused on two. Firstly, the ability to detect differences in Empathic Understanding may 
depend on the individual characteristics of a particular cohort. For example, as mentioned 
in chapter four, age may be an influencing factor. In particular, Hoffman (1984) noted that 
cognitive Empathic Understanding becomes more sophisticated with age,  whereas 
affective empathy is said to be more stable across time (Eisenberg et al., 2005). Secondly, 
as mentioned in chapter three, IQ may be influential in terms of an association between 
Empathic Understanding and offending behaviours. Jolliffe and Farrington (2006), for 
example, in a meta-analysis of 21 studies found that the relationship between Empathic 
Understanding and offending behaviours disappeared after controlling for IQ. Thus, by 
controlling for both age and IQ, this study proposes a true difference in Empathic 
Understanding between offenders and non-offenders.  
5.6.5: Performance-Based Empathic Understanding.  
 
The current study found a significant gender difference (hypothesis 5.2d) in the 
scores for the performance-based Empathic Understanding measure, with the female group 
scoring higher than the male group. Study 2 also found a significant difference in the 
scores according to status (hypothesis 5.2e) in performance-based Empathic 
Understanding; with the offender group scoring lower than the non-offender group. With 
regard to hypothesis 5.2f, the significant interaction indicated that the effect of gender on 
performance-based Empathic Understanding was dependant on the value of status.  
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One possible explanation for the identified differences according to gender may be 
attributed to levels of the hormone testosterone. Whilst, testosterone is responsible for the 
development of male gender characteristics, it has also been linked to reduced empathy in 
both genders (Batrinos, 2012). For example, Harris, Rushton, Hampson, and Jackson 
(1996), with a sample of 155 male and 151 female participants, found that a lower level of 
testosterone acted as a predictor of Empathic Understanding in men and women. However, 
although testosterone is found in both men and women, men have approximately 10 times 
as much of the hormone as their female counterparts. So, given this higher baseline, it 
might be concluded that men will be less empathic than women (Baron-Cohen, 2002). In 
light of this, Hermans, Ramsey, and van Honk (2008) tested the association between 
testosterone levels and emotional mimicry. Emotional mimicry is the ability to mimic the 
thoughts, beliefs, and feelings on another person. The results of the study revealed that a 
single dose of testosterone was enough to significantly decreased emotional mimicry in the 
female participant and led Hermans et al. to conclude that the naturally higher baseline of 
testosterone in males was explanation for their reduced ability to mimic emotions when 
compared to females.  
However, whilst previous research has indicated that women are more empathic than 
men, this has been largely based on self-report measures (Blair, 2005). As indicated above 
self-report measures can be influenced by demand characteristics (Makino, 2010). The 
present study adds to literature by demonstrating differences is empathic ability between 
male and female participants using a performance-based measure; thus showing the 
importance of assessing this perspective. 
 With regard to status, study 2 also found that the offender group scoring lower than 
the non-offender group on the measure for a performance-based Empathic-Understanding. 
144 
 
However, the difference in the scores between the offender group and the non-offender 
group where much greater in the performance-based measure than in the self-report 
measure. This may indicate that the participants in study 2 displayed some demand 
characteristics; in other words his or her answers may have reflected societal pressures or 
expectations, rather than true thoughts and beliefs (Rueckert et al., 2011). Therefore, by 
suggesting that a performance-based measure may indicate a truer realisation of male and 
female abilities in Empathic Understanding, study 2 adds to the literature.   
5.6.6: Self-Report and Performance-Based Empathic Understanding.  
 
Hypothesis 5.1g, that there would be an association between self-reported Empathic 
Understanding and performance-based Empathic Understanding, was not supported. Whilst 
not as predicted, the findings do reflect the work of Smith, Mattick, Jamadar, and Iredale 
(2014). In their study, 105 offenders (60 diagnosed with schizophrenia and 45 healthy 
controls) were compared using a performance-based Empathic Understanding measure 
with three key components; empathic responding, emotional empathy, and cognitive 
empathy, and a self-reported Empathic Understanding measure. Smith et al. found that the 
offenders demonstrated lower scores than the controls across the three performance-based 
Empathic Understanding measures, but that these measures showed minimal relation to the 
self-reported Empathic Understanding results. By emphasising the importance of assessing 
Empathic Understanding in offenders, using a performance-based measure, study 2 adds to 
the literature. 
5.6.7: Moral Reasoning. 
 
No main effect according to gender (hypothesis 5.3a) were identified in the present 
study; however a main effect according to status (hypothesis 5.3b) was found; with the 
145 
 
offender group scoring lower than the non-offender group on measures for Moral 
Reasoning. There was no interaction between gender and status (hypothesis 5.3c).    
The present study addresses the existing controversy with regard to gender 
moderated Moral Reasoning. For example, Gilligan (1982) asserted that women tend to 
resolve moral dilemmas using a care approach, whilst men tend to use a justice approach. 
However, Clopton and Sorell (1993) suggested that these differences were due to the 
different types of dilemmas women and men encounter in their daily lives, rather than 
differences in the way in which he or she might approach a problem. To address this issue, 
Clopton and Sorell used parenting problems to determine whether a restriction in the type 
of dilemma would reduce perceived gender differences in Moral Reasoning and found that 
men and women did not differ in their use of care or justice reasoning when the dilemma 
type was restricted; thus supporting the conclusion that male and female differences in 
Moral Reasoning result from differences in circumstances rather than stable gender 
characteristics. 
Similarly, Watt, Frausin, Dixon, and Nimmo (2000) found no differences in Moral 
Reasoning between the adult male and adult female offenders. They stated that both the 
male and the female groups in their study displayed similar levels of Moral Reasoning, in 
respect of two Kohlbergian dilemmas, with the majority of both groups attaining 
Kohlberg’s Moral Stage 3.  According to Colby and Kohlberg (1987), at Moral Stage 3 
most individuals accept that moral conduct involves perspective taking, having good 
motives, showing concern for others, and maintaining mutual relationships such as trust, 
loyalty, respect, and gratitude. 
More recently, Friesdorf, Conway, and Gawronski (2015), following a meta-analysis 
of 40 studies, in which the 6100 male and female participants were asked a number of 
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questions posing various moral dilemmas (including decisions about murder, torture, lying, 
abortion, and animal research) noted that perceived differences in gender related morality 
were due to women having a stronger emotional aversion to harmful actions, rather than an 
actual difference in cognitive reasoning abilities, when compared to men. Further, 
Friesdorf et al. explained that these studies, in assuming that moral behaviour was 
dependent on affective processes, often ignored the consequences of actions and so when 
emotions were controlled for, no evidence for gender differences were found.  
 Whilst, study 2 found no difference in Moral Reasoning according to gender, 
differences in status related Moral Reasoning was found; with the offenders achieving 
lower in the measure for Moral Reasoning when compared to the non-offenders.  As noted 
in chapter three, the measure used in the present study to assess abilities in Moral 
Reasoning was based on Kohlberg’s (1969) [four] Stages of Moral Judgement. In 
comparing the present findings against Kohlberg’s theory it became apparent that the 
offenders reached, on average, Stage 2, whilst the non-offenders were found to reason at 
Moral Stage 3. Although these findings were also reflective of those identified by Palmer 
and Begum (2006), these researchers considered only adolescent offenders. In contrast, the 
participants in study 2 ranged from 18- to 55- year of age; thus addressing a more 
representative age group in terms of the prison estate, and adding to the literature.  
 
5.8: Conclusion. 
Differences in perspective taking and decision making according to gender and status 
have been of interest to researchers for a number of years; particularly in the context of 
reducing offending levels. For example, Ross et al. (1988) suggested that prosocial training 
is an effective method in the reduction re-offending. In their Canadian study spanning 18 
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month, and following 62 offenders, they found that that the effective implementation of 
interventions resulted in an overall lower rate of recidivism (18.1%) when compared to 
those who received no training at all (69.5%). More recently, Vessels and Huitt (2005) 
proposed that any deficiencies in prosociality may be addressed by ‘programmes’ which 
focus on skills related to perspective taking, decision making, and prosociality in the form 
of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning.   
To this author’s knowledge the study 2 was first to examine for differences, in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, in a cohort of both 
offenders and non-offenders, across a representative age group, in a single study. As such, 
study 2 was the first to provide empirical evidence suggesting that offenders may differ in 
their abilities regarding Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning 
when compared to a matched group of non-offenders, and that males may differ in their 
abilities regarding verbal Theory of Mind and performance-based Empathic Understanding 
when compared to the females; thus adding to the literature. 
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Chapter Six 
Study 3 
 Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral 
Reasoning, and Social Capital 
 
Chapter four noted that it is ‘human nature’ to form relationships with others 
(Petersen et al., 2009). One explanation for this can be found in evolutionary psychology, 
where information processing systems were used to deal with the challenges associated 
with proliferation of the species (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). However, other explanations 
take a more socio-environmental focus (Frith & Frith, 2009). Rose and Clear (1998) 
proposed the mere fact of survival may have necessitated a need for trust and reciprocity 
within a society. Indeed, examples of positive human interaction can be found in early 
recorded history; for instance helpfulness and cooperation to serve the good of the 
household was evidenced in the Hopi culture as early as A.D. 500 (Knickerbocker, 2015). 
As a result it is concluded that humans are able to both construct others as being 
‘prosocial’, whilst acknowledging the effects of positive interaction with others; commonly 
referred to as Social Capital (Frith & Frith, 2006). 
Social Capital is said to emerge from the resource-rich, durable, and reciprocal 
networks and connections that people have with each other (Chen et al., 2015). It is usually 
built with an individual, group, or community that is valued, or with whom an ongoing 
relationship is desirable (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010). However, Social Capital can be highly 
contextual and pertinent to certain situations or interactions (Gallagher, Pettigrew, & 
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Muldoon, 2015). Therefore, for a person to successfully interact with others, Frith and 
Frith (2006) proposed, they must be equipped of a number of cognitive skills, as well as 
being able to attribute those same skills to others. As noted in chapter 2, those skills are: (i) 
Theory of Mind, (ii) Empathic Understanding, and, (iii) Moral Reasoning. This chapter 
will consider the relationship between Social Capital and Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. However, before doing so there are a number of 
socio-environmental effects, that whilst not the focus of this chapter, must be addressed.   
 
6.1:  Socio-Environmental Influences of Social Capital.  
 
Social Capital is said to underpin a society’s culture, as well as promoting 
individual well-being (Allan, Catts, & Stelfox, 2012). Originally used to explain the need 
for coordinated actions at a macro level, in terms of state governance and economic 
development, Social Capital now includes any beneficial connections a person has at a 
micro or individual level (Ferragina, 2013). According to Harpham (2008) this network of 
connections takes both structural and cognitive forms. Structural Social Capital defines the 
ties that exist between individuals, groups, and communities, whereas cognitive Social 
Capital describes the mutually agreed norms and values intrinsic to those relationships.  
Further, it has been proposed that the construct of Social Capital consists of three 
distinct sub-types: bonding Social Capital, bridging Social Capital, and linking Social 
Capital (Sabatini, 2009). Archuleta and Teasley (2013) described each sub-type as having 
its own distinct characteristics. For example: (i) bonding Social Capital is represented by 
family ties; (ii) bridging Social Capital refers to the connection between friends and 
acquaintances, and (iii) linking Social Capital is associated with the wider community. As 
each person’s Social Capital is shaped by a unique mixture of these sub-types, which are 
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then used to govern and influence ingroup and outgroup outcomes, the measure of Social 
Capital used in study 3 is said to tap into each (Baron Cohen et al., 2003). 
  However, despite there being a large number of ‘potential’ social networks 
available to a person, several influencing factors are said to affect his or her ability to 
acquire Social Capital. Firstly, the family is viewed as the ‘incubator’ of Social Capital, 
assisting in its development both intentionally and vicariously. Indeed, the relationship a 
person has with his or her primary caregiver(s) can have both positive and negative effects 
(MacPherson et al., 2013). Lee (2013), for example, noted an association between 
attachment style and Social Capital, suggesting that people with secure attachment styles 
were more likely to seek out social relationships, whilst those with fearful styles of 
attachment were more likely to avoid social interaction; both having a consequential affect 
relating to the building Social Capital.  
Secondly, Field (2003) suggested that the relationships a person develops within his 
or her school environment can promote or hinder the development of Social Capital. 
Indeed, Ferguson (2006, p. 2), in a synthesis of the available literature, noted that Social 
Capital “can facilitate positive outcomes with respect to …well-being, including reducing 
adolescent pregnancy, delinquency, academic failure, and child maltreatment” in young 
people. Certainly, it has been argued that an increase in teenage problems such as 
depression, suicide, and violent behaviour, may be related to a decrease in social 
connectedness within the school community (Zeldin, 2004). Put simply, Putnam (2000, p. 
296) suggested that “Social Capital keeps bad things from happening to good kids”.  
Lastly, a person’s exposure, and access, to structured, group-based activities are 
said to be important in facilitating the further development of Social Capital (Jarrett, 
Sullivan, & Watkins, 2005). For example, Jarret et al. (p. 49 - 50) suggested that 
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community based activities can provide individuals with “information, assistance, support, 
and encouragement”; thus helping them to achieve their personal goals in life.  However, 
as noted in the introduction to this chapter, it is assumed that to successfully interact with 
others and acquire Social Capital a person must be equipped of a number of prosocial 
skills, as well as being able to attribute those same skills to others (Frith & Frith, 2006). 
Those skills will now be discussed. 
 
6.2: Social Capital and Prosociality.  
 
6.2.1: Social Capital and Theory of Mind. 
 
As noted in chapter five, Theory of Mind relates to how individuals ascribe mental 
states; thus allowing a person to understand and predict the behaviour of others. McCabe 
and Smith (2000) suggested an association between Social Capital and Theory of Mind, 
which they termed ‘goodwill-accounting’. They suggest that ‘goodwill-accounting’ is the 
mechanism by which people are able to assess and commit to memory the extent to which 
another person can be trusted or relied upon. This information is then used to decide 
whether the initiation or further development of a relationship is worthwhile. Coricelli, 
McCabe, and Smith (2000) suggested to do this a person must be able to ‘read the minds’ 
of others.  
McCabe et al. (2001) gave support to the theory of ‘good-will-accounting’. In their 
study, they exposed participants to a simple two-player game of reciprocal trust, in which 
he or she was required to play against a human and/or a computer. During the game 
McCabe et al. noted the behaviour of each participant, whilst at the same time conducting a 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan. Based on the participant’s behaviour, he or 
she was then placed into one of two groups; group one consisted of participants who had 
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demonstrated cooperative behaviours whilst playing against a human opponent but not 
against the computer and group two consisted of participants who had shown no 
cooperative behaviour at all. An analysis of the brain scans revealed that, in group one, the 
medial prefrontal cortex, an area of the brain implicated in Theory of Mind, was activated 
during episodes of ‘cooperation’  with a human opponent, but no similar activations 
occurred when the same participant played against a computer. In contrast, participants in 
group two groups showed no significant difference in brain activations during play against 
a human or a computer.   
Further, as noted in chapter five, Theory of Mind is thought to require the 
recognition and understanding of both verbal and visual cues (Blair & Coles, 2000). From 
reviewing the literature there is an apparent void in the current understanding relating to a 
specific link between Social Capital and (i) verbal Theory of Mind and (ii) visual Theory 
of Mind, in either an offending or non-offending population. Study 3a will address this gap 
and the following hypotheses were made: 
• Hypothesis 6.1a: There will be an association between Social Capital 
                        and verbal Theory of Mind (in a cohort of offenders and non- 
  offenders).  
• Hypothesis 6.1b: There will be an association between Social Capital  
                        and visual Theory of Mind (in a cohort of offenders and non-offenders).  
6.2.2: Social Capital and Empathic Understanding.  
 
As detailed in chapter five, one characteristic that allows an individual to tune into 
the needs and feelings of another is Empathic Understanding (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, 
Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). Indeed, Damasio (2004) noted Empathic Understanding to 
be a fundamental motivating force required to build human relationships; in other words 
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Social Capital. Petersen et al. (2009) concluded that the need to build Social Capital is not 
always motivated by conscious assessments of self-interest, but rather an unselfish need to 
build a trusting and reciprocal relationships with others. To provide empirical evidence of 
this link Venkatanathan et al. (2013) recruited 93 participants (M age = 28.2 years; SD = 
5.1 years). Using social network structuring and regression analysis, they found a strong, 
positive relationship between Empathic Understanding and both bonding Social Capital 
and bridging Social Capital, as evidenced by the number of online ‘friends’ participants 
claimed to have. As a consequence, it was suggested that the ability to empathise enables 
an individual to interact effectively with others, and is therefore fundamental to the 
successful development of Social Capital.  
However, as noted in study 2 (chapter five) past research has predominately used 
self-report measures to establish levels of Empathic Understanding. Specifically, Makino 
(2010) noted that self-report measures may not be an indication of a participant’s true 
belief but rather reflect their knowledge of how other people might expect them to think. 
Therefore, study 3a used both a self-reported Empathic Understanding and a performance-
based Empathic Understanding measure to assess the relationship between Social Capital 
and Empathic Understanding. Further, although the measure for Social Capital in study 3a 
and b was a self-report assessment, it in included questions beyond a simple ‘how many 
friends do you have?’ approach; thus tapping into both opinion and evidence (for a fuller 
example please see chapter three). To address the relationship between Social Capital and 
Empathic Understanding, Study 3a made the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 6.1c: There will be an association between Social Capital 
                        and self-reported Empathic Understanding (in a cohort of offenders  
  and non-offenders). 
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• Hypothesis 6.1d: There will be an association between Social Capital 
and performance-based Empathic Understanding (in a cohort of offenders 
and non-offenders).   
6.2.3: Social Capital and Moral Reasoning. 
 
According to Adler and Kwon (2000, p. 17) “Social Capital is often understood as 
the ‘goodwill’ that is engendered by the fabric of social relations and that can be mobilised 
to facilitate action”. Social Capital is generally portrayed as being a positive construct 
(Leana & Van Buren, 1999) at both a societal (Putnam, 2000), and a personal (Svendsen & 
Sorensen, 2006) level. As a construct, Social Capital is said to deliver positive economic, 
political, and personal outcomes, based on the existence of collective resources such as 
local solidarity, common norms, trusting communities, better mental health, and education; 
which Putman (2000) stated were vital to people in terms of their everyday lives and 
ongoing well-being.   
However, a number of authors have acknowledged a downside to Social Capital 
(Edelman, Bresnen, Newell, Scarborough, & Swan, 2004). Portes (1998, p. 15) in 
particular  summarises the problematic aspects of Social Capital as being “the exclusion of 
others, excessive claims on members of the group, restrictions on individual freedoms, 
group closure, and the downward levelling of norms based on group solidarity”. Indeed, 
from a practical perspective, Social Capital may be seen to exclude ‘outsiders’ from the 
benefits developed and accrued by ‘insiders’ (Adler & Kwon, 2002). This may in turn 
hinder entrepreneurship and impose non-reciprocal obligations that lead to the favouring of 
subgroups over the goals of the collective (Willem & Scarbrough, 2006). Other issues that 
may arise are related to a group’s norms and beliefs. Lin (2001), for example, noted that a 
155 
 
group with strong internal ties, but only few external ties, may become insular, 
xenophobic, and status driven.  
Based on these theoretical examples the potential moral deficiencies of Social 
Capital are suggested (Ayios, Jeurissen & Spence, 2010). However, in order to determine 
the existence of a relationship between Social Capital and Moral Reasoning, further 
empirical study is needed. Study 3a in this chapter will address this and the following 
hypothesis was made: 
 Hypothesis 6.1e: There will be an association between Social Capital and Moral 
Reasoning (in a cohort of offenders and non-offenders).  
 
6.3:  Social Capital and Offending Behaviour.  
 
The current literature appears to suggest that the construct of Social Capital is 
primarily conceptualised in terms of relationships at an individual level (Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1994), which are then utilised at a societal level (Rose & Clear, 1998; 
Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). The personal investment and collective efficacy 
that stems from these bonds, at both the personal and societal level, are said to be 
characterised by a sense of knowledge, obligation, expectation, and trustworthiness (Nagin 
& Paternoster, 1994). Further, it is claimed that the sanctions these bonds engender, by 
endorsing societal norms, can create a form of informal social control (Sampson & Laub, 
2005).  
As a consequence Social Capital theories and frameworks have been used to 
explain offending behaviours (Hirschi, 1969). Hirschi stated that all humans are equally 
predisposed to crime but suggested that forming attachments to others may help to inhibit 
potential offending behaviours. Certainly, it has been suggested that notable life events that 
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endorse such attachments, for example employment (Kazemian, Farrington, & Le Blanc, 
2009) and marriage (Sampson, Laub, & Wimmer, 2006), may modify behavioural 
trajectories leading to desistance from crime. Indeed, Sampson and Laub (2005) in their 
Age-Graded Theory of Informal Social Control and Cumulative Disadvantage presented 
such an argument, stating that by forming attachments a person becomes more accepting of 
the norms and goals of the society in which they live; which often results in a more crime 
free life. In contrast, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) noted that it may not be the 
attachments themselves that make a difference to offending behaviours, but rather that such 
relationships reduce the amount of time and/or opportunities available to commit crimes. 
Thus, Social Capital is said to help protect individuals and communities from unacceptable 
behaviours (Piquero, Jennings, & Farrington, 2010). Further, whilst Moffitt (1994) 
suggested that as a person ages’ changes in attachments are inevitable, and that this may 
have an impact, either positive or negative, in terms of offending behaviours, Sampson and 
Laub (2005) posited that offending behaviours were most probable when a person’s 
relationships or bonds were absent, weakened, or broken. 
However, as noted in subsection 6.2.3 of this chapter, it is apparent that Social 
Capital may be categorised as prosocial (Allan et al., 2012) or antisocial (Putnam, 2000). 
The major difference between (pro) Social Capital and (anti) Social Capital is that the 
former appears to be more reciprocal, whilst the latter uses social bonds as a way of 
promoting personal gratification or enhancement. Indeed, McCarthy and Hagan (2001) 
suggested that Social Capital theories relating to antisocial or offending behaviours draw 
on the assumption that a person’s actions are driven by a desire to maximise their own 
welfare, whilst Heffernan (2015) found that members of a group characterised by a greater 
sense of societal norms are more likely to be socially alert to one another person’s needs. 
157 
 
In other words, it seems that a person may be able to build Social Capital, using an 
identical process of networking, with individuals who value either prosocial behaviours, or 
offending behaviours (Putman, 2000). Therefore, it might be expected that in a comparison 
of an offenders and non-offenders, the offenders would be shown to have less Social 
Capital than the non-offenders. Whilst theoretical research exists to support this notion, 
there is paucity in terms of empirical research. Study 3b addressed this gap, and the 
following hypothesis was made:  
• Hypothesis 6.2: There will be a difference in Social  
                        Capital according to status. 
 
6.4:  Methodology. 
 
The sample for studies 3a and 3b comprised of 400 participants: male and female 
offenders (male =100, female = 100, aged 18- to 55- years) and male and female non-
offender (male =100, female = 100, aged 18- to 55- years). The purpose of this study was 
twofold: (i) study 3a explored the relationship between Social Capital and Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning using Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation coefficient, and (ii) study 3b an independent t-test was conducted to compare 
the levels of Social Capital according to status. 
 
6.5: Results. 
 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary assumption testing were performed for each 
of the five measures in study 3a: (i) verbal Theory of Mind, (ii) visual Theory of Mind, (ii) 
self-reported Empathic Understanding, (iv) performance-based Empathic Understanding, 
158 
 
(v) and Moral Reasoning, and for the measure of Social Capital used in studies 3a and 3b. 
Table 6.1 on the following page shows the mean scores for each of the six measures. The 
standard deviations indicate that all the scores are located fairly close to the relevant mean 
score.  
Skewness and kurtosis values were examined to further explore the distribution of 
the scores, which are also shown in table 6.1 on the following page. With regard to the 
skewness of the data, for all six measures, the negative results indicate that most of the 
scores were clustered towards the higher end, in relation to the maximum scores available 
in each measure. However, all score are located within the permitted range of -1 to +1 
which indicates a relatively normal distribution of the data (Clark-Carter, 2010). With 
regard to kurtosis of the data, the following was identified: for verbal Theory of Mind, 
visual Theory of Mind-Visual, and self-reported Empathic Understanding the negative 
results suggest that the distribution of scores is relatively flat; for performance-based 
Empathic Understanding the positive results indicate that the scores are clustered towards 
the centre; and for Moral Reasoning and Social Capital, the negative result indicates a flat 
distribution of scores. However, with the exception of Empathic Understanding-
Performance based, all scores are within the permitted range of -3 to +3, indicating that the 
data are relatively normally distributed (Clark-Carter, 2010). 
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Table 6.1:  Descriptive Statistics for verbal and visual Theory of Mind, self-reported and performance-
based Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital, across the whole data set. 
 
                                                          
                                                      n             M              M            SD            Skewness           Kurtosis  
                                                                    5%  
                                                               Trimmed               
 
                Verbal 
      Theory of Mind                  400           12.06         12.70            5.53            -.43                  -.79 
   
                Visual  
     Theory of Mind                  400          23.90          24.07            8.26            -.431                -.66         
 
           Self-Reported 
Empathic Understanding        400          27.33           27.43          7.65            -.039              -.103   
 
          Performance-Based 
Empathic Understanding        400         122.26        122.39        23.03             -.178              .255   
      
      Moral Reasoning               400          299.95       301.06         39.75             -.223             -.316        
 
         Social Capital                  400          80.95         81.06         19.67              -.203              -.097 
 
 
 
6.5.1: Study 3a 
 
As noted above, the relationships between Social Capital and: (i) verbal Theory of 
Mind; (ii) visual Theory of Mind ; (iii) self-reported Empathic Understanding; (iv) 
performance-based Empathic Understanding, and; (v) Moral Reasoning were investigated 
using Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. The results are shown in Table 6.2 
on the next page. To summarise, hypothesis 6.1a was supported as there was a moderate, 
positive association between Social Capital and verbal Theory of Mind; however, 
hypothesis 6.1b was not supported as was there was no association between Social Capital 
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and visual Theory of Mind.  Hypothesis 6.1c was supported as there was a moderate, 
positive association between Social Capital and self-reported Empathic Understanding. 
Similarly, hypothesis 6.1d was supported as there was a small, positive association 
between Social Capital and performance-based Empathic Understanding. However, 
hypothesis 6.1e and 6.1f were not supported as there was no association between Social 
Capital and Moral Reasoning. 
 
Table 6.2:  Correlations between verbal and visual Theory of Mind, self-report and performance-based 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. 
 
             Measure                                   1                2                  3         4            5              6 
 
 
1. Verbal Theory of Mind                   -              
  
2. Visual  Theory of Mind                .157**              -     
          
3.         Self-Reported 
Empathic Understanding              .298**         .236**            -       
       
4.      Performance-Based 
Empathic Understanding              .272**         .286**          .086            -  
 
5. Moral Reasoning                           .477**          .209**         .160**       .324**         - 
                 
6. Social Capital                                 .327**          .091              .273**       .156**       .054         -       
  
 
** p < .001, df = 398 
 
6.5.2: Study 3b. 
 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary assumption testing were conducted for study 
3b. Table 6.3 on the following page shows the mean scores for Social Capital. The mean 
scores for the offenders and noon-offenders are relatively close and the standard deviation 
indicates that all the scores are located fairly close to the relevant mean score. 
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            Table 6.3:  Descriptive Statistics for Social Capital According to Status. 
 
                                                              Offenders                  Non-Offenders  
                                                        n         M        SD           n       M         SD 
 
                Social Capital            200        80.50    19.69      200      81.35    19.70 
 
An independent t-test was conducted to compare the Social Capital scores of 
offenders (M = 80.5, SD = 19.69) and of non-offenders (M= 81.35, SD = 19.7). Hypothesis 
6.2 was not supported as no significant difference was found in levels of Social Capital 
between the offending group and the non-offending group, t (398) = -.437, p= .663, two-
tailed. This indicates that the offenders in the present study did not report having less 
Social Capital than the non-offending group.  
 
6.6: Discussion. 
 
The current study had two objectives; (i) firstly to examine the association between 
Social Capital and verbal and visual Theory of Mind, self-reported and performance-based 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and (ii) secondly to identify any differences in 
levels of Social Capital between the offender group and the non-offender group, across a 
representative adult age range. The findings will now be discussed. 
6.6.1: Social Capital and Theory of Mind. 
 
Study 3a found an association between verbal Theory of Mind and visual Theory of 
Mind (hypothesis 6.1a). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) stated for the development and 
maintenance of Social Capital, individuals need to repeatedly interact with each other; 
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suggesting an ability to infer the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of those with whom an 
interaction is taking place. Cole and Griffiths (2007) concurred, suggesting that for 
successful reciprocal interactions, a person needs to properly assign suitable cognitive 
resources. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, an ability that enables this process is 
said to be Theory of Mind (Minio-Paluello, Avenanti, & Aglioti, 2006). More specifically, 
Saxe and Baron-Cohen (2006) stated that the ability to make inferences, or ‘read’ the 
minds of others, depends upon verbal signals. By processing these signals people are able 
to understand each other’s goals and desires (Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006) Therefore, the 
positive association between Social Capital and verbal Theory of Mind may be explained.  
However, no such association was found between visual Theory of Mind and Social 
Capital (hypothesis 6.1b). Although unexpected, Schmidt and Cohn (2001) stated that the 
written or spoken word is insufficient for successful social exchange. Specifically, these 
researchers noted that words may sometimes be understood to convey the exact opposite of 
their literal meaning by adding visual accompaniments such as humour, anger, or sarcasm 
(Scheff, 1988). Indeed, Hansen (2009) suggested that a mixture of both verbal and visual 
signals are needed to build Social Capital as they allow for the decoding of figurative 
speech such as irony and metaphor. More recently, Vlahovic, Roberts, and Dubar (2012) 
noted that relationships based mainly on the written or spoken word require greater effort, 
as it is more difficult to substitute some facial expressions with words and symbols. 
One possible explanation for the lack of association between Social Capital and 
visual Theory of Mind in study 3a may be found by examining the modern day phenomena 
of web-based communication (Park, 2010). Based on the notion that both verbal Theory of 
Mind and visual Theory of Mind are needed to form Social Capital, it could be 
hypothesised that individuals who largely communicate via technology, a medium to some 
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extent lacking in visual stimuli, might possess lower levels of Social Capital. However, 
Park suggested that through social media, the construct of Social Capital is more flexible, 
and as a result less reliant on both verbal and visual motivations. Antheunis, Vanden 
Abeele, and Kanters (2015) illustrated this view by noting that ‘pre-technology’ migrants 
(either within or outside of their home country) often suffered from social isolation. Whilst 
Binder and Sutcliffe (2014), noted that modern  technologies  assist migrants to ‘bridge’ 
large distances, and so maintain existing, as well as build new, Social Capital. In addition, 
through directed communication to known people, and public broadcasting to unknown 
people, an individual may be able strengthen both ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ capital 
(Antheunis et al., 2015). Moll, Pieschl, and Bromme (2015) agreed, noting that through 
social media less confident individuals can take part in exercises of self-disclosure; a 
process purported to be necessary for the building and maintaining of Social Capital as it 
allows for levels of trust to be reached. Collectively, this research suggests that visual 
stimuli may no longer be as important for the building of Social Capital.  
Past research has largely considered Social Capital in non-offending populations. 
As a consequence of including an equal proportion of offenders and non-offenders (the 
offenders serving a prison sentence of six months or less at the time of interview) study 3a 
undoubtedly adds to the literature.  However, in proposing that the building and 
maintenance of Social Capital in today’s society may no longer be dependent on both 
verbal and visual Theory of Mind, and that with the advent of social media the boundaries 
between emotional and informational support may have become blurred (Lomanowska & 
Guitton, 2016), another question is posed.  Specifically, prisons in the UK prohibit any 
form of social media. Therefore, it could be expected that the offenders in this study are 
unable to maintain a level of Social Capital outside of the prison environment, as both face 
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to face and ‘virtual’ contact with friends and family is limited. As a consequence, offenders 
may be expected to demonstrate lower levels of Social Capital in comparison to non-
offenders. This question was addressed by study 3b. 
6.6.2: Social Capital and Empathic Understanding.  
 
The present study found, as predicted, an association between both self-report 
Empathic Understanding (hypothesis 6.1c) and performance-based Empathic 
Understanding. Empathic Understanding refers to an awareness of the social environment 
in which a person lives and suggests an ability to recognise and respond appropriately to 
the feelings and behaviours of others (Pinker, 2011). Greenberg, Gullotta, and Bloom 
(2016) suggested that to empathise with others is important from the perspective of 
building Social Capital, stating that the ability to recognise and understand another 
person’s perspective helps to establish, nurture, and expand social networks. In addition, 
the ability to recognise that another’s view may be different from one’s own facilitates the 
regulation or modification of subsequent behaviours.   
Wölfer, Cortina, and Baumert (2012) suggested that individuals are able to adjust 
levels of Empathic Understanding according to the social structures in which they find 
themselves. For example, these researchers noted that prosociality in school age children 
altered according to whether a particular relationship was at an individual, group, class, or 
whole school level. Venkatanathan et al. (2013) explained this further by suggesting that 
different levels of Empathic Understanding could be utilised according to the type of 
Social Capital being targeted; specifically, bridging and bonding Social Capital, as used in 
a social context, might require greater levels of Empathic Understanding than linking 
Social Capital which is generally used in a more formal context. This notion is of interest, 
in that an offender’s ability to empathise with a fellow prisoner is different from his or her 
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ability to put themselves in the shoes of their victim. However, it was not considered in 
study 3a, and therefore may be of particular interest to future researchers.  
Despite this, by including a performance-based, as well as a self-reported, 
assessment of Empathic Understanding, and showing the relationship between Social 
Capital and Empathic Understanding was statistically significant in both, study 3a added to 
the literature. Further, to the current author’s knowledge, study 3a was the first to 
empirically consider an association between Social Capital and Empathic Understanding in 
a single cohort comprising of male and female, offenders and non-offenders; thus offering 
a unique view of the relationship between the two constructs.  
6.6.3: Social Capital and Moral Reasoning. 
 
The present study found no association between Social Capital and Moral 
Reasoning. This was unexpected given that Social Capital is said to be mediated by trust, 
reciprocity, and mutual cooperation (Chen et al., 2015). Indeed, Tonkiss and Passey (1999) 
suggested that the trust aspect of Social Capital is the ‘glue’ that holds society together, 
whilst Uslaner (2001, p. 1) described it as “the chicken soup of life”. Similarly, Popper 
(2013) suggested Social Capital is a coalition between reciprocity and cooperation; used to 
control societal behaviour. This is manifested, not only by encouraging individuals to 
behave in certain ways according to the situation, but also by offering sanctions that 
discourage individuals from socially deviant behaviour. Further, Akçomak and ter Weel 
(2008) argued that disparate levels of Social Capital can account significantly for observed 
differences in crime rates; with higher levels of Social Capital being positively associated 
with lower levels of crime. According to Castiglione, van Deth, and Wolleb (2008) this 
type of informal control’ is characterised by agreed societal norms, values, and Moral 
Reasoning; thus adding to the explanation. 
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However, one explanation for the apparent lack of association between Social 
Capital and Moral Reasoning may be found by examining the construct of cooperation. 
Popper (2013) pointed out that having a predisposition to behaving cooperatively, as well 
as an increased sensitivity to recognising and not tolerating behaviour that abuses the 
concept of cooperation was not a sufficient guarantee that people will always or at least in 
the majority of situations, favour cooperative behaviour over deception. Popper noted a 
possible cause for this may be that humans often favour short-term benefits over those that 
take more time and effort to achieve. In other words, Moral Reasoning, as a characteristic 
of Social Capital, can be overlooked by some individuals in the pursuit of personal gain.  
Another explanation for the current study’s findings may derive from organised 
crime. According to Bourdieu (1986), organised crime is characterised by a mutual trust 
between its members. Putman (2000) concurred stating that the members of organised 
crime syndicates were in possession of a form of Social Capital. Pih, de Rosa, Rugh, and 
Mao (2008) agreed; however, they stated that ties, relationships, and interactions in this 
form were better described as ‘illegitimate’ Social Capital. They noted that the longevity of 
‘illegitimate’ Social Capital was primarily due to the lack of ongoing ‘legitimate’ Social 
Capital available to gang members; meaning that involvement in organised crime often 
lasts into adulthood. 
 Further, whilst gang membership is believed to promote negative behaviours in 
terms of societal norms, within the context the gang itself, such behaviours maybe entirely 
normative (Decker, 2007). Therefore, gang membership should not be seen as simply 
chaotic and beyond moral boundaries, but rather that the moral boundaries of gangs may be 
very different from those considered acceptable by most of society; that is they tend to be 
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contentious and vengeful rather than harmonious and mutualistic, but are still grounded in 
honour and loyalty (Cooney, 2009).  
6.6.4. Differences in Social Capital according to Status (offenders and non- 
           offenders). 
 Study 3b found no difference in levels of Social Capital between the offender and 
the non-offender groups. This is somewhat surprising given that Venkatanathan et al., 
2013) noted that high levels of Social Capital are associated with compliance with societal 
norms and social control. Indeed, Laub (2006) is his re-analysis of the Glueck and Glueck 
(1937) data suggested that investments in Social Capital, or the social relations between 
interdependent individuals, can help to redirect a criminal pathway from one that reflects 
persistence in crime to one reflecting desistance. In other words the development of social 
relationships or bonds can serve to correct previously deviant pathways, thereby placing an 
individual on a trajectory towards more prosocial outcomes. As a consequence, it may have 
been reasonable to expect that a difference in Social Capital might be found between an 
offending and a non-offending group, matched for age and IQ, with the offenders reporting 
lower levels than the non-offenders.  
One explanation for this unexpected finding may be found by examining organised 
crime. As noted in subsection 6.6.3 of this chapter, the theories surrounding Social Capital 
do not successfully explain gangs, gambling syndicates, prostitution rings, and/or crime 
families. In each of these examples it could be said that Social Capital, in the form of trust, 
reciprocity, and veneration, is evident. Certainly, Wooditch, Tang, and Taxman (2014) 
noted that the relationship or bond between offenders is often characterised by a strong 
attachment. Whilst Fergusson et al. (2002), following a cohort of 1,265 young people (14- 
to 21- years) in New Zealand, noted that the existence of strong deviant-peer relationships 
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were positively associated with increasing rates of criminal activity. Wright and Cullen 
(2004) similarly found that deviant-peer relationships were the strongest predictor of 
criminal conduct; thus supporting the proposal that Social Capital “can be directed toward 
malevolent, antisocial purposes” (Putnam, 2000, p. 22).  In explaining the possible 
negative side of the construct Putman cited the case of Timothy McVeigh, noting that the 
bombers “network of friends, bound together by a norm of reciprocity” (p. 21), may have 
assisted him to bomb the Murrah Federal Building in the USA, in 1995. This type of Social 
Capital was noted as ‘illegitimate by Popper (2013).  
Whilst the similarities between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ Social Capital, in the 
form mutual trust (Bourdieu, 1986), cooperation (Popper (2013), loyalty, and honour 
(Cooney, 2009), are recognised, there are also notable differences.  Simply, Popper (2013) 
suggested that ‘legitimate’ Social Capital tended to be mutualistic in nature, whereas 
‘illegitimate Social Capital’ operated from a more egocentric perspective.  In other words, 
the possession of Social Capital may not be sufficient to guarantee that people will always 
behave in a prosocial way. However, one limitation is that the measure of Social Capital 
used in study 3a and b did not distinguish between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ Social 
Capital. Further, participants were not asked to describe the age or location of the 
friendship they were claiming to have. In other words the offenders may have been 
reporting new relationships or networks acquired in prison, rather than those formed before 
he or she was incarcerated. Alternatively, it could be that a sentence of six months or less is 
too short a time to ‘loose’ existing Social Capital formed outside of  the prison 
environment, or that the offender simply did not perceive it to be lost (Lafferty, Treloar, 
Butler, Guthrie, & Chambers, 2016). This may be an important factor in the current 
findings, and something future researchers may like to consider. 
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Further, in light of the theoretical back-ground relating to bridging, bonding and 
linking Social Capital, it may be important to consider a second limitation within study 3.  
Simply, the measure used primarily focused on bonding Social Capital as represented by 
the relationships between friends and family (Archuleta & Teasley, 2013). It did not 
consider the ability of individuals to access other groups or networks; thus employing 
‘bridging’ Social Capital. Given that relationships at a personal level can be of an 
antisocial or offending nature (Popper, 2013), it may be that ties or networks at a societal 
level are needed to engender social control (Sampson & Laub, 2005).  This would be 
termed bridging and/or linking Social Capital (Archuleta and Teasley, 2013) However, as 
indicated by study 3 offenders appear to have reduced abilities in relation to Theory or 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, and so may find the acquisition of 
bridging or linking Social Capital difficult; thus leaving them vulnerable to satisfying their 
social needs through less conventional means. Therefore, whilst this thesis concludes that 
similar levels of Social Capital, as characterised by social networks with strong norms and 
reciprocity, can be found in both offenders and non- offenders, future research may wish to 
consider the characteristics of the Social Capital under evaluation.  Specifically, the age 
and location of the ties, as well as the nature of the Social Capital in terms of bonding, 
bridging, or linking may be of interest to future researchers .  
 
6.7: Conclusion. 
 
Social Capital is said to be the availability of resources, from which individuals can 
draw, to reach their desired goals (Furstenberg, Cook, Eccles, Elder, & Sameroff, 1999). 
Whilst Social Capital has been of interest to psychologists for a number of years, the 
influence of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning on the 
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construct has to some extent been neglected.  To the current author’s knowledge study 3a is 
the first to demonstrate the relationship between Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital, within a mixed cohort of adult offenders and 
non-offenders, in a single study.  
Further, the findings also add to the literature by firstly suggesting that the creation 
and maintenance of Social Capital may no longer be dependent on both verbal and visual 
stimuli. Indeed, in terms of modern day Social Capital, the boundaries between 
informational and emotional support may have become confused. Secondly, the current 
study highlights that bonding Social Capital, as measured by trust and reciprocity, can be 
found at similar levels in a non-offending sample and an offending sample.  
To conclude, future studies may wish to consider the differences between offenders 
and non-offenders in relation to bridging or linking Social Capital, as well as the 
association Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning has with these 
constructs. Nevertheless, from the perspective of bonding Social Capital, used as an aid to 
reducing offending behaviours, practitioners may wish to take into consideration the 
characteristics, as well as the amount of the Social Capital, a person claims to have. 
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Chapter Seven 
Study 4 
Executive Functioning, Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social 
Capital. 
 
With regards to prosociality, which for the purposes of this chapter will include 
Social Capital; past research has largely concentrated on individual differences (Hilbig et 
al., 2014) or socio-environmental influences (Robinson, Zahn-Waxler, & Emde, 1994). 
However, a more recent focus has been on the cognitive mechanisms that make prosocial 
behaviour possible (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2014). These mechanisms not only include the 
capacity to feel, understand, and differentiate between complex thoughts, beliefs, and 
emotions, they also enable a person to self-regulate in order to adapt to the social 
environment in which they might find themselves (Marques et al., 2015). For example, in 
social interactions it is often necessary to control both positive and negative reactions in 
order to comply with the expected norms of a particular activity. Further, individuals often 
face situations where they must choose between competing options. To do this he or she 
must consider any rules and expectations associated with the choices available, as well as 
regulate his or her own need for immediate gratification (Rueda & Paz-Alonzo, 2013). 
Such behavioural and cognitive control is said to be related to Executive Functioning 
(Diamond, 2013).  
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Executive Functioning is described as a multidimensional cognitive control process 
that is characterised as being both voluntary and effortful on the part of the individual (Best 
& Miller, 2010). The Harvard Centre for the Developing Child described Executive 
Functioning as “an air-traffic control system for the brain” (Harvard University, 2011, p.1). 
In other words, Executive Functioning allows a person to navigate in a rapidly changing 
environment, to continuously evaluate and re-evaluate perceptions, and differentiate 
between what is or is not salient; all without being distracted or losing track of his or her 
long term goals (Rueda & Paz-Alonzo, 2013). To understand how this is achieved it is 
necessary to consider the abilities that are thought to underpin Executive Functioning; 
specifically Working Memory (Gordon & Olsen, 1998), Cognitive Flexibility (Welsh et al., 
1991), and Inhibitory Control (Hala et al., 2003). 
Working Memory is a ‘short-term store’, in which a person can temporarily hold a 
small amount of information. Compared to other memory systems, Working Memory is 
characterised by its transient properties in that information can quickly enter, be easily 
retrieved, and is rapidly lost if not actively engaged with (Cowan, 2001). One key function 
of Working Memory is to allow an individual to perform multi-step tasks whilst taking into 
account the social and structural rules that apply to the situation they are in. Cognitive 
Flexibility is the capacity to move between tasks or mental sets (Diamond, 2013). This 
includes the ability to produce different responses to identical stimuli; such as driving on 
the correct side of the road in different countries. Whilst, Inhibitory Control is the ability to 
deliberately ‘inhibit’ automatic responses based on habits or strong desires (Jasinska, 
2013). This skill allows an individual to ignore distractions, give others a fair turn, whilst 
keeping their own emotions in check. Focus, self-control, prioritisation, sustained attention, 
and action are also associated with Inhibitory Control (Rothbart & Posner, 2015).  
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It is likely that Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control are 
not distinct from one another, and that many tasks draw on more than one skill at any given 
time (McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010). Further, whilst many 
pieces of information arrive and depart the brain on separate occasions, some overlap. It 
therefore may be more accurate to suggest that Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, and 
Cognitive Flexibility are needed to direct and manage that flow (Anderson, Richardson, & 
Chemero, 2012). Accordingly a person is able to evaluate, organise, and achieve goals, as 
well as flexibly adapt when confronted with novel problems and/or situations (Rothbart, 
2007). Indeed, together these skills seem to allow a person to adjust his or her behaviour in 
response to changing circumstances by seeing things from different perspectives, applying 
the relevant rules for that setting, and recovering when things do not go as expected (Rueda 
& Paz-Alonzo, 2013). This is known as self-regulation (Rothbart, 2007). 
 
7.1: Differences in Executive Functioning according to Status. 
 
Whilst the capacity to self-regulate complex thoughts, beliefs, and emotions is said 
to be functional from an early age, further development appears to occur during childhood 
and into early adulthood; thus allowing for greater self-control in later life (Gunnar & 
Quevedo, 2007). One example of this is the intrinsic and extrinsic self-regulatory processes 
that develop in a child in line with their own emotional control and their caregivers’ 
responsiveness (Thompson, 2011). In other words, how a child exhibits emotions in the 
presence of stressors is influenced by the responsiveness of individuals to whom they have 
formed an attachment (Gunnar & Donzella, 2002). This not only lays the foundation for the 
development of emotional regulation in infants, but continues through adolescence and into 
adulthood (Heinrichs, Baumgartner, Kirschbaum, & Ehlert, 2003). 
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Language development is similarly thought to contribute to the early development 
of skilful self-regulation (Cole, Pathak & Schneider, 2010). In early childhood, a child’s 
paired verbal and non-verbal expressions are sequential, rather than simultaneous (Bloom 
& Capatides, 1987). However, by school age a child is able to concomitantly animate their 
verbal exchanges with emotional expressions (Garner & Lemerise, 2007), as well as 
exerting a level of control over spontaneous negative emotions (Cole, 1986). Indeed, 
developmental neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that ‘affective’ language can 
reduce the impact of, and response to, aversive stimuli (Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 
2008). By middle childhood children are able to regulate emotions according to cognitive 
capacity and social experiences; thus learning the rules of acceptable prosocial behaviour 
(Gnepp & Hess, 1986).  
Consequently, dysfunction in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control evidenced by a lack of self-regulation, may lead to offending behaviours 
(Meijers, Harte, Jonker, & Meynen, 2015). This association was demonstrated by Ogilvie, 
Stewart, Chan, and Shum (2011) in a meta-analysis relating to the relationship between 
offending behaviour and poor Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control. These researchers found a positive association, with a moderate to large effect size 
(d = 0.6), between poor self- regulation as determined by Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control and offending behaviours. However, this study largely 
focused on ex-detainees and patients in forensic hospitals. 
As noted in chapter one, a key aim of this thesis was to establish the influence of 
specific factors in the development of prosocial behaviour, and as such reflect on whether 
they should be considered when designing new, or when making refinements to existing, 
interventions aimed at reducing recidivism. Therefore, to further determine the importance 
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of Executive Functioning in relation to interventions aimed at reducing recidivism it is 
necessary to consider differences according to status in the component parts of the 
construct. So, whilst the main focus of this thesis has been Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, the current author suggests that Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control may also be important in relation to the 
development of prosocial or offending behaviours. To that end study 4a will consider 
differences in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control between a 
group of offenders (male and female) and a group of non-offenders (male and female); the 
following hypotheses are made:  
 Hypothesis 7.1a: There will be a difference in Working Memory according to 
status.  
 Hypothesis 7.2b: There will be a difference in Cognitive Flexibility according to 
status. 
 Hypothesis 7.3c: There will be a difference in Inhibitory Control according to 
status.  
 
7.2: Executive Functioning and Prosociality. 
 
Executive Functioning is said to provide people with the ability to understand, 
differentiate, and control the thoughts, beliefs, feelings, impulses, and behaviours that may 
be associated with a number of changing situations (Bargh & Morsella, 2008). Further, 
growth-promoting environments that establish routines, model social behaviour, and create 
and maintain supportive and reliable relationships, are said to provide scaffolding that can 
facilitate the development of Executive Functioning. However, as noted in chapter two, a 
number of cognitive skills are also necessary for the individual to understand their own, as 
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well as another’s mental state, perceive and understand their own, as well as another’s 
emotions, and both reason and behave from a moral perspective (Ashrafi & Estaki, 2013). 
These skills are thought to be Theory of Mind (Russell et al., 2007), Empathic 
Understanding (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009), and Moral Reasoning (Malti & Latzko, 2010).  
In addition, it is possible that Executive Functioning is the result of evolutionary 
adaptations and may serve as a predictor for Social Capital (Maner & Kendrick, 2010). The 
following subsections will now discuss Executive Functioning in relation to Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital. 
7.2.1: Executive Functioning and Theory of Mind. 
 
The idea that Executive Functioning may influence the development of Theory of 
Mind was first suggested by Russell et al. (2007). A link between Executive Functioning 
and Theory of Mind has a lot of intuitive appeal, because in Theory of Mind it is necessary 
to inhibit the content of one’s own perspective, flexibly switch to the mind-set of another, 
and process all salient information into a coherent picture. Yet, in assessing the current 
literature it appears that the theorised connection between Executive Functioning and 
Theory of Mind comes largely from correlational evidence. For example, Carlson and 
Moses (2001), in a study of 107 pre-school children, found an association between a 
person’s performance on tasks relating to Executive Functioning and measures of Theory 
of Mind. The results demonstrated a strong positive association between the two 
constructs, independent of IQ, gender, and age.   
However, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, Executive Functioning is 
thought to be an umbrella term for a collection of cognitive functions; Working Memory, 
Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive Flexibility (Goldstein, Naglieri, Princiotta, & Otero, 
2012). Therefore, it might be more appropriate to consider which of these functions best 
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correlates with Theory of Mind. For example, in Theory of Mind, individuals need to 
represent information simultaneously; therefore a poor Working Memory could account for 
apparent deficits in this skill. Gordon and Olson (1998) supported this proposition by 
finding a significant positive association between a measure of Theory of Mind and a 
backwards digit span task; this task being a typical measure of Working Memory. 
 Similarly, Doherty (2008) investigated a link between Cognitive Flexibility and 
Theory of Mind by asking participants to tap their finger whilst also naming an object. 
Congruent with the findings of Gordon and Olsen (1998), performance on these tasks were 
also found to be positively associated, even after age and order effects were controlled for. 
Regarded in this light, Cognitive Flexibility appears to be important for effective levels of 
Theory of Mind.  
Lastly, links can also be found between Theory of Mind and Inhibitory Control. 
Hughes (1998), for example, also using a backwards digit span task, asked participants 
recite the alphabet backwards (e.g. z, y, x …); thus inhibiting the automatic response of 
repeating it in a standard order. It might then be concluded then that the development of 
Inhibitory Control is a correlate of the development of Theory of Mind, although it must be 
noted that poor performance in some measures has been attributed to fatigue, boredom, and 
depression (Siegel, 1987).  
However, the main focus of this chapter is to establish if Executive Functioning is a 
necessary precursor for, and therefore a predictor of Theory of Mind (Carlson & Moses, 
2001). Previous studies have offered mixed findings; for example, Hughes (1998) 
anticipated that early Executive Functioning would predict later Theory of Mind 
performance, but found that this predictive relationship did not hold for all tasks used in the 
study. In contrast, Wimmer (1989) and Perner (1991) argued for an association in the 
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opposite direction; stating that Theory of Mind allows a person to apply Inhibitory Control 
in a more systematic yet complex way. One explanation for this lack of consensus may be 
that Theory of Mind is believed to require both a verbal and a visual element (Blair & 
Coles, 2000). As discussed in chapter five, the development of Theory of Mind is thought 
to require the recognition and understanding of both verbal and visual cues (Blair & Coles, 
2000).  
So, whilst the examination of Executive Functioning (as determined by Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control) and Theory of Mind appears to 
have shifted from an isolated view to a more associative perspective, additional research is 
needed in relation to a predictive explanation that also considers both verbal and visual 
perspectives of the latter (Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015). Further, the literature 
suggests that past research has largely been restricted to non-offending populations. Study 
4b therefore addresses this gap by considering Executive Functioning, as determined by 
Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory control, in terms of both verbal 
and visual Theory of Mind, in a cohort of male and female, offenders and non-offenders. 
The following hypotheses are made: 
 Hypothesis 7.2a: Working Memory will predict verbal Theory of Mind in a 
cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.2b: Cognitive Flexibility will predict verbal Theory of Mind in a 
cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.2c: Inhibitory Control will predict verbal Theory of Mind in a 
cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.3a: Working Memory will predict visual Theory of Mind in a 
cohort of male and female offenders. 
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 Hypothesis 7.3b: Cognitive Flexibility will predict visual Theory of Mind in a 
cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.3c: Inhibitory Control will predict visual Theory of Mind in a 
cohort of male and female offenders. 
7.2.2: Executive Functioning and Empathic Understanding. 
 
There is evidence that Executive Functioning plays an important role in Empathic 
Understanding. Individuals who are well regulated are less likely to be overwhelmed by 
their emotions when witnessing another person in distress or need (Eisenberg & Eggum, 
2009). Eisenberg and Eggum indicated that, as well as being the result of affective arousal 
and emotional contagion, Empathic Understanding may also arise from cognitive processes 
such as perspective-taking and/or memory retrieval. Further, it is claimed that individual 
differences, associated with a propensity to enact prosocial behaviours, are mediated by 
self- regulatory processes (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). These authors suggested that 
prosocial individuals tend to demonstrate good self-regulation and low impulsivity, 
whereas poor self-regulation and high impulsivity, throughout the lifespan, is associated 
with antisocial behaviours. Consequently, people who are able to exercise context 
dependent emotional self-regulation are most likely to possess effective Empathic 
Understanding.  
Like Theory of Mind, it is believed that various social and contextual factors 
moderate both the acquisition and expression of Empathic Understanding (Decety, 2011). 
For example, Decety (2011) has shown that Empathic Understanding can be moderated by 
how the recipient is perceived, including how similar or likable they are (Batson, Lishner, 
Cook, & Sawyer, 2005), as well as by group membership (Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & 
Peace, 2006). Indeed, Zagefka, Binder, Brown, and Hancock (2013) noted two theories of 
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intergroup relations that are said to play an important role in determining the attitudes and 
behaviours of one group towards another. Both the Relative Deprivation theory (Walker & 
Smith, 2002) and the Social Identity theory (Brown, 2000) propose that attitudes towards 
the outgroup stem from comparisons, and subsequent feelings of (dis)satisfaction, based on 
aspiration and attainment.  
Therefore, it might be expected that ingroup members would experience reduced 
concern for outgroup members. Indeed, this was evidenced by Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, 
Batson, & Singer (2010) who studied the reactions of a group of soccer enthusiasts whilst 
they were watching a film of: (i) ingroup members (fans of the ‘watchers’ favoured team) 
or, (ii) outgroup members (fans of a rival team) experiencing electric shocks. It was 
reported that the ‘watchers’ demonstrated more ‘physical’ concern for the ingroup 
members than the outgroup members, some even offering to take the place of an ingroup 
member. Moreover, a brain scan of the ‘watchers’, conducted at the same time as noting 
their physical reactions, revealed activity in the ‘empathy’ area of the brain in response to 
the perceived pain of the ingroup members, but not the outgroup members; thus suggesting 
that prosocial behaviour may be mediated by ingroup or outgroup status.  
A number of other factors are also known to moderate empathic responses; these 
include contextual and personal experiences. For example, Decety, Michalska, Akitsuki, 
and Lahey (2009), in a neuroimaging study documenting brain activity associated with the 
perception of another person’s distress, noted that differences appeared according to 
contextual factors. Specifically, these researchers found that participants were significantly 
more sympathetic to the ‘pain’ of individuals who had contracted AIDS following a blood 
transfusion than those who had contracted the disease as a result of drug-related needle 
sharing.  
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Personal experiences can also have an impact on a person’s ability to demonstrate 
Empathic Understanding. For example, Echols and Correll (2011) compared the neural 
reactions of doctors and a non-medical control group (matched for both age and IQ) whilst 
they watched videos of faces, hands and feet being: (i) pricked by a needle or, (ii) being 
touched by a cotton bud. These researchers noted that the ‘pain matrix’ area of the brain 
was activated in the control group as they watched the first condition, but not the second. 
In contrast, the doctors demonstrated no reaction to either condition. Further, Echols and 
Correll noted that the cortical regions of the brain, the area underpinning Executive 
Functioning and in particular self-regulation, were activated in the doctors but not in the 
control group; thus suggesting that the ability to self-regulate is a learned process.  
To conclude, from the literature reviewed, knowledge relating to an associative 
relationship between Executive Functioning and Empathic Understanding seems to be 
heavily reliant on neuroscience (Lamm & Majdandžić, 2015). Further, few studies have 
considered a link between the two constructs as determined by Working Memory, 
Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive Flexibility; each being required for Executive 
Functioning  (Diamond, 2013). Finally, there is a paucity in the literature in relation to the 
predictive abilities of Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive Flexibility in 
relation to Empathic Understanding, in cohorts of offenders and of non-offenders. 
Therefore, to address these concerns, study 4b assessed the ability of Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control to predict Empathic Understanding, using 
both a self-report and a performance-based measure, in a cohort of male and female, 
offenders and non-offenders. The following hypotheses were made: 
 Hypothesis 7.4a: Working Memory will predict self-report Empathic 
Understanding in cohort of male and female offenders. 
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 Hypothesis 7.4b: Cognitive Flexibility will predict self-report Empathic 
Understanding in a cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.4c: Inhibitory Control will predict self-report Empathic 
Understanding in a cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.5a: Working Memory will predict performance-based Empathic 
Understanding in cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.5b: Cognitive Flexibility will predict performance-based 
Empathic Understanding in cohort of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.5c: Inhibitory Control will predict performance-based Empathic 
Understanding in cohort of male and female offenders. 
7.2.3: Executive Functioning and Moral Reasoning. 
 
Executive Functioning is also believed to play a role in the development of Moral 
Reasoning. Specifically, a major aspect of Executive Functioning is Inhibitory Control 
which enables a person to guide their attention and thoughts in accordance with their 
intentions or goals (Ponsioen, 2001). This skill is of importance when studying Moral 
Reasoning (Malti & Latzko, 2010). Whilst the ability to act in accordance with intentions 
and engage morally can be observed in early childhood, the quality and complexity of 
Moral Reasoning appears to evolve as a person ages (Kohlberg, 1979). Indeed, Kohlberg, 
in his Theory of Moral Maturation, described six stages of Moral Reasoning across three 
distinct periods in a person’s lifetime. These periods are known as: (i) pre-conventional, 
(ii) conventional, and (iii) post-conventional, and range from a basic to a more complex 
form of Moral Reasoning.  
Gibbs (2010) also believed that the ways in which decisions are made changes 
across a person’s life time, from an immature or superficial level to a more mature or 
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profound level. This researcher also noted that very few individuals are able to progress 
beyond these two levels to develop more reflexive and theoretical reasoning. In the same 
way that Moral Reasoning is said to develops with age (Malti & Latzko, 2010), it has been 
suggested that Executive Functioning follows a similar trajectory; with developments in 
childhood leading to later social adjustment and resilience (Miller & Hinshaw, 2010). 
Indeed, the protracted development of the frontal lobes in the brain, which are associated 
with Executive Functioning, may partly explain the changes in decision-making abilities 
during a person’s lifetime (Prencipe et al., 2011).  
Risk factors, in the form of neglect, abuse, instability and ongoing threats, are also 
said to compromise the ability of the developing brain to form the connections required for 
normal Executive Functioning and Moral Reasoning (Petersen, Joseph, & Feit, 2014). 
According to the Harvard Centre for the Developing Child (2011), the brain regions 
associated with Executive Functioning have a multitude of interconnections that control the 
way in which a person responds to moral dilemmas. Narvaez (2010) suggested that in order 
to integrate the rational, emotional, and intuitive aspects involved in Moral Reasoning a 
better organised knowledge and understanding of  societal rules and norms, as well as a 
more controlled ability to reason, are needed. The number of risk factors that a person is 
exposed to can therefore have a detrimental effect on early childhood brain development , 
and later manifest in problematic behaviours such as loss of control or a failure to retain 
information. This notion is supported by meta-analytic evidence suggesting that some 
injuries or impairments in childhood are linked to poor Executive Functioning in 
adulthood, and as a consequence a reduced ability to respond is a socially acceptable way 
(Ganesalingam et al., 2011). The ability to control thoughts and behaviours in a rapidly 
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changing environment is typically attributed to Executive Functioning (Rueda & Paz-
Alonzo, 2013). 
To conclude, although previous research has noted the importance of Executive 
Functioning and Moral Reasoning on social compliance (Vera-Estay, Dooley, & 
Beauchamp, 2014), and neuroscientific studies have shown that skills, such as mental 
abstraction, and flexibility, and regulation of thinking and behaviour, share a similar neural 
network (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012), very little is known about the role of 
Executive Functioning, as determined by Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control, as a predictive tool in relation to Moral Reasoning (Gibbs, 2010), in a 
cohort of offenders and non-offenders. Study 4a assessed these issues; the following 
hypotheses were made: 
 Hypothesis 7.6a: Working Memory will predict Moral Reasoning in a cohort of 
male and female offenders.  
 Hypothesis 7.6b: Cognitive Flexibility will predict Moral Reasoning in cohort 
of male and female offenders. 
  Hypothesis 7.6c: Inhibitory Control will predict Moral Reasoning in a cohort of 
male and female offenders. 
7.2.4: Executive Functioning and Social Capital.  
 
Davis-Kean (2005) stated that as the social sciences have become more integrated, 
the need to study individuals in the context of their daily live has become clearer. An 
increasing amount of research has focused on this, particularly in relation to developmental 
psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Indeed, Flavell (1999) noted that by interacting with 
their environments, individuals accomplish social learning. To begin with this interaction is 
largely managed by parents or carers (Eccles, 1992). Later, teachers, relatives, peer groups, 
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and/ or significant others gain influence (Davis-Kean 2005). Thus, over the years, networks 
of stimuli combine to manage the information and resources available to inform the person 
about the world in which they live. This is known as Social Capital. 
According to Bourdieu (1986) the amount of Social Capital an individual possesses 
depends on the size and quality of their social network. Anheier, Gerhards, and Romo 
(1995, p.862) noted that Social Capital “is the sum of the actual and potential resources 
that can be mobilised through membership in a social network of actors and organisation”. 
By means of Social Capital, individuals may gain “social rewards, such as status, privilege, 
and positions in certain social circles, professions, or organisation” (Brown & Davis, 2001, 
p. 41). Simply, Social Capital comprises of the people and/or influences in a person’s life, 
as well as the availability of resources within the environment on which he or she can draw 
to reach a desired goal (Furstenberg, et al, 1999).  
The management of these resources, and the information that results, is reliant 
on the integration and coordination of a number of complex cognitive systems. As 
noted previously, Executive Functioning provides a useful tool to understand this 
integration and coordination process (Borkowski & Burke, 1996). Indeed, Executive 
Functioning appears to be critical in managing both the flow of information coming into 
the cognitive system, as well as the flow of information out, which results in thoughts or 
behaviours (Fletcher, 1996). At both an individual and societal level, Executive 
Functioning is said to provide a framework to explain how people manage their own 
behaviours, as well as how they work collaboratively to manage the socialisation of 
others and provide the scaffolding for successful social networking.  
To conclude, it appears that understanding the factors that influence an efficient 
Executive Functioning may be important in terms of explaining successful social 
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functioning. Indeed, Tilly (2004) suggested that reduced abilities in Executive 
Functioning, which may be manifested as an inability to make plans and achieve goals, is 
often associated with a lack of Social Capital. According to Tilly, individuals with lower 
levels of Social Capital can have poor language and numeracy skills, which may mean they 
fail to grasp complex social issues or struggle to make themselves understood. However, 
whist a link between the two constructs has been theorised, there is a paucity of empirical 
research assessing the predictive ability of Executive Functioning, as determined by 
Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, in relation to a person’s 
Social Capital. Study 4b will therefore address this gap; the following hypotheses were 
made: 
 Hypothesis 7.7a: Working Memory will predict Social Capital in a mixed group 
of male and female offenders.  
 Hypothesis 7.7b: Cognitive Flexibility will predict Social Capital in a mixed 
group of male and female offenders. 
 Hypothesis 7.7c: Inhibitory Control will predict Social Capital in a mixed group 
of male and female offenders.     
 
7.3: Methodology. 
 
7.3.1: Design. 
 
Study 4a: As noted in chapter three, a one-way, between groups, multivariate 
analysis of variance MANCOVA (controlling for age and IQ) was conducted to investigate 
status related differences in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control. A sample of 400 male and female participants, in two status groups (offenders and 
non-offenders) was used in study 4a. The independent variable was the two status groups 
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and the three dependent variables were: Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control. Further, to examine any indicated differences between the two status 
groups, in each of the three measures Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control, several multiple ANCOVAS (controlling for age and IQ) were 
performed. 
Study 4b:  
In psychological research it is common to study theoretical constructs that cannot 
be directly observed and therefore cannot be directly measured. Executive Functioning 
(Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006), Theory of Mind (Suminar & Hastjarjo, 2016), 
Empathic Understanding (Hojat & LaNoue, 2014), Moral Reasoning (von Weltzien 
Hoivik, 2004), and Social Capital (Congdon Fors, 2012) are all examples of this. 
Therefore, to make such constructs measurable they are often defined in terms of 
behaviours that are quantifiable. This is true of Theory of Mind (Lawson et al., 2004), 
Empathic Understanding (Wakabayashi et al., 2006), Moral Reasoning (Gibbs et al, 1992), 
and Social Capital (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003). However, it is also possible to break down 
some constructs into their constituent factors, or latent variables which, in some instances, 
can be directly quantified. Executive Functioning is one such example (Cronin-Golomb, 
1990). In the introductory section of this chapter it was noted that Executive Functioning 
can be viewed as comprising of three main factors: (i) Working Memory (Gordon & Olsen, 
1998), (ii) Inhibitory Control (Hala et al., 2003), and (iii) Cognitive Flexibility (Welsh et 
al., 1991). Given that abilities in Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive 
Flexibility may separately vary, and can independently be quantified, it was decided to 
establish the predictability of each as distinct influences, in terms of Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social Capital.  
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In deciding upon a design for study 4, both latent variable analysis and path 
analysis were considered. Firstly, latent variable analysis was deliberated. Latent variables 
are variables that are not directly observed but are rather inferred from other variables that 
are observed or measured. In study 2 it would have been possible to adopt three sets of 
measurable variables (see table 7.1):  
 
Table 7.1:  Latent Variable and Measurable variable Relationship 
 
                       Latent Variable               Measurable Variable  
 
                                                                          Working Memory 
                1.  Executive Functioning                 Cognitive Flexibility 
                                                                                     Inhibitory Control 
 
                                                                          Theory of Mind 
                2.  Social Behaviour                    Empathic Understanding 
                                                                                      Moral Reasoning  
 
       3.                     Social Capital 
 
 
 
Adopting a latent variable design would have indicated if,  statistically, Executive 
Functioning (as determined by Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control) was predictive of Social Behaviour (as determined by Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning) and Social Capital. However, the overriding aim of 
this thesis, as noted in chapter 1 (sub-section 1.3), was to establish if specific measurable 
factors should be considered when designing new, or when making refinements to existing, 
interventions aimed at reducing levels of recidivism. Those factors were noted as Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, Social Capital, and Executive 
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Functioning (as measured by individual abilities in Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control). As latent variable analysis would not have satisfied 
this aim, and was therefore rejected.  
The second design to be considered was path analysis. A path design is usually 
directional, allowing the researcher to establish if one variable is able to predict another, in 
a pre-determined order. Simply, it is a multivariate procedure that allows for the 
examination of a set of relationships between one or more predictor variables and one or 
more outcome variables, both either continuous or discrete (Ullman, 1996). For example, 
in study 4 a path analysis design could determine if Working Memory was independently 
predictive of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social 
Capital. As a consequence, path analysis is generally considered the most appropriate 
statistical procedure for investigating the predictability of multiple behavioural 
measureable constructs on other behavioural constructs (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). In 
addition, path analysis has been found to offer more power to detect the predictive effects 
of one variable on another (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013). Given that the aim of Study 4b was 
to establish the predictability of Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control, in relation to Theory of Mind, Empathic understanding, Moral Reasoning, and 
Social Capital, path analysis was considered the most appropriate tool and was therefore 
selected.  
A sample of 200 male and female offenders was used in study 4b. This study used 
IBM SPSS Amos version 23 (path analysis) to establish if abilities in Working Memory, 
Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive Flexibility, and the component factors of Executive 
Functioning, could predict abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning and levels of Social Capital. The model fit was evaluated according to 
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the recommendations of Kline (2011), and included the chi-square likelihood ratio statistic, 
comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) with 
associated 90% CI, and the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR).   
7.3:2: Participants, Materials, and Procedure. 
 For the participants, materials, and procedures used in this study please see chapter 
three.   
 
7.4: Results. 
 
7.4.1: Study 4a 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.1 across the two status groups, there could be differences 
between the mean scores for each of the three measures. The standard deviations in each of 
the three measures, across the two status groups, indicated that most of the scores were 
located fairly close to the relevant mean score.  
 
Table 7.2:  Descriptive statistics for Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility and 
Inhibitory Control scores by Status Group 
 
                                                                               Offenders                                   Non-Offenders    
                                  
                                                                       n           M          SD                         n           M             SD      
             
 
                     Working Memory                200       46.47       6.46                    200         51.29        7.57                 
 
                    Cognitive Flexibility             200      43.50        7.91                    200        48.82         7.48                  
 
                     Inhibitory Control               200      92.20       19.93                  200        11.927       16.19                  
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Descriptive statistics and preliminary assumption testing was also conducted for 
each of the three measures for the whole sample (see table 7.2). Skewness and kurtosis 
values were obtained. With regard to the skewness, the following was identified: for 
Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, the positive results 
indicate that all the scores were clustered towards the lower end, whilst the negative result 
indicates that all the scores were clustered towards the higher end, in relation to the 
maximum scores available in this measure. However, all score were located within the 
permitted range of -1 to +1, indicating a relatively normal distribution of the data (Clark-
Carter, 2010).  
                           Table 7.3:  Descriptive statistics for Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility and 
Inhibitory Control Scores across Whole Data Set  
 
                                                            
                                                         n                M                    SD               Skewness            Kurtosis   
 
          
             Working Memory         400             48.86               7.42                .504                    -.546        
 
  
               Cognitive Flexibility      400             46.14               8.14                 .072                   1.131     
 
 
       
                Inhibitory Control        400            104.95             22.24              - .394                   - .33       
     
                              
 
 
 
With regard to the kurtosis of the data, the following were identified: for Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control the negative results in Working 
Memory and Inhibitory Control indicate that the distribution of scores were relatively flat, 
whilst the positive result in Cognitive Flexibility indicates that the scores were rather 
peaked.  However, all scores were within the permitted range of -3 to +3, indicating that 
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the data were relatively normally distributed (Clark-Carter, 2010). Preliminary assumption 
testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious 
violations were noted.  
To investigate possible status differences in Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, and to control for type I error a one-way, a between 
groups, multivariate analysis of variance (MANCOVA) was performed. The independent 
variable was status group and the three dependent variables were: Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control. A statistically significant difference was 
found between the two status groups, F (3, 396) = 44.235, p = < .01; Wilks’ Lambda = .99; 
partial η2 = .107. To examine the indicated difference between the two status groups for 
each of the three measures Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control, further tests were conducted; a series of ANCOVAS was selected for this.  
Because doing this increases the risk of type I error, in line with Tabachnick and Fidell’s 
(2013) recommendations, a more stringent p value was adopted, p < .025.  
Firstly, to explore the impact of status on Working Memory a one-way, between 
groups ANCOVA was conducted (for the descriptive statistics see Table 7.2). Hypothesis 
7.1a was supported as there was a statistically significant difference in Working Memory 
regarding status: F (1, 398) = 28.61, p < .001.  An effect size of .11 was calculated using eta 
squared. To explore the impact of status on Cognitive Flexibility and to test hypothesis 
7.7b, another one-way, between groups ANCOVA was conducted. Hypothesis 7.1b was 
supported as there was a statistical significant difference in Cognitive Flexibility regarding 
status: F (1, 398) = 28.20, p<.01. An effect size of .11 was calculated using eta squared. To 
explore the impact of status on Inhibitory Control and to test hypothesis 7.1c, a further one-
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way, between groups ANCOVA was conducted. Hypothesis 7.1c was supported as there 
was a statistical significant effect of status on Inhibitory Control regarding status: F (1, 398) = 
120.17, p < .01. An effect size of .34 was calculated using eta squared. In all instances the 
offender group scored lower than the non-offender group.         
7.4.2: Study 4b. 
 
To test the hypotheses within study 4b, that is that Working Memory, Inhibitory 
Control, and Cognitive Flexibility, as component factors of Executive Functioning, would 
predict abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and levels 
of Social Capital, a path model was generated; all model variables were screened for 
missing data outliers and tested for assumptions; none were found. The hypothesised 
pathway is described in Figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1: Hypothesised Path Analysis for Executive Functioning to predict Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning and Social Capital 
 
In path analysis, ‘fit’ indices are used to establish whether a model can be accepted. 
Table 7.1 presents the fit indices for study 4b using IBM SPSS Amos version 23. Marsh, 
Balla, and Hau (1996) recommend that a number of fit indices are utilised to overcome 
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individual index limitations and assess the model fit. Whilst the hypothesised path analysis 
model is significant; χ² (10, n= 200) = 64.998, p <.001, and a non-significant result is required 
for a good model fit. Raykov (2000) stated that when a sample size is 200 participants or 
over, such results may be disregarded, as a large sample is known to produce significant 
results in path analysis software. Similarly, the Root Mean Square residual (RMSEA) 
produced an index of .117, which is greater than the recommended index of .08 (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993). However, more recently Moss (2016) indicated that whilst zero represents 
a perfect fit, the maximum should be unlimited, especially when using large participant 
groups.  
Table 7.4:  Results for Path Analysis for Executive Functioning to predict  
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning and Social Capital 
               NFI           CFI         IFI          RMSEA          Chi-Square  DF   Probability     
                 .935          .942       .944           .117         64.995  10          <.001 
 
Note: Because AMOS is unable to incorporate means and intercepts, the current model used estimates.   For this reason a Goodness of 
Fit Index (GFI) was not calculated 
 
In contrast, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) was .935 and Byrne (1994) recommended 
that for an acceptable model fit this figure should exceed .90. The Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) was .942 and Byrne (1994) recommended that for an acceptable model fit this figure 
should exceed .93. The CFI represents the ratio between the discrepancies of the target 
model to the discrepancy of the independence model. In simple terms, a value approaching 
1.0 suggests that the default model is a better fit than is the independence model (Fan, 
Thompson, & Wang, 1999). Similarly, the NFI (also known as the Bentler-Bonett normed 
fit index) can vary from 0 to 1.0; with 1.0 equalling the ideal of 100%. The NFI equals the 
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difference between the chi-square of the null model and the chi square of target model, 
divided by the chi-square of the null model. In other words, an NFI of .942 indicates the 
target model improves the fit by 94.2% relative to the independence model. Similarly the 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) in the target model is .944 which exceeds the recommended 
figure of .90 (Bollen, 1990).Therefore, this model was considered to be acceptable and 
post-hoc modifications were not conducted. 
Nine of a possible 18 path coefficients were found to be significant at the p<.001 
level and two were significant at the p<.05 level (see Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4).  
 
Table 7.5: Standardised Path Coefficients 
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Figure 7.2: Significant Path Coefficients Only 
To summarise, hypotheses 7.2a, 7.4a, and 7.5a were supported in that Working 
Memory was found to be predictive of verbal Theory of Mind, self-reported Empathic 
Understanding, and performance-based Empathic Understanding. Similarly, hypotheses 
7.2b, 7.3b, and 7.5b were supported in that Cognitive Flexibility was found to be predictive 
of verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of Mind, and performance-based Empathic 
Understanding.  Finally, hypotheses 7.2c, 7.3c, 7.4c, 7.5c, and 7.6c were supported in that 
Inhibitory Control was found to be predictive of verbal Theory of Mind, visual Theory of 
.44* 
.25* 
.20 
.12* 
.27* 
.25* 
.12 
.52* 
.24* 
.37* 
.24* 
Moral 
Reasoning 
Empathic 
Understanding 
Performance-Based 
Empathic  
Understanding 
Self-Report 
 
Theory of 
Mind 
Visual 
 
Theory of 
Mind 
Verbal  
 
Working Memory  
 
 
 
 Inhibitory  
Control  
 
 
      Cognitive  
      Flexibility 
198 
 
Mind, self-reported Empathic Understanding, performance-based Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning. All other hypotheses were not supported. 
 
7.5: Discussion. 
 
7.5.1:   Differences in Executive Functioning According to Status. 
 
Study 4a had one aim, which was to investigate the possible effect of status on 
abilities in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control and such status 
related differences were found. The findings will now be discussed in relation to each 
measure. 
7.5.1a: Working Memory: As predicted in hypothesis 7.1a the offender group achieved 
lower scores than the non-offender group on the measure for Working Memory. This 
finding may then go some way in answering the question of why some offenders appear 
not to learn from negative past experiences and continue to make poor quality decisions. 
This was evidenced by Zelazo and Muller (2002) who found that poor decision making, as 
manifested by the inability to control thoughts, actions, and emotions, to be positively 
associated with deficits in Executive Functioning. More recently, De Brito, Viding, 
Kumari, Blackwood, and Hodgins (2013) in a study of 45 offenders and 21 non-offenders, 
assessed for decision-making abilities and Working Memory, found that the offenders 
demonstrated impairments in both skills. The earlier work of Raine, Park, & Lencz (2001) 
may offer further explanation in that their study of Working Memory, with groups of 
offenders and non-offenders, who were neglected or abused as children, and a control 
group of non-abused individuals, found that the abused individuals, irrespective of status, 
showed reduced abilities in Working Memory. Consequently, an impaired Working 
Memory may be an important factor relating to offending. In particular it may offer an 
199 
 
explanation as to why some individuals, despite receiving repeated punishments, persist in 
offending.  
7.5.1b: Cognitive Flexibility: With regard to hypothesis 7.1b, the offender’s scores in the 
measure for Cognitive Flexibility differed significantly from those of the non-offenders, 
with the offenders scoring lower than the non-offenders. As with Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility has been linked to criminal behaviour, for example in a modified 
version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting task, Vilà-Balló et al. (2015) found that offenders 
had a larger number of failures in terms of applying new sorting rules than the non-
offenders in their study; thus suggesting that offenders have reduced abilities in Cognitive 
Flexibility. Given that Cognitive Flexibility is said to be needed for the successful 
decoding of cognitive and emotional cues that lead to adequate social functioning (Tirapu-
Ustárroz, Pérez-Sayes, Erekatxo-Bilbao, & Pelegrín-Valero, 2007), a reduced ability may 
be associated with a failure to use all relevant information to predict the consequences of 
behaviours (Heinz et al., 2011) , which may, in part, contribute to offending behaviours.  
7.5.1c: Inhibitory Control: A significant differences in Inhibitory Control between the 
offender group and the non-offenders group, was found as predicted in hypothesis 7.1c.  
Whilst, Inhibitory Control is a complex construct, it has been linked to impulsive 
behaviours (Roberts et al., 2011). According to Robinson et al. (2012) individuals who 
demonstrate behavioural problems at an early age are more likely to suffer from low self-
control and impulsivity; which often manifests as disrespect for authority and/or offending 
behaviours (Higgins, Kirchner, Ricketts, & Marcum (2011).  
Whilst evidence exists to suggest that genetic factors (Walderhaug, Herman, 
Magnusson, Morgan, & Landro, 2010) or dispositional determinants (Rogers, Moeller, 
Swann, & Clark, 2010) play a role in problems relating to Inhibitory Control, deficits in 
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cognitive abilities have also been noted (Bruce, Steiger, Ng Ying Kin, & Israel, 2006); 
specifically Working Memory and  Cognitive Flexibility (Dellu-Hagedorn, 2006).  Further, 
Inhibitory Control is said to change throughout childhood and into adolescence (Caspi & 
Roberts, 1999); a notion supported by neuroscientific study relating to brain maturation 
and Executive Functioning (Knapp & Morton, 2013). Higgins et al. (2011) added to this in 
the context of Moffitt’s (1993) developmental taxonomy of offending. Originally a dual 
taxonomy, Moffitt modified her theory in 2003 by adding a third group, low level-chronics, 
who are described as having “uncontrollable temperaments early in life”, which continue 
into adulthood and are characterised by persistent offending behaviours (Higgins et al., 
2011, p. 186). Higgins et al. supported this theory using data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979), Child and Young Adult surveys (n = 413), 
concluding that low levels of Inhibitory Control are more likely with life course persistent 
individuals. 
Studies of specific types of offending behaviours have drawn similar conclusions. 
In particular, low levels of Inhibitory Control have been evidenced in sex offenders. For 
example, Ward, Keenan, and Hudson (1999) suggested that deficits in this type of 
offending fall into two categories: (i) inability to inhibit deviant sexual thoughts and 
actions, and (ii) inability to suppress inappropriate actions. Similarly, Enticott, Ogloff, 
Bradshaw, and Fitzgerald (2008) found low levels of Inhibitory Control and self-reported 
impulsivity in violent offenders. Specifically, these researchers investigated a link between 
cognitive inhibition and impulsive behaviour in violent offenders with schizophrenia (n = 
18) and healthy adults. Their participants completed a Stroop task and a self-report 
impulsivity measure, and evidence of negative priming was found. This is also suggestive 
of deficits in Working Memory, given that negative priming is a memory effect in which 
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prior exposure to a stimulus unfavourably influences the response to the same stimulus. So 
to conclude, individuals with low levels of Inhibitory Control may have difficulty in 
suppressing their own immediate responses long enough to behave in a considered way 
(Alexander et al., 2002); thus possibly contributing to offending behaviours. 
7.5.2: The Predictive Ability of Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive  
 
          Flexibility 
 
Study 4b had four aims which are summarised below:  
(i) to investigate the ability of Working Memory, Inhibitory Control,  
  and Cognitive Flexibility to predict both verbal and visual Theory of  
  Mind in male and female offenders;  
(ii) to investigate the ability each of Working Memory, Inhibitory  
  Control, and Cognitive Flexibility to predict self-reported and  
  performance-based Empathic Understanding in male and female  
                        offenders;  
(iii) to investigate the ability of Working Memory, Inhibitory Control,  
  and Cognitive Flexibility to predict Moral Reasoning in male and 
                        female offenders, and;  
(iv) to investigate the ability of Working Memory, Inhibitory Control,  
  and Cognitive Flexibility to predict Social Capital in male and 
                         female offenders.  
7.5.2a: Executive Functioning and Theory of Mind: Study 4b suggested that Executive 
Functioning was predictive of Theory of Mind. However, as noted in the introduction to 
this chapter, Executive Functioning is thought to be made up of three separate cognitive 
skills: (i) Working Memory; (ii) Cognitive Flexibility and; (iii) Inhibitory Control, In 
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addition, both verbal and visual constructs contribute to a person’s Theory of Mind. 
Consequently, and in response to the recommendations of Goldstein et al. (2012), the 
present study considered the predictive abilities of Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control in terms of verbal Theory of Mind and visual Theory of 
Mind. When taking all of these sub-components into consideration the present study found 
that Working Memory (hypothesis 7.2a), Cognitive Flexibility (hypothesis 7.2b), and 
Inhibitory Control (hypothesis 7.2c) were predicative of verbal Theory of Mind, and 
Cognitive Flexibility (hypothesis 7.3b) and Inhibitory Control (hypothesis 7.3c) were 
predicative of visual Theory of Mind. The findings according to each will now be 
discussed. 
With regard to Working Memory, one explanation for these findings may be found 
in the processing abilities of the construct. For example, Borst, Taatgen, and van Rijn 
(2010) described Working Memory as a cognitive ‘bottle neck’ in that it is only able to 
store a limited amount of information, for a short period of time, before that information is 
lost. According to Borst et al. this problem is addressed by transforming information into 
‘chunks’ that can fit more easily through the ‘bottleneck’; thus allowing a person to process 
complex pieces of information more effectively and efficiently. Arslan, Hohenberger, and 
Verbrugge (2017) noted that a less flexible or deficient Working Memory may constrain 
the ability to do this, and so may result in lower scores in complex measures of Theory of 
Mind.   
However, contrary to expectations, study 4b found that Working Memory did not 
predict ability in visual Theory of Mind (hypothesis 7.3a). As noted above, Working 
Memory has limited capacity. This is addressed by ‘sending’ important information to long 
long-term memory, from possibly where it can be retrieved at a later time. According to 
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Anderson and Schooler (2000) retrieving information from long-term memory is complex 
and there is a chance of accessing the wrong information. One way to avoid this problem is 
to pair verbal concepts with meaningful images (Gutierrez, 2014). This may allow for 
easier retention and access to the information; for example, Kaputa and Palus (2013) found 
that after three days, participants in his study retained only 10 to 20 percent of written or 
spoken information but almost 65 percent of visual information. From this perspective, it 
may be that Working Memory is less useful, thus offering an explanation as to why the 
construct is not predictive of ability in visual Theory of Mind. Study 4b considered only 
three determinants of Executive Functioning; Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control, and so the long term memory in relation to Theory of Mind was not 
assessed;  something that future studies may wish to take this into consideration.     
As expected, study 4b found Cognitive Flexibility to be predictive of both verbal 
Theory of Mind (hypothesis 7.2b) and visual Theory of Mind (hypothesis 7.3b). One 
explanation for this may lie with the ‘Cognitive Complexity and Control’ theory (Zelazo & 
Frye, 1998) which states that Cognitive Flexibility is needed to shift efficiently between 
multiple incompatible perspectives, descriptions, beliefs, intentions, or situations (Jacques 
& Zelazo, 2005). Indeed, Liszkowski (2013) proposed that such flexibility is critical for 
social understanding. This was supported by Bock, Gallaway, and Hund (2015) who found 
Cognitive Flexibility to be positively associated with social understanding, even after 
controlling for age and vocabulary. Bock et al. concluded that the ability to make 
simultaneous judgments, from multiple and sequentially shifting situations, is critical for 
understanding everyday interactions. However, past research has considered Cognitive 
Flexibility and Theory of Mind from only an associative perspective. The present study 
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adds to the literature by suggesting that Cognitive Flexibility is predictive of Theory of 
Mind in both verbal and visual form.  
The present study found that Inhibitory Control to be predictive of both verbal 
Theory of Mind (hypothesis 7.2c) and visual Theory of Mind (hypothesis 7.3c). As noted 
in the introduction to this chapter, Executive Functioning is a multifaceted construct that 
includes the ability to shift between behavioural responses when the ‘rules’ relating to any 
given situation are changed (Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003). Specifically, 
Inhibitory Control refers to the cognitive processes that inhibit automatic responses, and so 
allow for the accomplishment of goal-directed tasks. Alexander et al. (2002) offered an 
example, noting that individuals with weaker Inhibitory Control appear to have difficulty 
in suppressing their own immediate responses long enough to search in their memory for a 
more considered verbal or behavioural response to a given situation. However, as with 
Working Memory and Cognitive Flexibility, past research has only considered Inhibitory 
Control and Theory of Mind from an associative perspective. The present study adds to the 
literature by demonstrating that Inhibitory Control is not only correlated with Theory of 
Mind, but is also predictive of verbal and visual Theory of Mind.  
7.5.2b: Executive Functioning and Empathic Understanding: As with Theory of Mind, 
the present study suggests that Executive Functioning is generally predictive of Empathic 
Understanding. However, as noted above, Executive Functioning is thought to be made up 
of three separate sub-constructs: (i) Working Memory; (ii) Cognitive Flexibility, and; (iii) 
Inhibitory Control. In addition, as previous research has questioned the reliability of self-
report measures (Makino, 2010) the present study included both a self-report and a 
performance-based measure for Empathic Understanding. Study 4b found Working 
Memory (hypothesis 7.5a), Cognitive Flexibility (hypothesis 4.5b), and Inhibitory Control  
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(hypothesis 7.5c) to be predictive of performance-based Empathic Understanding, but only 
Working Memory (hypothesis 7.4a) and Inhibitory Control (hypothesis 7.4c) to be 
predictive of self-reported Empathic Understanding. These findings will now be discussed.   
Working Memory and Empathic Understanding are core constructs in 
psychological research; each being considered essential for normal social functioning 
(Smith et al., 2014). Certainly, each construct has been extensively researched from a 
developmental (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), social (Blakemore, 2008), and 
neuroscientific (Decety & Jackson, 2004) perspective. However, whilst Empathic 
Understanding is said to require an individual to extract salient information relating to a 
given situation and form a coherent ‘mental’ representation; a skill which calls on Working 
Memory (Henderson & Hollingsworth, 2003), research considering the correlates of the 
two constructs has to some extent been neglected (Gao, Ye, Shen, & Perry, 2016). Indeed, 
Gao et al. reasoned that the more information a person is able to store in his or her 
Working Memory, the easier it should be for that person to extract social cues from a 
situation, and so understand the emotions and intentions of others. Therefore, study 4b adds 
to the literature by demonstrating the predictive nature of Working Memory in relation to 
Empathic Understanding, in both self-reported and performance based measures.  
In contrast, the ability of Cognitive Flexibility to predict self-reported Empathic 
Understanding (hypothesis 7.4b) was not supported by study 4b. This was somewhat 
unexpected as previous studies have found that self-reported Empathic Understanding is 
related to Cognitive Flexibility (e.g. Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-
Peretz, 2004). However, the present study did find Cognitive Flexibility to be predictive of 
performance-based Empathic Understanding. Given that Makino (2010) suggested self-
report measures do not always represent the true feelings and beliefs of an individual, the 
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current author suggests that the findings of the current study are more representative of the 
associative relationship between Cognitive Flexibility and Empathic Understanding.  
As noted in chapter two, Empathic Understanding refers to the cognitive and 
emotional reactions of an individual to the observed experiences of another (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). In particular, the cognitive element of Empathic Understanding allows a 
person to understand what someone else might be thinking and, thus, anticipate their 
behaviour (Zaki, 2014). One important characteristic of Cognitive Flexibility is the ability 
to accurately decode and understand numerous ‘expressions’ that may occur during any 
one social interaction (Gery, Miljkovitch, Berthoz, & Soussignan, 2009). This decoding 
process provides contextual information that enables a person to make situational 
judgements. Moreover, it allows for the adoption of another person’s perspective, to 
predict their actions, and so decide how to react to any resultant behaviour. Conversely, a 
reduced ability in Cognitive Flexibility may be associated with a failure to use salient 
information to predict the consequences of one’s own, as well as another person’s, actions 
(Heinz, Beck, Meyer-Lindenberg, Sterzer, & Heinz, 2011); and so lead to social 
inadequacy or inappropriate behaviours (Tirapu-Ustárroz et al., 2007). Study 4b added to 
the literature by demonstrating the predictive nature of Cognitive Flexibility in relation to 
performance-based Empathic Understanding.  
Similarly, study 4b found that Inhibitory Control was predictive of Empathic 
Understanding as assessed by both the self-report (hypothesis 7.4c) and the performance-
based measures (hypothesis 7.5c). According to Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) prosocial 
individuals tend to be good ‘inhibiters’, with low impulsivity, whereas poor inhibition and 
high impulsivity are associated with antisocial behaviours. Eisenburg (2007) built on this 
by suggesting that when prosocial behaviours were ‘costly’ to a person, the ability to 
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successfully inhibit automatic responses, from both an emotional and a behavioural 
perspective, was extremely important. Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) also suggested that 
individuals who are able to ‘inhibit’ are less likely to be overwhelmed by their own 
emotions when witnessing another person in need or distress. However, whilst the 
associative nature of Inhibitory Control and Empathic Understanding has been proposed 
within the context of developmental psychology (Deater-Deckard, 2014) few empirical 
studies have considered the predictive abilities of Inhibitory Control in relation to 
Empathic Understanding (Posner & Rothbart, 2007). Therefore, study 4b adds to the 
literature by confirming this, from both a self-report and a performance-based perspective, 
in an adult population.  
7.5.2c: Executive Functioning and Moral Reasoning: However, study 4b found that 
neither Working Memory (hypothesis 7.6a) nor Cognitive Flexibility (hypothesis 7.6b) 
predicted Moral Reasoning. One explanation for this may be that moral schemas, or 
frameworks, reside in long-term memory, and not working memory (Rest, Narvaez, 
Bebeau, Thoma, 1999). Moral schemas are said to form when a person notes similarities 
between his or her remembered experiences. According to Endicott, Bock, and Narvaez 
(2003) there are three different frameworks in which these moral schemas fit: (i) the 
personal interest framework, (ii) the maintaining norms framework, and (iii) the post-
conventional framework. The ‘personal interest framework’ is the most primitive and relies 
on an egocentric and interpersonal perspective. In contrast the ‘maintaining norms 
framework’, which usually emerges in adolescence, is characterised by the perceived need 
for a society-wide system of cooperation and the uniform application of laws and social 
norms. Finally, the ‘post conventional framework’, which is the most complex of the three, 
is characterised by the core belief that “ moral obligations [should] be based on shared 
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ideals, which are reciprocal and are open to debate and tests of logical consistency, and on 
the experience of the community” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 307). Therefore, if moral 
judgements are based on schemes and frameworks, as well as personal memories, all of 
which are stored in long-term memory, the findings of study 4b appear appropriate. 
However, as noted in subsection 7.5.1 of this chapter, study 4b considered only factors 
related to Executive Functioning, and as such long term memory in relation to Moral 
Reasoning was not assessed, future studies may wish to take this into account.     
Also noted above, the expected predictive relationship between Cognitive 
Flexibility and Moral Reasoning was not found.  The hypothesis relating to the predicative 
abilities of Cognitive Flexibility in relation to Moral Reasoning was based on Kohlberg’s 
theory of Moral Development (1969). Kohlberg suggested that an age related ‘shift’ in 
Moral Reasoning was characterised by a move from a relatively rigid way of thinking to a 
more flexible style. This flexibility is said to enable a person to utilise the multiple moral 
schemas that are held in his or her long term memory (Ross, Krukowski, Putnam, & 
Adams, 2003). One explanation for this unexpected finding may lie in the theory of 
‘Cognitive Blockade’ (Cañas, Fajardo & Salmerón, 2006), which is characterised by a 
tendency to continue with an initial behaviour, even when reasoning suggests that an 
alternative course of action is required. This was demonstrated by Whitton, Henry, and 
Grisham (2014) who assessed 68 individuals for Cognitive Flexibility using three types of 
moral dilemma: benign, impersonal, personal. Whitton et al. concluded that as a result of 
personal situations or obsessions, some individuals have a more rigid Moral Reasoning in 
response to moral dilemmas; thus offering an explanation for the fact that Cognitive 
Flexibility was not shown to be predictive of Moral Reasoning in study 4b.   
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 In contrast, study 4b did find that Inhibitory Control (hypothesis 7.6c) was 
predictive of Moral Reasoning. Inhibitory Control has been defined as the ability to inhibit 
dominant, maladaptive responses, either under instruction or in novel or ambiguous 
situations (Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 2001). Hoffman (1987) noted that 
Inhibitory Control, as well as regulating emotional responses, plays a role in moral 
decision making. Indeed, Narvaez (2010) stated that in order to integrate the rational, 
emotional, and intuitive aspects involved in Moral Reasoning, the ability to control or 
inhibit personal responses is needed. Confirmation of this is found in the earlier work of 
Eisenberg et al. (1994) who argued that over arousal, resulting from negative affect in 
moral conflict situations, may lead to personal distress.  
In contrast, individuals who are able to inhibit such negative effects are thought to 
experience sympathy and consequently display other-centric response tendencies. In other 
words, individuals with high levels of Inhibitory Control are able to self-regulate, reflect 
upon their own behaviours, and when necessary feel guilt (Malti & Ongley, 2014). Such an 
association has been documented in recent twin studies. For example, Gagne and Saudino 
(2010) found Inhibitory Control to be a significant genetic component in terms of 
similarities in moral behaviours between twins. From this perspective, the self-regulation 
afforded by Inhibitory Control (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997) may play a crucial role in 
the occurrence of sympathy and reparative behaviours (Malti & Ongley, 2014). In light of 
these findings, this thesis suggests that Inhibitory Control may form a basis for Moral 
Reasoning.  
7.5.2d: Executive Functioning and Social Capital: Finally, study 4b found that 
Executive Functioning did not predict Social Capital from a Working Memory (hypothesis 
7.7a), a Cognitive Flexibility (hypothesis 7.7b) or an Inhibitory Control (hypothesis 7.7c) 
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perspective. Whilst this may be unexpected, given that Executive Functioning provides a 
useful conceptual tool for understanding the coordination required to successfully manage 
a social network, the following sub-section will offer a possible explanation.  
Like Moral Reasoning, research suggests that the shared historical experiences, or 
memories, of a group or community are a driving force for contemporary Social Capital 
(Puntscher, Hauser, Pichler, & Tappeiner, 2014). Puntscher et al. suggested that schemas or 
frameworks relating to common experiences, cultural attitudes, as well as ‘shocks’ in the 
history of the individual, group or the community, were key indicators for the building of 
Social Capital.  Indeed, these researchers found that ‘significant shocks’ remained in the 
memory of an individual, group, and/or community, influencing behaviour long after the 
‘incident’ occurred, and were thus instrumental in the establishing of collective 
frameworks and schemas. As noted previously, the multitude of schemas or frameworks 
held by a person, group or community are contained in the long term memory (Ross, 
Krukowski, Putnam, & Adams, 2003). As a result, the levels of social trust and 
networking, as key factors in the formation of Social Capital, are significantly influenced 
by events both inside, and outside, of the individual and collective memory; resulting in an 
individual, group, or community developing protective measures in order to secure the 
norms, values, and traditions of a network. Consequently, by measuring Working Memory, 
as opposed to long term memory, the present study did not tap into the cognitive area 
important for Social Capital in relation to other aspects of memory; something future 
studies may wish to take into consideration.     
Similarly, Krishna and Schrader (2000) noted ‘flexibility’ to be important within 
Social Capital. However, these researchers suggested that such flexibility should be 
structural rather than cognitive; structural being the roles, rules, and precedents of a group, 
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rather than the cognitive norms, attitudes, values, and beliefs that are held individually. 
Gould (2001) noted that this structure applied to both individual Social Capital and cultural 
Social Capital; the latter accessed through shared celebrations, rites, and intercultural 
dialogue. According to Coleman (1988) and Putman (2000), Social Capital is a resource 
related to the social structure whose purpose is to facilitate meaningful activity. They 
identified Social Capital in terms of: (i) the requirement of reciprocity, including trust; (ii) 
the information channels and the flow of information, and (iii) norms, including effective 
sanctions. They state that only through these resources can a person achieve their goals. 
From this perspective it may be that Cognitive Flexibility in terms of Social Capital is 
unimportant; explaining the current study not finding a predictive relationship. 
Finally, a review of the literature has suggested that the building of Social Capital 
may not require Inhibitory Control (Perry et al., 2015). Using the construct of prosocial 
behaviour to illustrate his theory, Perry et al. noted that the controlled inhibition of self-
interested or antisocial responses may not be an essential part of building human 
relationships. Instead, he argued for an intuitive, automatic nature of prosociality; stating 
that costly prosocial responding in infants appears to emerge prior to the development of 
Inhibitory Control. Further, neuroimaging research suggests that prosocial behaviour that 
comes at a cost to the donor may be facilitated by the heightened values or personal 
rewards that are assigned to a particular course of action, rather than a conscious inhibition 
of automatic antisocial responses (Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). Together, these findings imply 
that building Social Capital does not necessarily require effortful Inhibitory Control; thus 
possibly explaining the negative findings in the current study. 
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7.6: Conclusion.   
 
 In conclusion, cognitive mechanisms such as the capacity to feel, understand, and 
differentiate between complex thoughts, beliefs, and emotions, and the ability to self-
regulate in order to adapt to different social situations are important for successful human 
social interaction (Marques et al., 2015). Such cognitive or behavioural control is thought 
to be related to Executive Functioning (Diamond, 2013). 
To begin with study 4a considered differences in abilities in Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control between offenders and non-offenders and 
found that in all three of the key sub-constructs of Executive Functioning the offenders 
performed at a lower level than the non-offenders. Following on from this study 4b 
examined the ability of Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, to 
predict abilities in verbal and visual Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning. This current author suggested that study 4a and b are the first to do this within a 
single study.  Further, in suggesting that each sub-construct forms the basis of the main 
skills required for prosocial development, this adds to the literature, and may be of future 
use to both practitioners and researchers.  Further, by demonstrating that Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and perhaps most importantly, Inhibitory Control, are not 
prerequisites of Social Capital may guide future work in this area.  
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control are said to be the key determinants of Executive 
Functioning. Further, given that offenders were shown in study 4a to have reduced abilities 
in each of the three constructs when compared to non-offenders, and that each construct 
was shown in study 4b to predict abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning (skills thought to be required for acceptable prosocial behaviour), the 
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ability to detect and measure such differences between offenders and non-offenders may be 
of interest to practitioners and researchers. Specifically, by measuring abilities in Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, practitioners may be able to more 
accurately assess offenders’ suitability for rehabilitative programmes aimed at reducing 
offending behaviours by improving levels of prosociality, or indeed tailor such 
programmes to meet the specific needs an offender, given that Inciardi, Martin, and 
Clifford (2004)  noted that more focused interventions, aimed at meeting the specific needs 
of an offender, would be more likely to have a greater the impact in terms of reducing re-
offending behaviours. Therefore, study 4a and 4b add to the literature.  
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Chapter Eight 
The Discussion 
 
‘How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are  
             evidently some principles in his nature, which interest 
             him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness  
             necessary to him’ (Smith, 1790, p. 1). 
 
If prosociality defines humanity (Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009), and an obvious 
consequence of this is the inhibition of actions that have negative impacts on others 
(Eisenberg et al., 2010), then the ability to address deficiencies in this area is likely to be of 
benefit in the battle to lower recidivism in the UK and elsewhere (Spenser et al., 2015).  
The overriding aim of this thesis was to establish if certain factors are important to the 
acquisition and conveyance of socially acceptable behaviours; those factors being Theory 
of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. Underpinning that aim were 
three key questions:  
(i) firstly, is it possible to assess abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, and if so, are they moderated by 
status, gender, and age’?,  
(ii) secondly, given that Executive Functioning is said to be a 
multidimensional cerebral control mechanism utilised in the management 
of other cognitive processes (Best & Miller, 2010); does it predict 
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abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning?, and  
(iii) thirdly, assuming prosocial behaviour is regulated by socio-
environmental influences; do Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning facilitate the building of Social Capital?  
These questions were addressed in four studies (chapters four to seven). In a study 
by study format, the following subsections will remind the reader of the key findings and 
note the unique contributions to the literature.  Then the implications of each in terms of 
current practice with be discussed, the limitations will be examined, and finally 
recommendations will be made for future research.  
 
8.1: Summary of Findings and Contribution to the Literature.  
 
8.1.1: Study 1. 
 
            Study 1 investigated the association of age (i.e. adolescence, young adulthood, and 
adulthood) with abilities in verbal and visual Theory of Mind, self-report and performance-
based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning a cohort of (a) male and (b) female 
non-offenders. The key findings are summarised in table 8.1on the next page, where a tick 
indicates that a significant difference was found between the participant groups.   
With regard to verbal Theory of Mind, study 1 revealed a significant difference 
between both the young-adult adult group and the adult group, when compared to the 
adolescent group. Similar differences were obtained using the visual measure. However, in 
contrast to the verbal measure, the visual measure also produced a statistical difference 
between: (i) the adolescent group and (ii) the young-adult group and the adolescent group 
and the adult group (see chapter four).  
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Table 8.1: Summary of Significant Findings in Study 1 
 
 
 
                                                                          Male and Female    Male and Female   Male and Female                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 Adolescent                Adolescent           Young- Adult        
             to Young-Adult             to Adult                    to Adult 
                                            
                                                Verbal                   
        -                                                                                                                                                   Theory of Mind   
 
                                        Visual  
                         Theory of Mind                                    
 
                                                                   Self-Reported 
                    -                                       Empathic Understanding                                                     
                                                                                                                                        
   Performance-Based           
                  Empathic Understanding                  -            -                                                                                                                            
  
      -                        -                                                            Moral Reasoning    
                
 
     Note: A tick denotes a significant difference and a – denotes a non-significant difference. 
 
Epley et al., (2004) suggested that such findings might be the result of practice, 
noting that even the most effortful cognitive processes become more efficient with time. 
However, an alternative explanation was offered by Blain- Brière et al., (2014) who 
suggested that improved ability in language may hold the key. The latter researchers noted 
that the ongoing development in, and ability to, recognise rules relating to language may be 
influential in terms of Theory of Mind. Simply, as language develops people may find it 
easier to recognise and understand the thoughts, beliefs, desires, and feelings of another.  
In terms of Empathic Understanding, study 1 demonstrated a significant difference 
in the self-report scores of both the male and female young-adult group and the male and 
female adult group when compared to the male and female adolescent group. However, the 
performance-based measure only produced a significant difference between the male and 
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female adolescent group and the male and female adult group (see chapter four). One 
explanation for this may be the individual and social changes that take place during 
adolescence. For example, Yadav and Iqbal (2009) suggested that those who were well 
schooled in life skills and experiences during adolescence were able to exhibit greater 
abilities in Empathic Understanding during adulthood. There are two theories that go some 
way in explaining the relative stability of Empathic Understanding between young-
adulthood and adulthood.  Firstly, Socio-Emotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen et al., 
1999) suggests that by adulthood individuals are more able to regulate their emotions. The 
second explanation is found in Dynamic Integration Theory (Labouvie-Vief, 2003) which 
is concerned with the development of cognitive complexity; in other words by adulthood a 
person is more able to deal with and control a multitude of thoughts, beliefs, and feelings at 
the same time. Both theories suggest that cognitive representations become increasingly 
complex and well-balanced between adolescence and early adulthood, reaching stability by 
early to mid-adulthood.  
Regarding Moral Reasoning, study 1 found a significant difference between the 
male and female adolescent group and the male and female young-adult group, following 
which abilities in this construct appeared to stabilise. This was in line with Kohlberg 
(1979) who suggested that a proficient ability in Moral Reasoning was achieved by early 
adulthood. However, Krebs et al. (1991) posited that whilst this may be true, as people get 
older they develop an ability to evoke different levels of Moral Reasoning, as suited to a 
particular situation. Simply, people become ‘morally’ flexible.   
The conclusions that can be drawn from study 1 add to the current literature in that 
they shed light on the developmental plasticity of Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. Study 1 found verbal and visual Theory of Mind, 
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self-reported and performance-based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning to 
improve, to some extent, across the life span. In addition, whilst Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding and Moral Reasoning have been of interest within psychological research 
for a number of years, studies have largely focused on the constructs within a young 
population, and research relating to their development in later life has been neglected. 
Study 1, to the current author’s knowledge, is the first to demonstrate in a single study the 
effects of aging in relation to Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, from adolescence to adulthood.  
In chapter four links between Executive Functioning and Theory of Mind (Duval et 
al., 2011), Executive Functioning and Empathic Understanding (Lahat et al., 2010), and 
Executive Functioning and Moral Reasoning (Lahat et al., 2010), were examined, and 
similarities in the maturation processes of each were noted (Best & Miller, 2010). It was 
offered that the developmental similarities between the constructs may be important in 
understanding age related growth of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning. However, whilst the associations of Executive Functioning with Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning have been previously researched, 
work on its ability to predict competencies in each of the three constructs appears to be 
limited; hence studies 4a and b were conducted (see chapter seven).   
8.1.2: Study 2. 
 
Study 2 investigated abilities in verbal and visual Theory of Mind, self-report and 
performance-based Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in relation to gender, 
and status. The key findings are summarised in table 8.2, where a tick indicates a 
significant difference was found between the participant groups.   
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             Table 8.2: Summary of Significant Findings in Study 2. 
 
 
                                                                     Gender                           Status 
                                                               
                                                                              Verbal 
 Theory of Mind                                                                            
 
                                      Visual 
Theory of Mind                                        - 
 
                            Self-Reported  
                         Empathic Understanding                             -                                           
                            
                                    Performance-Based 
                  Empathic Understanding          
 
                        Moral Reasoning                                      - 
                
 
        Note: A tick denotes a significant difference and a – denotes a non-significant difference. 
 
A significant gender difference was found for verbal Theory of Mind, with men 
scoring lower. One explanation for this might be the  amount of ‘supportive’ and 
‘emotional’ talk that parents and older siblings enter into with young children, as past 
research suggests such communications appear to favour girls over boys (Brown & Dunn, 
1996). According to Leaper et al. (1998), this difference may be all that is needed to give 
girls a ‘boost’ with regard their ‘developing’ Theory of Mind. However, no gender 
difference was found for the visual task. This may be explained by Bolger et al. (2007) 
who reported that girls outperform boys in tasks where there is a verbal stimulus, whilst 
boys outperform girls in tasks when they are presented with visual stimuli. As the task to 
assess visual Theory of Mind, as used in this thesis, involved both a verbal and a visual 
stimulus (see subsection chapter 3, subsection 3.3.3 for an example) it is possible that each 
moderated for the other in terms of gender related abilities. In other words the verbal 
220 
 
stimuli provided an advantage for the male participants, whilst visual stimuli provided an 
advantage for the female participants, resulting in no difference in the scores for visual 
Theory of mind between the male and the female participants. 
In terms of status, differences were found between the offender and the non-
offender groups for both verbal and visual Theory of Mind; with the offender group 
scoring lower on both measures. It is known that carer stimulation is needed for the 
development of Theory of Mind (Suminar & Hastjarjo, 2016). Thus, one explanation for 
the lower Theory of Mind in the offender group may be related to the existence of ‘risk 
factors’ in their upbringing (Hoeve et al., 2009). In particular backgrounds of neglect, 
negative attitudes, and/or conflict and abuse are thought to be related to the onset of 
offending behaviours (Hoeve et al., 2009) and as such are said to impact on the 
development and shaping of a person’s capacity to mentalise (Happé & Frith, 1995).  
With regard to Empathic Understanding, study 2 detected no gender difference in the 
self-reported measure; however a difference was detected in the performance-based 
measure, with the male participants scoring lower.  One explanation for this may be that 
studies using self-report measures, where gender differences in Empathic Understanding 
have been identified, reflect societal expectations rather than participant beliefs (Makino, 
2010). Indeed, Devlin, Zaki, Ong, and Grube (2014) noted that performance-based 
measures are more likely to report the true feelings and/or beliefs of participants; which 
may explain why the performance-based measure for Empathic Understanding found a 
gender difference. As to the origins of the difference in Empathic Understanding between 
offenders and non-offenders, the answer may be found in biology (Batrinos, 2012). Simply, 
men are generally known to have higher baseline levels of testosterone, which has been 
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associated with lower levels of empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2002); therefore it might be 
concluded that men are generally be less empathic than women.  
With regard to Empathic Understanding and status, a significant difference was 
found; with the offender group scoring lower than the non-offender group on both the self-
reported and the performance-based measures. These findings were expected as prior 
studies have reported a deficit in Empathic Understanding in offenders (Hoaken et al., 
2007). In particular, Robinson et al. (2012) suggested that offenders were less able to 
distinguish between negative facial expressions such as  sadness, fear, disgust, and anger, 
when compared to IQ-matched controls; thus suggesting a lower ability in terms of 
Empathic Understanding. One explanation for this may be found by looking back at the 
perspective taking or Theory of Mind of offenders. For example, Marshall and Marshall 
(2011) postulated that to understand the emotions of another it is necessary to comprehend 
a situation from their perspective; especially with regard to distress cues (Blair, 2005). As 
noted in subsection 8.1.1, some offenders have reduced abilities in Theory of Mind, also 
known as the ability to perspective take; thus potentially explaining the reduced level of 
Empathic Understanding in offenders. 
With regard to Moral Reasoning study 2 found no gender difference. Whilst, some 
previous studies have reported a gender difference in Moral Reasoning (Gilligan, 1982; 
Ford & Richardson, 1994), Friesdorf et al., (2015) explained that this may be because they 
assumed moral behaviour to be an affective process. As a consequence, it was proposed 
that disparity in gender related morality was due to women having a stronger emotional 
aversion to harmful actions than men, rather than any actual differences in cognitive 
reasoning. However, Friesdorf et al. noted that when emotion was controlled for no 
difference was found. In using a task purported to measure both cognitive and affective 
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abilities in moral reasoning, study 2 was able to confirm this. In contrast, status related 
differences in Moral Reasoning were found.  Palmer and Begum (2006) similarly found 
that offenders reasoned at Kohlberg’s Moral Stage 2, whilst their matched non-offender 
control group reasoned at Moral Stage 3. However, Palmer and Begum’s study was limited 
to 14- to 17- year olds.  
Study 2 adds to the literature by demonstrating that offenders have reduced abilities 
in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, when compared to 
their non-offending counterparts. It was also noted that although females generally perform 
slightly better than males in measures of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, women offenders do appear to have reduced abilities in these constructs 
when compared to the male and female non-offending control group (when matched for 
age and IQ); thus supporting the relevance of rehabilitative programmes aimed at reducing 
reoffending by improving prosocial abilities.   
8.1.3: Study 3a and 3b. 
 
Study 3a investigated the association between Social Capital and (i) verbal and 
visual Theory of Mind, (ii) self-report and performance-based Empathic Understanding, 
and (iii) Moral Reasoning, as well as any differences in levels of Social Capital according 
to status (offenders and non-offenders). Table 8.3 summarises the key findings, where a 
tick indicates a significant difference was found between the participant groups.   
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            Table 8.3: Summary of Significant Findings in Studies 3a and b. 
 
 
 
                                                                     Social Capital                           
                                                         
                                               Verbal 
                        Theory of Mind                                                                            
 
Visual  
                        Theory of Mind                                                          - 
 
                            Self-Reported  
                       Empathic Understanding                                                                        
                                                           
          Performance-Based 
                  Empathic Understanding          
 
                        Moral Reasoning                                                         - 
 
                    Offender / Non-Offender Comparison                                     - 
                
 
     Note: A tick denotes a significant difference and a – denotes a non-significant difference. 
 
With regard to Social Capital and verbal Theory of Mind, an association was found. 
Saxe and Baron-Cohen (2006) explained that the ability to make inferences (or ‘read’ the 
mind) and so understand the goals and desires of others, was dependent upon the ability to 
process verbal signals; which may explain the association between ability in Theory of 
Mind and Social Capital found in study 3a. In contrast, no association was found for visual 
Theory of Mind. Whilst, this is somewhat unexpected, modern use of web based 
communications might offer an explanation (Park, 2010). Simply, in contemporary culture 
it is apparent that through non-visual directed communication and non-visual public 
broadcasting individuals are able to build Social Capital (Antheunis et al., 2015); thus 
suggesting that face to face contact may have become less important in modern western 
society and that individuals no longer exclusively rely on face-to-face or visual contact to 
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build social networks. This adds to the literature by noting that the difference between 
informational and emotional understanding may have become blurred.  
As expected, study 3a did find an association between Social Capital and both self-
report and performance-based Empathic Understanding.  These findings confirm that the 
ability to appreciate another person’s situation and/or perspective helps to establish, 
nurture, and expand social networks (Greenberg et al., 2016). Indeed, Venkatanathan et al. 
(2013) noted that empathic people seen to be drawn to ‘community orientated’ activities 
(Williams, O’Driscoll, & Moore, 2014), and, possibly because of the help they offer to 
others, are well supported in return (Roberts et al., 2011); thus building Social Capital.  
The findings in relation to Social Capital and Moral Reasoning (study 3a) and the 
differences in Social Capital between offenders and non-offenders (study 3b), were 
somewhat unexpected. However, in considering possible reasons for these findings, it was 
determined that the explanations for each were very similar. Firstly, although it has been 
suggested that higher levels of Social Capital, as characterised by moral cooperation, can 
act as a discouragement to individuals in terms of socially deviant behaviour (Popper, 
2013), it has also been noted that this may not be sufficient to guarantee that people will 
always behave accordingly. In other words, higher levels of Social Capital do not mean 
that a person is more morally focused, and thus Moral Reasoning may be overlooked in the 
pursuit of personal gain.  
The lack of association between Social Capital and Moral Reasoning might also be 
explained by work on organised crime. According to Bourdieu (1986) organised crime, for 
example, organised crime ‘families’,  gangs, gambling syndicates, and/or prostitution rings, 
is characterised by a degree of mutual trust between their members. Putman (2000) noted 
that this is actually a form of Social Capital. Simply, whilst organised crime produces 
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negative effects in relation to societal moral norms, in terms of its members such behaviour 
is entirely normative (Decker, 2007). Indeed, whilst the moral boundaries of such groups 
may be very different from those considered acceptable by most of society, they are in 
many cases grounded in honour and loyalty (Cooney, 2009).  Study 3a therefore adds to the 
literature by suggesting that to build Social Capital a person does not necessarily have to 
behave in moral way as prescribed by society.  
Organised crime could also explain the similarity in levels of Social Capital 
between offenders and non-offenders found in study 3b. Wooditch, Tang, and Taxman 
(2014) noted that both groups possess Social Capital, in the form of trust, reciprocity, and 
veneration. Therefore, it may be concluded that Social Capital can be used for prosocial 
and antisocial purposes (Putnam, 2000), and can exist, in equal measure, from both a 
legitimate and illegitimate perspective (Pih et al., 2008). Whilst, this is a concept that has 
previously been discussed in terms of young offenders (Wooditch, Tang, & Taxman, 
2014), the current thesis notes that it should also be considered with reference to groups of 
older offenders, thus adding to the literature.  
To conclude, Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and 
Social Capital have been a focus of psychological research for a number of years. 
However, the influences of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning on the development of Social Capital have to some extent been neglected. To 
the current author’s knowledge, the present research is the first to demonstrate, within a 
single study, the effects of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, on Social Capital. Further, in finding no difference in levels or Social Capital 
between the offenders and the no-offenders, the current study revealed that offenders feel 
as supported, in terms of networks and ties, as non-offenders. Together the findings of 
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studies 3a and 3b add to the literature relating to the influence of Social Capital and the 
effects it may have on recidivism. 
8.1.4: Study 4a and 4b. 
 
According to Marques et al. (2015) cognitive mechanisms, such as the capacity to 
feel, understand, and differentiate between complex thoughts, beliefs, and emotions, and 
the ability to self-regulate in order to adapt to different social situations, are important for 
successful human social interaction. Such behavioural and cognitive control is related to 
the theory of Executive Functioning (Diamond, 2013). As noted in chapter three, 
subsection 3.3.8, Executive Functioning is perceived as not having a ‘gold-standard’ 
assessment tool (Chan et al., 2008; Salthouse, 2005), which may be because of its 
multidimensional nature (Brugger et al., 1998). However, McCloskey et al. (2009) 
suggested that certain cognitive abilities should be taken into consideration when assessing 
Executive Functioning; Working Memory; Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control. 
Therefore based on their recommendation, this thesis focused on those constructs.  
With regard to 4a, the current thesis found differences in levels of Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control according to status, with the 
offending group achieving lower scores and study 4b found one or more of these 
observable and measureable skills to be predictive of Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning (Table 8.4 summarises the key findings).   
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Table 8.4: Summary of Significant Findings in Study 4 
 
 
                                                                                     Working            Cognitive              Inhibitory 
                                                                                      Memory             Flexibility             Control                                                                       
                                                               
                         Verbal    
          Theory of Mind 
                                                           
                                               Visual 
                              Theory of Mind                             - 
 
                  Self-Reported  
         -                     Empathic Understanding          
                                                            
                        Performance-Based          
                  Empathic Understanding          
 
                        Moral Reasoning                             -                   -         
 
                          Social Capital                                      -                     -                   - 
                
 
     Note: A tick denotes a significant difference and a – denotes non-significant difference. 
 
In particular, study 4b investigated how Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, and 
Cognitive Flexibility, as the three key measurable factors said to make up the construct of 
Executive Functioning, might predict proficiency in verbal and visual Theory of Mind, 
self-report and performance-based Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, and Social 
Capital.  Study 4b found that Executive Functioning, in the form of Working Memory, 
Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, was able to predict verbal Theory of Mind,  
and that Cognitive Flexibility and Inhibitory Control were able to predict visual Theory of 
Mind.  With regard to Cognitive Flexibility, Bock et al. (2015) suggested it is needed to 
move efficiently between multiple incompatible perspectives, descriptions, beliefs, 
intentions, or situations. In other words, Cognitive Flexibility allows a person to make 
simultaneous judgments, from multiple and sequentially shifting situations, and so ‘make 
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sense’ of everyday interactions from both a verbal and a visual perspective, whilst 
Inhibitory Control allows the individual to supress his or her own immediate responses 
long enough to allow for a considered response. 
In contrast Executive Functioning, in the form of Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, was found not to predict visual Theory of Mind. One 
explanation for this may be that Working Memory can store a very limited amount of 
information for a short period of time. To resolve this issue important information is 
generally transferred to long-term memory for later retrieval. This requires larger pieces of 
information to be ‘transformed’ into smaller, more manageable ‘chunks’. An inefficient 
Working Memory may act as a ‘bottle neck’, meaning that individuals are less able to 
successfully transform data to allow easier movement into, and recovery from long-term 
memory (Borst et al., 2010). However, according to Gutierrez (2014) visual imagery, 
including verbal data that has been successfully transformed into a visual metaphor, allows 
for easier access to information for longer periods of time, thus suggesting that visual 
information is much easier to manage and therefore not as reliant on an effective Working 
Memory.  
Further, Executive Functioning, in the form of Working Memory, Cognitive 
Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control was able to predict Empathic Understanding in respect 
of the performance-based measure in study 4b, whilst Working Memory and Inhibitory 
Control were able to predict Empathic Understanding in respect of the self-report measure. 
This can be explained by the proposition that a more efficient Working Memory allows for 
an increased amount of information to be stored, thus making it easier for a person to 
extract the relevant social cues from any given situation to allow Empathic Understanding 
(Gao et al., 2016). Similarly, efficient Cognitive Flexibility allows a person to alternate 
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between salient pieces of information, thus allowing for the prediction, recognition, and 
understanding of emotional responses (Heinz et al., 2011). That Cognitive Flexibility was 
found not to predict self-reported Empathic Understanding may lie in the measure that was 
used. As noted in the preceding chapters in relation to Empathic Understanding, self-
reports may reflect individuals’ understanding of societal expectations, rather than their 
own true beliefs (Makino, 2010).  Therefore, a performance-based measure may be more 
representative of how Cognitive Flexibility may predict Empathic Understanding.  
Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) suggested that individuals who are unable to ‘inhibit’ 
are likely to be overwhelmed by their own beliefs in a particular situation, and so make a 
less appropriate decisions. Simply, to make moral judgements, people must be  able to self-
regulate, curb over-arousal, and reflect upon the rights and wrongs of their own, as well as 
others’, behaviour (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997), as well as integrate the rational, 
emotional, and intuitive aspects of a situation (Malti & Ongley, 2014). In other words, 
Inhibitory Control is necessary when making moral judgements (Hoffman, 1987); thus 
giving explanation to the hypothesised findings in study 4b.  In contrast, Working Memory 
and Cognitive Flexibility did not predict Moral Reasoning was unexpected. This is 
particularly the case for Cognitive Flexibility, given that Kohlberg (1969) suggested that 
the move to a higher stage of Moral Reasoning is characterised by a more flexible way of 
thinking.  
However, as before, these findings can be explained within the context of moral 
schemas. According to Kohlberg and Candee (1984) moral schemas are developed through 
previous interactions and inform expectations relating to appropriate behaviour in a 
particular situation. However, as noted above, moral schemas do not to reside in Working 
Memory, but rather in long-term memory (Rest et al., 1999), thus explaining that Working 
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Memory did not predict Moral Reasoning. Further, Cañas, Fajardo, and Salmerón (2006) 
suggested that some people may have a ‘cognitive blockade’ in relation to these schemas. 
Such a blockade may then prevent him or her from executing Cognitive Flexibility in the 
advent of a new moral dilemma. In other words, personal schemas may be so engrained 
that the ability to change in the face of a new moral situation becomes impaired.  
In contrast, study 4b found that Social Capital was not predicted by Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, or Inhibitory Control. This was unexpected given that 
Executive Functioning, as the overriding construct, is thought to provide for the 
coordination required to successfully manage a social network. However, as with Moral 
Reasoning, the building of Social Capital is said to be influenced by schemas or 
frameworks that relate to common experiences, especially ‘shocks’ (Puntscher et al., 
2014). As noted above, these schemas are lodged in long-term memory; which offers an 
explanation as to why Working Memory may not predict Social Capital. Further, Krishna 
and Schrader (2000) noted that structural flexibility was more important than Cognitive 
Flexibility in building Social Capital. Specifically, structural flexibility refers to the roles, 
rules, and precedents of a group, rather than the cognitive norms, attitudes, values, and 
beliefs that are held individually. Finally, Perry et al., (2015) noted that the controlled 
inhibition of self-interested or maladaptive automatic responses was not an essential part of 
building human relationships. For example, prosocial behaviour may result from the value 
assigned to a particular course of action, rather than the conscious inhibition of an 
antisocial response (Zaki & Mitchell, 2013), or a helping behaviour may also have self-
serving motives (Jensen et al., 2014). Study 4b contributed to the literature as, to the 
current author’s knowledge, it is the first to examine, within a single study, the ability of 
the three key sub-constructs of Executive Functioning in terms of Working Memory, 
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Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, to predict abilities in Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning; thus suggesting potential alternative tools 
for measuring levels of prosociality. 
To summarise, section 8.2 noted a number of unique contributions arising from 
studies one to four. These include: 
 Study 1 offered empirical evidence in terms of the effects of aging in 
relation to Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, 
from adolescence to adulthood in both male and female participants.   
 Study 2 demonstrated that offenders, in general, have reduced abilities in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. It was 
also noted that women offenders also have reduced abilities in Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning; thus supporting the 
relevance of rehabilitative programmes aimed at reducing reoffending by 
improving prosocial abilities.  
 Study 3a offered empirical evidence of the associations of Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning with Social Capital, in a 
single study. In addition study 3b suggested that Social Capital can be used 
for prosocial and antisocial purposes, and can exist from both a legitimate 
and illegitimate perspective. 
 Study 4b found that offender’s score lower on measures of Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control thus providing 
alternative mechanisms for measuring prosociality. In addition, Study 4b 
was the first study to examine, within a single study, the ability of Working 
Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control (as the three key sub-
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constructs of Executive Functioning) to predict abilities in Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning (as the three key sub-
constructs of prosocial behaviour). 
 
8.3: Practical Implications of Studies 1 to 4. 
 
Reducing the level of recidivism is an important goal for Criminal Justice Systems. 
Indeed, in the last ten years there has been a shift from a “punish them hard enough and 
they won’t come back” ethos, to a more integrated rehabilitative approach to reducing 
reoffending (Hooley, 2010, p. 3).  From the perspective of this thesis, that ‘rehabilitative 
approach’ involves the development of certain cognitive skills that are said to underpin 
prosocial behaviour (i.e. Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning).  
In the UK, the most commonly used rehabilitative intervention, within both the 
prison and probation services, is the TSP. Initially piloted in 2008, TSP began its roll-out in 
2009, and has now completely replaced it predecessor, ETS. A main focus of TSP appears 
to be the development and improvement of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, specifically:  
(i) the ‘Stop and Think’ principle which aims to help offenders to solve 
problems by developing the ability to see situations from a number of 
different perspectives; in other words Theory of Mind (McGuire et al, 
2007);  
(ii) the development of an emotional awareness element by which the 
offender is encouraged to recognise and manage his or her own 
emotions, and subsequently make more effective and controlled 
decisions; simply Empathic Understanding (Solomon, 2007);  
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(iii) the introduction of moral concepts, where the offender is helped to 
understand society’s point of view, and as well as explore his or her own 
personal values; namely Moral Reasoning (Ward & Nee, 2008).  
Although official government statistics relating to the ability of TSP to impact upon 
levels of recidivism are yet to be released, the success of its predecessor (ETS) was less 
than anticipated (Sadlier, 2010). For example, whilst initial evaluations of the ETS 
programme found statistically significant reductions in the reconviction rate of male 
participants; 14% for medium-to-low risk offenders and 11% for medium-to high risk 
offenders, (Friendship et al., 2002), research at the two year mark failed to find a 
statistically significant difference; suggesting that any changes to offending patterns were 
short lived (Falshaw et al., 2003). Other factors that may have driven these variable results 
include: (i) the inability to control for potential differences in dynamic risk factors such as 
age, gender, ethnicity, and criminal career variables (Cann, 2006), and (ii) the suitability of 
the selection criteria  (Sadlier, 2010). 
Whilst the introduction of TSP is said to have addressed a number of these issues, 
another concern was identified by the current author in 2012 during a programme of 
research at HMP Nottingham, which was approved by the Ministry of Justice and the 
National Offender Management Services (unpublished master’s thesis, Staffordshire 
University, 2011). Firstly, pre-programme assessments (specifically relating to TSP) do not 
allow for any individual ‘cognitive’ differences, with the exception of IQ; thus meaning 
that any one group of participants will include individuals with a range of skill levels and 
abilities. The current author suggests that this may be an issue given that Weaver and 
McNeill (2010) noted that it was essential to allow for individual differences in 
rehabilitation, particularly with reference to persistent offenders, if desistance is to be 
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achieved. Simply, Weaver and McNeil stated that a one-size-fits-all approach will not 
work. Further, Inciardi et al. (2004) noted that the more focused the intervention is to the 
specific needs of an offender, the greater the impact in terms of reducing re-offending 
behaviour will be. However, in defence of the apparent assumption that all potential 
participants have a similar basic level of ability in the three key skills said to underpin 
prosocial functioning on which TSP can build (Spenser et al., 2015), few studies have been 
conducted relating to Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning, and 
their importance in terms of offender rehabilitation. 
To conclude, whilst differences in abilities, across various populations, in Theory of 
Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning have been of interest to 
psychologists for a number of years, to the current author’s knowledge the current study is 
the first to consider each, within a single study. Therefore, in light of the unique 
contributions to literature described in section 8.2, the following subsections will comment 
on how the new findings in this thesis may impact on current practice.  
8.3.1: Study 1.  
 
Firstly, whilst it is known that the acquisition of Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning begins in early childhood (Grusec et al., 2000), 
previously it has not been understood whether each continues to change across adolescence 
and into adulthood, or if at a certain point in late childhood they become fixed (Smith et al., 
2003). Study 1 found that Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning 
are relatively plastic and, in most cases, continue to develop or improve until early 
adulthood. At this point the development of Empathic Understanding and Moral Reasoning 
appears to slow down or plateau. However, these findings should be generally encouraging 
for practitioners, as had these skills become fixed in childhood or adolescence, the 
235 
 
relevance of interventions aimed at modifying them in older offenders may have been 
questioned.  
Therefore, of key importance to practitioners, is the suggestion that age may not be 
a prohibitive factor in relation to the later development or re-enforcement of values and 
behaviours necessary for acceptable social behaviour; specifically Theory of Mind, 
Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning. However, given that approximately 18% 
of the prison population is aged 18- to 24- years (Bromley Report, 2017); approximately 
one third serving short term sentences, and that 44% of all adult offenders and 69% of 
under 18- year olds will reoffend within one year (Commons Library Briefing, 2017), this 
thesis suggests that a TSP type programme, focussing on the improvement of prosocial 
skills, would be of benefit to this previously rather neglected group of offenders.  
8.3.2: Study 2.  
 
Vessels and Huitt (2005) proposed that any early deficiencies in prosociality could 
be addressed by programmes which focus on the development of offenders prosocial 
abilities. A second objective of this thesis was therefore to establish if differences in 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning could be identified 
according to gender and status. The key findings in study 2 were:  
(i) that offenders, across a representative age range, generally have reduced 
abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning;  
(ii) that women (both offenders and non-offenders), generally perform better 
than men in measures for Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning;  
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(iii) improved knowledge relating to the relevance of rehabilitative 
programmes aimed at reducing reoffending by improving prosocial 
abilities.  
The current author suggests that to maximise the success of TSP (or similar 
interventions), assessing individual abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning may assist in confirming a person’s suitability for the programme. 
That is, if offenders’ score below the established norm in measures for these skills it may 
not be unreasonable to expect that he or she would benefit from an intervention aimed at 
improving prosocial abilities. In addition, and perhaps most pertinently, if and when 
reduced abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and/or Moral Reasoning are 
identified, practitioners may wish to group individuals with similar abilities together and/or 
tailor interventions to meet the specific needs of that cohort. Finally, TSP is not generally 
offered to offenders serving a sentence of less than 4 years; a cohort that represents 
approximately 30% of today’s prison population (Commons Library Briefing, 2017). Yet, 
according to reoffending data, this group reoffends at particularly high rate (Ministry of 
Justice, 2016). Overall, consideration of these factors could be of benefit in terms of 
improving prosocial abilities and reducing levels of recidivism, given that the offending 
population used in this thesis were male and female prisoners serving sentences of less than 
six months,  
8.3.3: Study 3a and 3b. 
 
Study 3a  found that Social Capital may not depend on both verbal and visual 
Theory of Mind, and study 3b found that offenders and non-offenders appear to ‘own’ a 
similar level of Social Capital. These findings may be of particular interest to people within 
the Criminal Justice System who advocate the creation of Social Capital as a means to help 
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redirect a person from a criminal pathway, to one reflecting desistance. In particular, this 
thesis has identified that Social Capital can exist in similar levels in both a legitimate and 
an illegitimate form (Pih at al., 2008). Although, this has previously been recognised in 
young offenders (Wooditch, Tang, & Taxman, 2014), this thesis suggests that it should 
also be considered with reference to older offenders; in particular those involved with 
gangs, gambling syndicates, prostitution rings, and/or organised crime families.  
Whilst the current view within the Criminal Justice System appears to be that 
building Social Capital supports the reduction of offending behaviours, this thesis submits 
that practitioners may wish to consider not only the amount, but also the nature, of those 
networks. Although, desistance is likely to be the result of relationships formed for reasons 
other than the involvement in crime, practitioners may need to be aware that Social Capital 
exists in both the real, and the virtual world (Park, 2010). Therefore, whilst the focus of the 
probation service in the UK has been the risks and needs of offenders; this thesis suggests 
that a greater understanding of, and support for, the development of positive and legitimate 
Social Capital may be a useful tool to help offenders involved in the revolving door of 
crime, on the road to desistance.   
8.3.4: Study 4a and 4b. 
 
Study 4a found differences in Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control according to status.  However, whilst further research will be needed 
before recommending these constructs as additional pre-programme assessments, 
practitioners may wish to take their predictive nature when designing new, or modifying 
existing, programmes in relation to interventions aimed at improving prosociality in 
offenders. In addition, study 4b found that Executive Functioning, broken down into its 
main constructs of Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control, is 
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largely predictive of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and to a lesser extent, 
Moral Reasoning. Indeed, it appears that a developed Executive Functioning is necessary 
for a person to comprehend and ‘shift’ between multiple incompatible perspectives, 
descriptions, beliefs, intentions, and/or situations, whilst supressing automatic responses. In 
contrast, an underdeveloped Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory 
Control may contribute, at last in part, to offending behaviours. The current author notes 
that previous studies have largely focused on the associative relationship between the 
constructs; study 4b therefore contributes to the literature by proposing a predictive 
connection between Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control and 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning.  
 
8.4: General Considerations, Limitations and Future Studies. 
 
In quantitative research, generalisability is considered a major criterion for 
evaluating the quality of a study (Polit & Beck, 2008). However, researchers recognise that 
generalisations involving quantitative evaluations can never be made with certainty 
(Cronbach, 1975). Instead such studies are said to form a working hypothesis “to be tested 
again in the next encounter and again in the encounter after that” (Guba, 1978, p. 70).  
Nevertheless this section will attempt to address the question of generalisability.   
8.4.1: Population. 
The ‘population’ is the totality of elements or people that have common, defined 
characteristics, and about whom the study results are relevant (Polit, 2010). Whilst the best 
strategy for achieving a representative sample of the population is to use probability 
(random) methods of sampling, it is recognised that this is not always practical (Polit, 
2010). This study adopted opportunity sampling, whilst controlling for age and IQ across 
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the different groups, which allows a degree of transferability of the findings (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).   
In terms of sample size, Clark-Carter (2010) suggests in studies where performance 
between two groups is the focus, and a medium effect size (.5) and a power of 0.8 are 
desired, a target of 20 participants in each group is desirable.  In study 1 a total of 23 
participants per group were used, in study 2 50 participants per group were used, and 
studies three and four 100 participants per group were used.   
It is noted that the research within this thesis purposely used a cohort of offenders 
serving short term sentences. Therefore, further study is needed to determine whether the 
current findings are generalisable to those serving longer prison sentences, as well as those 
who have been dealt with by way of a community disposal. Further, Donmoyer (1990) 
cautioned against generalising the findings from a specific group of individuals, but rather 
use the findings as a starting point. However, although this study was conducted in the 
Midlands, the offender groups were recruited from representative prisons, and therefore 
may generalisable to other areas of the UK. 
8.4.2: Replication. 
 
In discussing replication, Firestone (1993, p. 17) noted that “when conditions vary, 
successful replication contributes to generalisability”. Indeed, Fahs et al. (2003) suggested 
that there should be greater encouragement for the planned replication of studies. In other 
words, if findings can be confirmed with different cohorts of people, validity, and 
applicability can be strengthened (Shadish et al., 2002). The present thesis used 
documented screening criteria to select participants, thus facilitating future replication. 
However, it must be noted that opportunity sampling was used; with participants 
volunteering for the research in response to notice placed in appropriate places in the 
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schools, prisons, and community, and as such, may not be truly reflective of the whole 
population.  
Further, to facilitate replication, the present thesis adopted well established 
measures to assess abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning, as well as IQ, Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, Inhibitory Control, and 
levels of Social Capital. In addition, in recognition of Makino’s (2010) concern relating to 
the risks associated with self-report measures, performance-based measures were used for 
the assessment of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, Moral Reasoning, IQ, 
Working Memory, Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitory Control. However the assessment 
of Social Capital was based on a self-report measure. Therefore, the reader must consider 
that the findings relating to Social Capital may not be truly reflective.  .  
8.4.3: Limitations and Future Studies. 
 
There are a number of limitations within the four studies in this thesis; each will 
now be discussed. Firstly, study 1 did not include male or female offender as participants. 
This is especially pertinent in relation to female offenders as, although it is acknowledged 
that women are accused of far fewer crimes than men, a total of 297,034 recorded offences 
were committed by females in 2012 (Criminal Justice Statistics, Quarterly Update, 2012) 
constituting about 24% of all offences committed in England and Wales in that year. 
Further, the Corston report (2007) recommended the creation of a “distinct, radically 
different, visibly-led, strategic, proportionate, holistic, woman-centred, integrated 
approach” to the rehabilitation of female offenders (Prison Reform Trust, 2017, p. 1). 
Theories regarding age related development of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning cannot simply be generalised from male to female offenders. 
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Consequently, future studies considering age related changes in Theory of Mind, Empathic 
Understanding, and Moral Reasoning may wish to include a female cohort.  
Secondly, studies 1, 2 and 3 did not:  
(i) differentiate between the crime categories,  
(ii) include individuals serving sentences of more than six months, or  
(iii) take into consideration the socio-environmental backgrounds of the 
offending and non-offending groups.  
Whilst this is not uncommon, as Chen and Howitt (2007) noted that past studies rarely took 
note of other individual differences, for example, types of crimes committed. In addition, 
the importance of noting factors such as drug dependency, education, or employment status 
should not be overlooked (Entorf & Spengler, 2000). Therefore, in the future, more fine 
grained approaches could further establish the generalisability of the current findings.  
 Thirdly, studies 3 and 4 used a measure that assessed only bonding Social Capital. 
As such it omitted to ask participants to describe the age, location, or nature of the 
friendship they were claiming to have; and so did not measure levels of bridging or linking 
Social Capital.  Simply, the offenders may have been reporting new relationships or 
networks acquired in prison, rather than those formed before he or she was incarcerated.  
Therefore, whilst this thesis concluded that similar levels of Social Capital, as characterised 
by social networks with strong norms and reciprocity, can be found in both offenders and 
non- offenders, future researchers may wish to more closely consider the characteristics of 
the Social Capital under evaluation.   
Lastly, the current thesis focused on offenders in custody. However, according to 
the Ministry of Justice, Offender Management Statistics (2016), 224,823 offenders were 
being managed by probation. This figure is likely to be around 65,000 higher since the 
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‘post-sentence supervision’ ruling of 2013. As in 2007 the recidivism rate for individuals 
serving short sentences in the UK was 69.6% at the one year mark, this ruling may increase 
the burden of how to help offenders escape the ‘revolving door of crime’ firmly in the 
hands of the probation service. Therefore, future studies may wish to consider offenders 
serving a community sentence, as well as a custodial sentence.    
 
8.6: Conclusion. 
 
There is general accord that Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
Reasoning are first detected in children between the ages of 12 and 18 months (Smith et al., 
2003). Eventually, most people learn to comply with societal standards and develop the 
belief that prosocial behaviour is an obligatory part of acceptable social functioning 
(Sanstock, 2014).  However, empirical evidence is mixed in relation to the development of 
Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning beyond their initial 
emergence. Nevertheless, Lam (2012) stated that an understanding of prosocial behaviour, 
and the constructs that support it, were important when considering research and practice 
within the Criminal Justice System in the UK. This is supported by findings suggesting that 
the risk of offending behaviour is lowered if a person acquires certain prosocial skills 
(Prior & Paris, 2005), and is increased if those same skills were reduced or absent 
(Farrington, 2010; Palmer, 2013). Indeed, this premise is recognised by the Ministry of 
Justice which as a result has developed a number of accredited rehabilitative interventions, 
with the focus of improving levels of prosociality and thus seeking to reduce offending 
behaviour (Palmer, 2013). 
The overriding aim of this thesis was to establish whether specific factors should be 
considered when designing new (or when making refinements to existing) interventions 
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aimed at reducing recidivism. Those factors are Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, 
and Moral Reasoning. This thesis also considered Social Capital and Executive 
Functioning. As a consequence, the specific objectives of the four studies within this thesis 
were to establish:  
(i) a clearer understanding of how age might affect the  
  ongoing development of Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding,  
  and Moral Reasoning;  
(ii) a better understanding of how status and gender 
                        might affect abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding,  
                        and Moral Reasoning;  
(iii) a clearer understanding of how abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic  
                        Understanding, and Moral Reasoning might affect a person’s ability 
                        to build Social capital, and;  
(iv) if cognitive specific influences, in the form of Working Memory,  
                        Cognitive Flexibility, and Inhibitive Control, as a components of  
                        Executive Functioning, are able to predict abilities in Theory of Mind, 
                        Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning.   
In conclusion, the studies within this thesis provide empirical evidence that male 
and female offenders, and offenders and non-offenders differ in their abilities regarding 
Theory of Mind, Empathic understanding, and Moral. However, these abilities remain 
relatively plastic; with a general ability to develop and improve into adulthood. These 
finding suggest that if skills are underdeveloped they may lead to reduced social 
functioning and, as a result may contribute, at least in part, to anti-social or offending 
behaviours. Indeed, it was found that Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral 
244 
 
Reasoning are relatively plastic and that improvement in ability can occur, to some extent, 
during the life span of an individual.  
Further, it was suggested that an inefficient Executive Functioning may lead to 
poorer problem-solving, self-regulation, and behaviour (Zelaszo & Frye, 1998).  However, 
whether such ‘disabilities’ reflect a deficient functioning at the individual level, which may 
be addressed by programmes or are due to inefficient external influences resulting from 
inadequate resources, information, and monitoring, requires further research to determine. 
Nevertheless, when combined the studies within this thesis offer further insight into 
factors that may be considered when designing new, or when making refinements to 
existing interventions and programmes aimed at reducing recidivism through the medium 
of improved prosociality. The current author recognises that there may be a cost 
implication associated with this proposal and further economic evaluation will be needed. 
However, by prioritising people involved in the ‘revolving door’ of offending, as well as 
those classed as ‘high risk’ of reoffending, the costs associated with additional pre-
programme assessments and targeted TSP sessions may be offset by a reduction prison 
capacity requirements.  
Therefore, taking into consideration the premise that the more focused the 
intervention is to the specific needs of a group of offenders, the greater the impact may be 
in terms of reducing re-offending (Inciardi et al., 2004), this thesis proposes that an 
accurate measure of offender abilities in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and 
Moral Reasoning, as well as consideration of Working Memory, Cognitive flexibility, and 
Inhibitory Control would allow practitioners to:  
(i) assess the suitability of a prospective programme participant,  
(ii) group individuals with similar levels of ability together, and  
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(iii) adjust the initiative to meet the needs to that specific group, which in turn 
may help to reduce levels of recidivism. 
However, it must be noted that ‘psychological’ rehabilitation can take a person only 
part of the way towards a better life, and if the route is blocked by the practical effects of 
having a criminal record or the refusal of a community to accept that someone has 
changed, then desistance may be threatened. Indeed, the Owers review (2011) noted that 
desistance is a social process as much as a personal one, and that no amount of prison or 
community based support for change will secure desistance without a broader social and 
political commitment to ex-prisoner reintegration. As such, the Criminal Justice System in 
the UK may like to consider the need for state, voluntary, and private agencies to support 
those who have served their punishments, and especially those who have succeeded in 
achieving the aims of their offender programmes, and as such have made improvements in 
the skills and qualities focused on within this thesis.   
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(approximately three pages; maximum of five pages) which (i) summaries the research 
aims and approach, (ii) highlights the key findings, and (iii) sets out the implications for 
NOMS decision-makers. It should be submitted to the NRC alongside the NRC project 
review form (which covers lessons learnt and asks for ratings on key questions). Provision 
of the research summary and project review form is essential if the research is to be of 
real use to NOMS. The report should use language that an educated, but not research-
trained person, would understand. It should be concise, well organised and self-
contained. The conclusions should be impartial and adequately supported by the research 
findings. Further guidance on the format of the report is available on request.  
 Publications - The NRC (National.Research@noms.gsi.gov.uk) receiving an electronic copy 
of any papers submitted for publication based on this research at the time of submission 
and at least one month in advance of the publication. 
 Data protection - Compliance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and 
the Offender Management Act 2007- 
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents 
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/21/contents 
Researchers should store all data securely and ensure that information is coded in a way 
that maintains the confidentiality and anonymity of research participants. The researchers 
should abide by any data sharing conditions stipulated by the relevant data controllers.   
 Research participants - Consent must be given freely. It will be made clear to participants 
verbally and in writing that they may withdraw from the research at any point and that 
this will not have adverse impact on them. If research is undertaken with vulnerable 
people – such as young offenders, offenders with learning difficulties or those who are 
vulnerable due to psychological, mental disorder or medical circumstances - then 
researchers should put special precautions in place to ensure that the participants 
understand the scope of their research and the role that they are being asked to 
undertake. Consent will usually be required from a parent or other responsible adult for 
children to take part in the research. 
 Termination - NOMS reserves the right to halt research at any time. It will not always be 
possible to provide an explanation, but NOMS will undertake where possible to provide 
the research institution/sponsor with a covering statement to clarify that the decision to 
stop the research does not reflect on their capability or behaviour. 
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Research requiring access to prison establishments and/or probation trusts   
 
 Access - Approval from the Governor of each establishment / Chief Executive of the 
probation trust  you wish to research in. (Please note that NRC approval does not 
guarantee access to establishments/trusts; access is at the discretion of the 
Governor/Chief Executive and subject to local operational factors and pressures). This is 
subject to clearance of vetting procedures for each establishment/trust. 
 Security - Compliance with all security requirements. 
 Disclosure - Researchers are under a duty to disclose certain information to prison 
establishments/probation trusts. This includes behaviour that is against prison rules and 
can be adjudicated against, undisclosed illegal acts, and behaviour that is potentially 
harmful to the research participant (e.g. intention to self-harm or complete suicide) or 
others. Researchers should make research participants aware of this requirement. The 
Prison Rules can be accessed here and should be reviewed: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/pso/PSO_0100_the_prison_rules
_1999.doc 
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Volunteers Wanted Poster 
 
Volunteers Wanted 
Do you know when someone  
is annoyed?  
 Do you 
know when 
someone  
     is happy? 
 
Are you over 18 years of age? 
Can you speak and understand English? 
Are you willing to spend some time answering  
a few very simple questions? 
Yes? 
    Then I would like your help? 
I work at Nottingham Trent University and I am 
doing research into   
   understanding other people thoughts and feelings 
If you are willing to answer a few simple questions 
then please contact: 
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Briefing Document – Prison Staff 
 
The support I have requested would be very similar to that of 2011. I intend of assess a 
similar number of offenders; 50 between the ages of 18 and 24 years and 50 over the age of 
25 years. A battery of 6 measures will be used in the study. It is anticipated that the time 
required with each offender will be in the region of 1 hour. 
 For you information, in addition to HMP Nottingham,  the study has the support of the 
Crime Safety Partnership (Nottingham), Nottingham City Council (Vanguard Plus), The 
Youth Justice Board (Nottingham) and the Youth Offending Team (Nottingham).  
Working Title  
 Pro-Social Skills as Contributory Factors to Offending and Anti-social Behaviour in 
Young People 
Research Rationale and Aims Overview 
 Modern society is naturally concerned with punishing offending behaviour but this alone 
does not appear to be enough to dissuade the majority of offenders from reoffending. In 
2004, 78% of those serving a custodial sentence in the UK reoffended within 12 months of 
their release (Whiting & Cuppleditch, 2006). The implementation of ‘rehabilitating’ 
interventions such as the TSP may assist in the reduction of re-offending. However, TSP is 
not offered to all offenders and where offered its success has been questioned as a wide 
range of issues are covered at a general level through only nineteen sessions (Tong & 
Farrington, 2006).   
Nevertheless, researchers continue to assume that one of the factors contributing to 
offending behaviour in young people is a lack of learned pro-social skills (Richell et al., 
2003).  These pro social skills include Theory of mind (ToM), empathy and moral 
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reasoning.  ToM is the ability to ascribe thoughts, intentions, beliefs and feelings to others, 
usually by recognising verbal or visual cues (Sharp, 2008). Empathy is the ability to not 
only recognise these cues but also share in the emotional states of others within context 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005) and  Moral Reasoning  is the thinking process by which 
individuals determine whether an idea is right or wrong (Blair, 1995). 
Whilst the research with offenders has readily identified deficiencies in Empathy and 
Moral Reasoning, it has had mixed results when considering ToM. Richell et al., (2003), 
for example failed to provide empirical evidence for a deficit in ToM in offenders and 
suggested that this was because over time, some areas of the brain may have the ability to 
compensate for the reduced functioning of other areas. However, this implies that ToM is a 
singular function. Blair and Cippolotti (2000) drew a distinction between two aspects of 
ToM: cognitive and affective. Cognitive ToM requires the observer to recognise the 
thoughts, intentions and beliefs of others, whereas affective ToM also requires the observer 
not only to recognise but also to understand the emotions generated by these states. 
Following on from this empathy requires the observer recognise and understand the mental 
state of another and also to be able to share the emotions. Moral reasoning is the final skill 
in this continuum. 
My theory is based on the fact that past research has omitted a stage in this continuum; that 
is that affective ToM or the ability to understand as well as recognise the thoughts 
intentions belief etc. of another person, has not been previously considered. My past 
research HMP Nottingham in 2011 research provided empirical evidence to suggest that 
deficits in ToM could be detected in young adult offenders (18 – 24 years) when the 
measures used considered not only cognitive ToM but also affective ToM. 
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As it is known that the acquisition of these skills begins in early childhood (Grusec et al., 
2002), it is not unreasonable to assume that similar deficiencies may be detectable in 
younger offenders and those who have not yet offended but are considered at risk of future 
offending. As government figures suggest that gun, knife and gang crime in children and 
young adolescents has increased in recent years by 22% (Warburton & Hough, 2009); this 
will be an area of focus for the research. The research will consider individuals aged from 
10-24 years.  Furthermore, three specific Nottingham locations (identified as high risk 
areas by Vanguard Plus) will be considered: St Ann’s, the Meadows and Aspley. Lastly, 
consideration will be given to the antecedents of gang affiliation including details of the 
socio-demographic background of the individuals taking part in the research. The research 
will expand on previous research by examining ToM, Empathic Understanding and Moral 
Reasoning in younger offenders and those identified by Vanguard Plus as at risk of 
becoming involved in offending.   
Participants 
Offenders serving a custodial sentence with be selected according to the selection criteria - 
(males, 18-24 years and > 25 years, English speaking) 
Significance 
Researchers have emphasised the importance of understanding and explaining social 
functioning in terms of human cognition and suggested that deficient understanding of 
another’s mental state, might lead to antisocial behaviour (Richell et al., 2003). The 
proposed research will draw and expand upon my past research (Spenser, 2011) and 
examine deficits in ToM, Empathic Understanding and Moral Reasoning in young 
offenders across broader age groups and both genders. The earlier identification of deficits 
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in these skills and the subsequent ability to deliver more specific interventions, in addition 
to the traditional socio-structural interventions, would arguably have more success in 
reducing offending and reoffending rates in the UK.   
Ethics 
Guidelines will be adhered to and ethical approval will be sought from the following 
bodies: 
 The BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009).  
 The National Offender Management Services and prison services 
 NTU 
The boundaries of informed consent, confidentiality and my own professional conduct and 
competency will be thoroughly considered and reviewed throughout the research.  
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Information Sheet 
Understanding the Thoughts and Feelings of Other People 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information 
Who is doing the Research? 
My Name is Karin. I work at Nottingham Trent University and as part of my job I also do 
some research here at xxxx 
What is the research? 
I am interested in how you think when you try to understand other people’s behaviour.  
For example, do you... 
o Put yourself in their shoes?   
o Do you recognise if they are happy or angry? 
o Can you see both sides of an argument?  
How have the participants been chosen? 
The group I would like to interview are men under the age of 25 who can speak English. 
You will all be volunteers who have said that you are interested in taking part in my 
research. The research was advertised on xxxx 
What sort of questions will be asked? 
The research is made up of 6 sets of questions.  
 
1. Understanding feelings (1).  I will read out loud 22 sentences.  For example I may read 
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‘I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes’. After each sentence I will ask you if 
you agree or disagree with what I have read. There is no right or wrong answers. It is just 
your opinion. 
2. Understanding feelings (2).  I will read out loud 10 short sentences. I will ask you if you 
agree or disagree with what I have read. I will then ask you to think of something that you 
have done which demonstrates this. There is no right or wrong answers. It is just your 
opinion. 
3. Recognising Emotions. I will show you 18 photographs and I will ask you what the 
person was feeling. For example I may ask ‘Is this person feeling happy, surprised, 
confused or playful’. There is no right or wrong answers. It is just your opinion. 
4. Recognising Rudeness. I will read out loud 10 stories. For example I may read 
‘Christine had an interview for a new job. She decided to buy a new dress to wear to the 
interview and thought it would also do for her 50th birthday party. When she finally got on 
the bus to go home she had her hands full, so the bus conductor told her not to worry about 
showing him her OAP bus pass’. I will then ask you after each story if anyone said 
something that could have offended another person.  Again, there is no right or wrong 
answer. It is just your opinion.  
5. The Right Thing to Do. This consists of 10 statements. I will read each one out loud. For 
example I may read ‘How important is it for people to keep their promises to friends?’ I 
will then ask you if you think it is very important, important or not very important. There is 
no right or wrong answers. It is just your opinion. 
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6.  Verbal /Non-Verbal Aptitudes Measure. This is a set of four tests. Some are word 
based. For example I might say a word and ask you what it means or I might give you a 
few shapes and ask you to arrange them in a certain way. This test is done with people 
from 4 to 84 years of age and is really quite fun! 
Where will the research be done? 
The research will be done in an interview room in xxxxx. 
(A member of the prison staff will be outside the interview room door at all times)  
How long will the questions take? 
The questions will take no more than 1 hour and 10 minutes but if you need a short break 
during the session that will be ok.  
Are there any benefits for participants? 
It is your choice whether or not you would like to take part in my research.  
It will take up a little of your time but there are no other disadvantages to taking part. 
However there aren’t any special rewards either. Taking part will have no effect on your 
sentence plan or anything else that happens to you in HMP xxx.  
How will the information be used? 
There are no right or wrong answers; I only want your opinion. However each answer you 
give me will be given a score. I will use these scores to compare your answers to the 
answers other people have given me. I can then work out the different thinking processes 
that are being used by different people when they try to understanding the behaviour or 
beliefs of others. The results of the research should help the prison service think about the 
way it works with people.  I will write a report on the findings for my university and a 
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summary for prison staff.  I might also talk about them at a conference.  There will be 
nothing to identify you in any of these reports. 
Will the information be kept confidential? 
Your answers are private and confidential. They will only be used in this research. I will 
not be given your name. I will only know you by your prison number. The only people 
who will have access to this information are me and my supervisors at Nottingham Trent 
University. However, there are some types of information, which if given to me, I would 
have to disclose. For example:  
 If you told me that you intended to harm yourself or someone else 
 If you knew about something that threatened the security of the prison. 
 If you (or someone known to you) had broken prison rules. 
 If you gave me information about a crime you (or someone known to you) had 
committed but for which you (or they) had not been not charged). 
How will the information be stored? 
 During the research the information you give me will be stored on a password protected 
computer. Hard copies of the information (during and after the research is over) will be 
kept in a secure storage place at Nottingham Trent University along with other confidential 
documents. The information will be kept for five years following the publication of the 
research findings and then it will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the information after that? 
We will destroy it by cross shredding. 
Can participants change their mind? 
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Your involvement in my research is voluntary.  If you decide you don’t want to do it, you 
can stop at any time during the interview without giving me a reason. If you decide you do 
not want your information to be included in my research when the interview is over, you 
have 14 days to tell me and I will remove it. You will need to quote your prison number to 
me as I won’t have any other details about you.  You can do this by contacting: (name to be 
provided). 
Why is the information needed? 
This study will help me understand how you think when you try to understand other people 
behaviour. It will tell me if you recognise and understand other people’s thoughts, 
emotions and behaviours and whether you are able to put yourself in their shoes.  
(The information will help the prison service to develop courses which will help to 
improve offender’s abilities in these areas. This might then help offenders from re-
offending* Delete for non-offenders)  
Complaints  
If you were unhappy with any part of my research you can contact my supervisor at 
Nottingham Trent University. Her details will be given to you after the interview on a 
debrief form. 
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Consent Form 
Understanding the Thoughts and Feelings of Other People 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research project. This is a summary of the 
information sheet which you have already read. 
My name is Karin and I work at Nottingham Trent University. 
 
I am looking at the different ways of thinking used by people when they try to understand 
the behaviour or beliefs of others people. For example, do you... 
o Put yourself in their shoes?   
o Do you recognise what they are feeling ...if they are happy or angry for 
example? 
o Can you see both sides of an argument? 
All of my participants are men under between the ages of 18 and 24 years or over 25 years. 
All are volunteers who have who have said that they are interested in taking part in my 
research. 
The research consists of eight sets of questions.  The questions are about Understanding 
Feelings, Social Stories and Thinking about Social Situations.   I will read some statements 
or stories to you and then I will ask you some questions. There are no right or wrong 
answers. I am only asking for your opinion. It will take no more than 1 hour 10 minutes. 
Your answers are private and confidential. They will only be used in this research. I will 
not be given your name. I will only know you by your prison number. The only people 
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who will have access to this information are me and my supervisor at Nottingham Trent 
University. 
However, there are some types of information, which if given to me, I would have to 
disclose. For example: 
 If you told me that you intended to harm yourself or someone else 
 If you knew about something that threatened the security of the prison. 
 If you (or someone known to you) had broken prison rules. 
 If you gave me information about a crime you (or someone known to you) had 
committed but for which you (or they) had not been not charged.  
 
Consent 
By completing this form you are confirming that you have read and understood all of the 
information provided on the information sheet and that you are happy to take part in my 
research. 
 
Unique Number                                                    Date 
                      --------------------------------------            --------------------------------- 
Witness                                                               Date 
                       --------------------------------------           ----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
329 
 
Debrief Document 
Understanding the Thoughts and Feelings of Other People 
Thank you for taking part in my research project 
The Research 
My study is about the different ways of thinking which are used by people when they try to 
understand the behaviour or beliefs of others.  
 
For example, do you... 
o Put yourself in their shoes?   
o Do you recognise what they are feeling ...if they are happy or angry for 
example? 
o Can you see both sides of an argument? 
I want to understand what those ways of thinking are and how different people use them. 
My study looks at men between the ages of 18 and 24 years or over 25 years from two 
different places: xxxx  
If you change your mind? Your right to withdraw. 
Your involvement in my research is voluntary.  If you decide you don’t want your 
information to be included in my research when the interview is over, you have 14 days to 
tell me and I will remove it. You will need to quote your prison number to me as I won’t 
have any other details about you.  You can do this by contacting wing psychologist. 
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More Information 
Should you want more information about the project or wish to see the results of the 
research you can do this by contacting: 
Support 
If today’s interview has raised any questions or issues for which you would like support, 
this can be obtained by contacting xxxx 
(your personal officer, a member of staff from the offender management unit, the 
psychology department within the prison or a listener* Delete for non-offenders). 
Complaints  
In the unlikely event that you are unhappy with any part of the research project you can 
contact my supervisor at Nottingham Trent University. Her details are as follows:  
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Task 1: Basic Theory on Mind Task 
 
The ‘False Belief’ or Letter Task (Samson, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
The ‘False Belief’ or Letter Task – Response Sheet 
Letter Task 
Participant Number ............................................... 
Instructions 
Please look at the following pictures and note where you think the woman will look for her 
ball. 
In the left-hand basket  
In the middle basket 
In the right-hand basket 
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Task 2: Theory of Mind – Verbal Test  
 
Social Stories Questionnaire (S.S.Q) 
 
ALL INFORMATION REMAINS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
 
Unique Participant Reference Number ......................................................... 
 
Instructions 
 
This questionnaire contains 10 short stories that involve people saying things that could 
upset other people. 
Please read each of the stories and then answer the questions that appear below each 
section. 
When the question asks for a yes or no answer, please do not tick only one box. 
When marking the line that shows the thing that could have upset someone, please colour 
in the red dot at the beginning of the line. 
Please try and imagine how an average person would feel when answering the questions. 
Please don’t spend too long on each question. 
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Story 1 
 
A) Christine had seen the advertisement. ‘Shop assistant wanted for weekends and some evenings. Full training provided’. So, 
the following morning she went to town looking for a new dress to wear at the interview. Even though it was quite expensive 
she chose the blue one. She thought she would be able to wear to her own 50th birthday party later in the year.  
o    The assistant said, ‘It seems to match your eyes’. 
o    ‘Do you think so’, said Christine. 
o    ‘Oh yes,’ said the assistant, ‘It highlights them beautifully. 
Christine paid for the dress and went to catch her bus home. As she sat down the young conductor walked past,  
o   ‘Don’t bother to show me your bus pass’, he said, ‘I can see you’ve got  
       your hands full’.  
                    Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
    offended someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                                    No – move on to next section 
 
B) o    ‘A single to Nottingham,’ said Christine.  
o    ‘Is it busy in town’, said the conductor. 
o    ‘It wasn’t too bad earlier’, said Christine, ‘but it’s getting busy now’.  
The next morning Christine went to the shop where the job had been advertised. She walked up to man who looked like he 
was about 30. She asked him if she could see Mrs Ross the manager. After a few minutes a tall woman in her twenties came 
from the office at the side of the shop. 
o   ‘Hello I’m Gail Ross’, she said, ‘You wanted to see me?’  
o   ‘Yes’, said ‘Christine, it’s about the job you advertised, is it still  
      available?’ 
                           Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                                offended someone? 
                                          Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                                          No – move on to next section 
C)  o    ‘Yes’, said Mrs Ross, ‘are you asking for yourself, or someone else?’ 
              o    ‘For me’, said Christine. 
              o    ‘Have you had any experience’, said Mrs Ross. 
              o    ‘No’, said Christine, ‘but I’m willing to be fully trained’. 
              o     ‘Oh’, said Mrs Ross, ‘Well you’re not what we are looking for. We  
                      want someone with experience’.    
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                                          Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                                                offended someone?  
                                                         Yes – Indicate which line it was on    
                                                        No – move on to next section 
 
Story 2  
A) Amy was looking forward to fancy dress party all week. She had put a lot of effort into her costume and she was very pleased 
with it.  
o    ‘Are you sure my hair looks ok?’ asked Amy looking in the mirror. 
o    ‘It looks great’ replied Fred putting on his mask and cape, ‘come on the  
        taxi is waiting’.  
Fred gave the babysitter his mobile number in case of emergencies. 
       Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
             someone?  
                        Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                        No – move on to next section 
 
B) As the taxi arrived at the party, Amy was very excited. 
o   ‘It’s here on the left’, she said to the driver.  
o   ’No problem’, replied the driver.  
o   ‘Right here we go’, said Amy to Fred, ‘I hope they appreciate my hard  
       work’.  
o   ‘I’m sure they will’, said Fred from behind his mask.  
When Amy got out of the taxi she was so excited she bumped into a woman on the street.  
o   ‘I’m sorry’, said Amy.  
o    ‘Look where you are going, you stupid cow!’ replied the woman. 
          Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                someone? 
                        Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                        No – move on to next section 
 
C) o ‘I said I was sorry’, said Amy, but the woman just kept on walking.  
o ‘Three fifty’, said the taxi driver.  
After ringing the door bell, Toby opened the door.  
o    ‘I love your costumes’, he said, ‘my goodness Amy are you pregnant?’  
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o    ‘Sorry we’re late’, said Fred.  
o    ‘Don’t worry’, said Toby, ‘lots of people haven’t arrived yet’.  
             Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended 
                   someone? 
                                      Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                                      No – move on to next section 
Story 3 
A) Billy moved into his new flat at the weekend. It was more expensive than his last one but he could just about afford it because 
he had an evening job. The next week he bought some new curtains, a coffee table and a rug. The following weekend his 
friend, Keith came to have a look at it.  
o ‘So this is your new place?’ said Keith, ‘Very nice, you must be on good  
     money these days’.  
o ‘I wish’, said Billy. ‘I can only afford it because I work nights as a bouncer  
     at the nightclub’. 
o ‘Oh just think about all the fresh air you’ll get, standing outside’, said  
     Keith.  
      Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
            someone?  
                                 Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                                 No – move on to next section 
 
B) o   ‘Oh, would you look at that rug’, said Keith, ‘It looks like you spilt  something on it. Did you really pay good money for 
that?’  
o   ‘Yes, so do you want to go to the pub or shall we get a take away?’ said Billy.  
o   ‘You decide, I’m easy’, said Keith.  
o   ‘Well’, said Billy, ‘I fancy a curry. 
o   ‘OK’, said Keith, ‘Eat in or shall we go out’. 
o    ‘It’s Saturday night’, said Billy, ‘Let’s go out’.  
        Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
              someone? 
                                 Yes – Indicate which line it was on  
                                 No – move on to next section 
 
C) Ten minutes later Billy had changed and was ready to go out. He had on his favourite jeans and a new T-shirt. He thought he 
looked good.  
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o ‘Are you ready’, asked Billy. 
o ‘I’ve been ready for ages!’ said Keith.   
Keith and Billy left the flat and walked towards the high street. They bumped into an old man.  
o ‘Sorry’, said the old man, ’I was miles away’.   
o ‘It’s OK’, said Keith.  
o ‘Fancy a pint, first’, said Billy.  
o ‘Yes’, said Keith. 
                     Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended 
                            someone? 
                                              Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                              No – move on to next section 
Story 4 
A) Brian Johnson was not impressed with his new radio. Two of the knobs had fallen off and the display panel was cracked. He 
had bought it two weeks earlier; just before he went on holiday. He decided to take it back to the shop. He had to go into town 
anyway to get some new shoes. He’d just been in the third shop and could find anything he liked, when he heard an assistant 
call out to him.  
o ‘Excuse me sir, are you Mr Johnson?’  
o ‘Yes’, said Brain.  
o ‘It’s Amy, sir, I used to be in your form at school’ said the assistant. 
o ‘Oh, I remember you’, said Brian, ‘managed to get a job then?’  
o ‘Yes’, said Amy, ‘I’ve been here about a year now’.   
                Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                     someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
B) Amy told Brian all about her interview and how she felt when they offered her the job.  
o  ‘Are you still enjoying it?’ asked Brian.  
o  ‘It’s not too bad’, said Amy, ‘and I get a day off in the week’. 
o  ‘A day off in the week?’ asked Brian, ‘You’ve landed on your feet!’  
o  ‘Can I help you with anything?’ asked Amy. 
               Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                    someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
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C) o ‘No’, said Brian, ‘I was just looking, I’m fine. I better get going. Look after  
     yourself Amy’. 
Brian left the shop and walked down the street until he came to the electrical shop where he’d bought the radio. He walked in 
and saw a young man behind the counter. 
o ‘Hello’, said Brian, ‘I have a bit of a problem, can I speak to the manager,  only it’s a bit complicated’. 
            Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                 someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
Story 5 
A. Julie and Tom hadn’t been away on holiday since last May. So when a weekend came up where they had nothing to do, 
they decided to get in the car and drive to the coast. They needed to fill up with petrol. Tom had just got the car and he 
didn’t know how much petrol it would take to fill the tank. The numbers kept spinning round and he got worried. When 
it got to £35 he decided to stop. He went inside to pay the woman behind the counter. He was looking at the road maps. 
o   ‘Do you have any more road maps’, he asked the woman. 
o ‘That’s all we’ve got’, she said. 
o ‘Only I wanted one with more detail on it’, Tom said. 
o ‘That’s all we’ve got.... sorry’, replied the woman.  
o  ‘Never mind’, said Tom, ‘Pump number 1 please’. 
            Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                 someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
B. o  ‘£35 please. Do you want a receipt?’ droned the woman. 
o  ‘No thanks’, said Tom handing the woman the money, ‘Isn’t petrol  expensive these days?’ 
Tom got back in the car and they continued on their journey. After 40 minutes they noticed a farmhouse with a B&B 
sign.  
o ‘This looks Ok’, said Julie, ‘Let’s go and see how much it is’. 
They rang the bell and a woman in a blue dress came to the door. 
o ‘Can I help you?’ she said. 
            Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                  someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
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C. o ‘Do you have any vacancies?’ asked Julie. 
o  ‘Yes we do’, replied the woman, ‘’I’ve got a nice double overlooking the meadow, its £50 a  night. But the room at 
the side might be more in your price range’. 
o  ‘Oh’, said Julie.’ Is it Ok if we have a look at it?’ 
o ‘ Yes’, said the woman, ‘Come on in’. 
             Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
                   someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
Story 6 
A. Samantha was clearing a table in the cafe at the seaside where she worked. It seemed like the millionth time that day. She 
piled the dirty dishes on her tray and noticed that a couple on the next table were about to leave. She decided to clear their 
cups away too. 
o ‘Do you mind if I take these?’ asked Samantha. 
o ‘No that’s fine’, said the woman, ‘Do you live here?’ 
o ‘Yes, I grew up here. I’ve been away. I’ve just come back to work the summer season, this is my second day,’ she replied. 
o ‘Good,’ said the woman, ‘You might be able to tell me where we can find a  bit of life after 10 o’clock at night’, said the 
woman. 
                    Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                         offended someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
B. o ‘Oh, if it’s a bit of life you want you’ve come to the wrong place’, said  
    Samantha, ‘the town   is pretty but that’s as far as it goes’. 
The couple looked disappointed. 
o ‘You could always try Tourmouth, it’s a couple of miles that way’, added Samantha.  
o ‘Thanks’, said the woman. 
A bit later Samantha went for her break. As she walked down the high street she realised how much she had missed the place. 
She then bumped into the woman who owned the corner shop. 
o ‘Hello, Mrs Jones’, said Samantha. 
                    Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                          offended someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
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C. o ‘Hello Samantha’, said Mrs Jones, ‘Are you home for good now?’ 
o ‘Just here for the summer season’, said Samantha. I’m working at the cafe on the sea front. How is Mr Jones? Does he still 
get grumpy with kids coming into the shop?’ 
o ‘He died last winter’, said Mrs Jones. 
o ‘I’m sorry to hear that’, said Samantha. 
o ‘ That’s OK’, said Mrs Jones, ‘Stop by the shop some time for a chat’. 
                    Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                         offended someone? 
                                   Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                   No – move on to next section 
Story 7 
A. Linda was nervous. She was about to introduce her new boyfriend, James, to her friends, Faye and Alex. She was nervous 
because they had really like her last boyfriend, Keith. She was also nervous because she had just spoken to her old best friend 
Kate. Kate and Linda had been best friends at school but when they left Kate had got a job in another town and they had lost 
touch. That was five years ago. Bt Kate was back and wanted to meet up tonight. 
At 7pm the door bell rang and Linda opened the door to see Kate standing there. 
o ‘Hello stranger’, said Linda,’ Come on in’. 
o ‘Crikey, there’s a few more lines on that face than I remembered’, said  
    Kate. 
o ‘Well it’s been a few years. What brings you back? ‘         
                      Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                            offended someone? 
                                            Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                             No – move on to next section 
 
B. o ‘Just came back to see my mum’, replied Kate. 
o ‘Oh,’ said Linda, ‘Do you want a drink?’ 
The others arrived shortly afterwards and to Linda’s relief everyone was getting on really well.   
                    Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                         offended someone? 
                                            Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                             No – move on to next section 
 
a. Linda had cooked a meal of roast beef. Just after she had dished it out she realised she’d forgotten to ask James if 
he was vegetarian.  
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o ‘Great meal, Linda’, said James to Linda’s relief. 
Later when she was making coffee with Faye and Alex she realised she was out of milk.  Faye carried the black 
coffee into the living room. 
o ‘Sorry Keith, you don’t mind it black do you?’ 
o ‘No’, he replied. 
                    Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                         offended someone?  
                                             Yes – Indicate which line it was on    
                                              No – move on to next section 
Story 8 
A. Valerie had moved to England from America. She had a new job, a new flat and a new car. She wanted to look around the 
place that she had moved to.  She got a guide book and decided to visit a castle that it said was ‘stunning’. When she got there 
Valerie was disappointed. It didn’t look stunning to her. 
o ‘How much is it to get in?’ she asked the man at the kiosk. 
o  ‘£4 for adults and £2.50 for children’, he replied even though it was  
     obvious she didn’t have a child with her. 
o ‘Is there anything else to see as well as the castle?’, asked Valerie. 
o ‘Well’, he answered, ‘There’s some brass rubbings and arrow heads’. 
               Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                    offended someone? 
                                                       Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                                        No – move on to next section 
 
B. o ‘It’s not much of a castle’, said Valerie, ‘Are there any turrets or anything?’ 
o ‘This is the site of a very old fortress, madam’, the man replied. 
o ‘Oh, I see’, said Valerie, ‘One adult then please.’ 
Valerie looked round for an hour. Then she felt thirsty and decided to visit the cafe. Ahead of her in the queue where two old 
ladies. 
o ‘Have you been here before?’ one old lady asked the other. 
                   Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                         offended someone? 
                                      Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                       No – move on to next section 
C. o ‘I’ve been to the ruins’, answered the second old lady, ‘but not to the cafe’. 
o ‘Is that a terrace I can see?’ replied the first old lady, ‘shall we go out?’ 
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o ‘Oh, yes’, said the first old lady, ‘we’ll get a great view of the castle. That is if there is any space, it’s usually full of 
Americans!’ 
o ‘Lets go and look’, said the second old lady. 
                                 Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have  
                                       offended someone? 
                                                      Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                                        No – move on to next section 
 
Story 9 
A. Bob worked a tyre fitting company. He didn’t like going to the parties organised by the company he worked for. He went this 
time because the people he worked with had gone on and on at him. He was trying to talk to George, Richard and Steve. It 
was really difficult because there was a really noisy woman in a purple dress behind them. 
o ‘My god’, said Bob, ‘That woman’s got a loud voice’. 
o ‘Yes’, said George. 
Bob decided to go the bar to get some more drinks. When he got there he saw a tall man with black hair. 
o ‘Bob isn’t it’, said the tall man. 
 
      Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended someone?  
                                       Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                       No – move on to next section 
 
B. o ‘Yes’, said Bob, ‘You’re than guy who was transferred to a different site  aren’t you?’ 
o ‘Yes’, said the man, ‘My names Sean’.  
o ‘I worked there for a bit last year’, said Bob, ‘I really liked it’. 
o ‘Why don’t you ask to be transferred?’ said Sean. 
o  ‘I might’, said Bob 
       Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  someone? 
                                        Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                        No – move on to next section 
 
C. o ‘So do you like it?’ asked Bob 
o ‘Yeah’, said Sean,’ the people are great’. 
Bob collected his drinks and was about to walk away when he heard two of the girls from accounts talking. 
o ‘You remember that dress I told you about’, said Liz,’ It’s the one that  Georges wife  is wearing’. 
o ‘You mean the purple one you wanted?’ said Jo 
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o ‘Yeah’, said Liz.  
        Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended some 
                                    Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                     No – move on to next section 
 
Story 10 
A. Ryan had a doctor’s appointment so he took the morning off work. He got to where his doctors were a bit early so he decided 
to go shopping. He wanted some new lights for his bike. The assistant explained that people usually went for one of two 
makes. She explained the difference but there didn’t seem to be much in it. 
o ‘The bulbs on these ones cost twice as much as those one’, she said, ‘but  
     they last longer’. 
o ‘They are still very popular and we’ve had no problems with them’. She  
    added. 
o ’OK’, said Ryan ‘I’ll take them’. 
o ‘OK’, said the assistant, ‘Do you want us to fit them?’ 
o ‘I assume there’s an extra charge for that?’ asked Ryan  
         Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
              someone? 
                                    Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                     No – move on to next section 
 
B. o ‘Yes £2’ said the assistant. 
o ’No don’t worry’, said Ryan, ‘I’ll do it myself’. 
Ryan gave her the money and put his lights in his rucksack and left the shop.   Later Ryan was sitting in the doctor’s waiting 
room reading a paper. 
o ‘Ryan Jones’ called Dr Hughs voice into the otherwise silent waiting room.  
Ryan got up feeling really self-conscious and went into the doctor’s office. 
o ‘So what wrong with you today? Said Dr Hughs. 
          Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  
               someone? 
                                    Yes – Indicate which line it was on 
                                     No – move on to next section 
 
C. Ryan told her about that over the last three months he’d had problems at work and that because of all the bickering at home 
he couldn’t sleep.  
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o ‘I don’t know what to suggest’, said the doctor, ‘maybe you need a holiday,  or improve   things at home and the other 
problems might go away’. 
o ‘I’d like to but I can’t. There are already two people off at work at the minute and it’s really busy’, said Ryan. 
o ‘ I’m only telling you what I think would be good for you and your health’,  said the doctor 
o ‘ Yes, I know’, said Ryan 
              Q. Was anything said that in that section that could have offended  someone 
Yes – Indicate which line it wa 
 No – move on to next section 
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Task 3: Theory of Mind – Visual Test 
 
Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
jealous panicked 
 
 
arrogant hateful 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
playful comforting 
 
 
irritated bored 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
terrified upset 
 
 
arrogant annoyed 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
joking flustered 
 
 
desire convinced 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
joking insisting 
 
 
amused relaxed 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
irritated sarcastic 
 
 
worried friendly 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aghast fantasizing 
 
 
impatient alarmed 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
apologetic friendly 
 
 
uneasy dispirited 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
despondent relieved 
 
 
shy excited 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
annoyed hostile 
 
 
horrified preoccupied 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cautious insisting 
 
 
bored aghast 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
terrified amused 
 
 
regretful flirtatious 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
indifferent embarrassed 
 
 
sceptical dispirited 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decisive anticipating 
 
 
threatening shy 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
irritated disappointed 
 
 
depressed accusing 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contemplative flustered 
 
 
encouraging amused 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
irritated thoughtful 
 
 
encouraging sympathetic 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
doubtful affectionate 
 
 
playful aghast 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
decisive amused 
 
 
aghast bored 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
arrogant grateful 
 
 
sarcastic tentative 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dominant friendly 
 
 
guilty horrified 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
embarrassed fantasizing 
 
 
confused panicked 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
preoccupied grateful 
 
 
insisting imploring 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contented apologetic 
 
 
defiant curious 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pensive irritated 
 
 
excited hostile 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
panicked incredulous 
 
 
despondent interested 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
alarmed shy 
 
 
hostile anxious 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
joking cautious 
 
 
arrogant reassuring 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interested joking 
 
 
affectionate contented 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
impatient aghast 
 
 
irritated reflective 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
grateful flirtatious 
 
 
hostile disappointed 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ashamed confident 
 
 
joking dispirited 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
serious ashamed 
 
 
bewildered alarmed 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
embarrassed guilty 
 
 
fantasizing concerned 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aghast baffled 
 
 
distrustful terrified 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
puzzled nervous 
 
 
insisting contemplative 
36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ashamed nervous 
 
 
suspicious indecisive 
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Task 4: Empathic Understanding - Self Report  
 
ALL INFORMATION REMAINS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
Unique Participant Reference Number ......................................................... 
 
 
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a 
conversation. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
2. I really enjoy caring for other people. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
3. I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
4. I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or 
polite. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
5. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts 
rather than on what my listener might be thinking. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
6. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but 
means another. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
7. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so 
much. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
8. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's shoes. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
9. I am good at predicting how someone will feel. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
10. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling 
awkward or uncomfortable. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
11. I can't always see why someone should have felt 
offended by a remark. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
12. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
13. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how strongly slightly slightly strongly 
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they are feeling and what they are thinking. agree agree disagree disagree 
14. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored 
with what I am saying. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
15. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they 
say that I am very understanding. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
16. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person 
doesn't tell me. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
17. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I 
don’t always see why. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
18. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and 
intuitively. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
19. I can easily work out what another person might want to 
talk about. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
20. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
21. I am good at predicting what someone will do. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
22. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's 
problems. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree  
Strongly 
disagree 
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Task 5: Performance-based measured in booklet. 
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6: Moral Reasoning Test 
 
  
Social Reflection Questionnaire 
 
 
        Unique Participant Reference Number ......................................................... 
 
1. How important is it for people to keep their promises to friends? 
 
                VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
2. How important is it to keep promises to anybody, even if they are strangers? 
 
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
3. How important is it for parents to keep their promises to their children? 
 
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
4. Do you think that the truth should be told at all times? 
 
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?............................................................................................................................... 
 
5. How important is it for children to help their parents? 
 
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?............................................................................................................................... 
 
  
 
41  
 
 
 
 
6. Let’s say you are the only one who can help a friend and without your help they may 
dies. How important is it for a person (without losing their own lives) to save the life 
of a friend? 
 
                VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
7. How important is it for a person (without losing their own life) to save the life of a 
stranger? 
 
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
 
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
8. How important is it for a person to live even if they don’t want to? 
  
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT    
 
 
Why?............................................................................................................................... 
 
9. How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people?  
 
               VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT             
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
10. How important is it for people to obey the law? 
 
                 VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
                 
Why?...............................................................................................................................  
 
11.  How important is it for judges to send people who break the law to jail? 
 
                VERY IMPORTANT                IMPORTANT            NOT IMPORTANT 
                 
Why?............................................................................................................................... 
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Task 7: In booklet. 
